Robbins SCE Research
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I & G Robbins file RCMP Complaint to COMM'R, Re: July 14, 2014 BC State sanctioned home invasion (millions $$ lost) (Vol 2)
  Mar 26, 2021

Commentary
Continued from March 28, 2021 (Canada Polls) {Personal Liability s. 21(1)}.
(GPR: Supreme Court of Canada McCulloch v Murray {1942} S.C.R. 141 Date: 1942-02-03 (reader should note for context very few cases on the subject), Per the Chief Justice @ page 142:
“Comment as to attempting to define or replace by paraphrased the phrases “gross negligence” or “wilful and wanton misconduct”, and observations as to a trial judge’s duty in assisting a jury in an action based upon said enactment. The said phrases imply conduct in which, if there is not conscious wrongdoing, there is very marked departure from the standards by which responsible and competent people (in charge of motor vehicles habitually govern themselves). Subject to that, it is entirely a question of fact for the jury whether conduct falls within the category of one or other of said phrases”
“In this case the jury found gross negligence and stated that the gross negligence consisted in reckless driving. I have no doubt that the jury were entitled on the evidence to find that the appellant’s driving was reckless, and, that having been found, there was, I think, a sufficient basis for their finding that this reckless driving constituted gross negligence.” (GPR: Unlike RCMP member police officers and other designations of police officers the driver in this case was not a “professional” motor vehicle driver. Because the police officer is considered to be professional, it is likely that a higher standard of care and caution would be expected from them). (GPR: “In criminal law and the law of tort, recklessness may be defined as the state of mind where a person deliberately and unjustifiably pursues a course of action while consciously disregarding any risks flowing from such action.” “Recklessness means the person knew (or should have known) that his or her action were likely to cause harm.”)
(GPR: Please cross reference these provisions relating to liability and recklessness - negligence to RCMP Act above under Part IV Conduct “Purposes” Section 36.2: “The purposes of this Part re (a) to establish the responsibility of members; (b) to provide for the establishment of a Code of Conduct that emphasizes the importance of maintaining the public trust and reinforces the high standard of conduct expected by members; (c) to ensure that members are responsible and accountable for the promotion and maintenance of good conduct in the Force; (d) to establish a framework for dealings with contraventions of provisions of the Code of Conduct, in a fair and consistent manner, at the most appropriate level of the Force; and (e) to provide, in relation to the contravention of any provision of the Code of Conduct, for the imposition of conduct measures that are proportionate to the nature and circumstances of the contravention and, where appropriate, that are educational and remedial rather than punitive”; and again from RCMP Act “Responsibilities”: “It is the responsibility of every member (a) to respect the right of all persons; (b) to maintain the integrity of the law, law enforcement and the administration of justice; (c) to perform the member’s duties promptly, impartially and diligently, (GPR see also due diligence) in accordance with the law; (d) to avoid any actual, apparent or potential conflicts of interests; (e) to ensure that any improper or unlawful conduct of any member is not concealed or permitted to continue; (g) to be incorruptible...or otherwise placing the member under any obligation that may prejudice the proper performance of the member’s duties; (g) to act at all times in a courteous, respectful and honourable manner; and (h) to maintain the honour of the Force and its principles and purposes”).
(GPR: And to really throw a wrench is this federal provincial incongruence of legislative drafting from Canada’s Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46) Part XXIII Sentencing (continued)) Purpose and Principles of Sentencing:
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives,..respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (see: “remedial” (“educational”) in the Statute) (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to the victim or to the community. (GPR - difficult in this circumstance to tell the difference between the criminals and the police - a Rolling Stones song in there I believe).
And from the Canadian Criminal Code Section 39 (1) (b) “Contravention of Code of Conduct”: “Every member who is alleged to have contravened a provision of the Code of Conduct (GPR: as opposed to Criminal Code the primary federal Statute pertaining to RCMP and Police Officers (Peace Officers))...whether or not the member has been charged with an offence constituted by, included in or otherwise related to the alleged contravention or has been tried, acquitted, discharged, convicted or sentence by a court in respect of such an offence. (2) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction of any court to try a member for any offence triable by that court.”
Trespass Act (RSBC 2018) Chapter 3 (This Act is current to March 10, 2021).
Definition: “In this Act: “authorized person” means a person authorized by an occupier of premises to exercise a power or perform a duty of the occupier of this Act; “enclosed land” includes land that is (a) surrounded by a lawful fence, (b) surrounded by a natural boundary, (c) surrounded by a lawful fence and a natural boundary, or (d) posted, in accordance with signs prohibiting trespass, “lawful fence” means a lawful fence as defined by regulation, “occupier” in relation to premises, means the following: (a) in the case of premises that are (i) land, including enclosed land, foreshore and land covered by water. (T)he definition of ‘premises’, a person entitled to maintain an action for trespass in respect of those premises, (b) in the case of premises that are property described in paragraph (b) in the case of premises that are property described in paragraph b (ii) or (iii) of the definition of “premises”, a person lawfully entitled to possession of those premises; (d) in any case, a person who has (i) responding for and control over the condition of the premises or the activities carried out on the premises, or (ii) control over persons allowed to enter the premises.” (GPR - “IR” had a new fence built in her backyard which was very private just prior to the home invasion). “Owner”, in relation to land, means a person registered in the land title office as the owner of the estate in fee simple of the land; “premium” means (a) land, including (i) enclosed land, and (ii) foreshore and land covered by water, and (b) anything on the land, including (i) a building or other permanent structure, including a building or permanent structure designed or used for shelter for livestock, (ii) a ship or vessel, train, railway car, vehicle or aircraft, except while in operation, (iii) a trailer or a portable structure designed or used as a a residence, for shelter, including shelter of livestock, or to house a business, and (iv) water; “vehicle” has the same meaning as in the Motor Vehicle Act.”
Trespass prohibited
2 (1) “Subject to section 3, a person who does any of the following commits an offence: (a) enters premises that are enclosed land; (b) enters premises or an authorized person that the activity is prohibited. (2) A person found or in premises that are enclosed land is presumed to be on the premises without the consent of an occupier of the premises or an authorized person. (3) Subject to section 3, a person who has been directed, either orally or in writing, by an occupier of premises or an authorized person to (a) leave the premises, or (b) stop engaging in an activity on or in the premises commits an offence if the person (a) does not leave the premises or stop the activity, as applicable, as soon as practicable after receiving the direction, or (d) re-enters the premises or resumes the activity on or in the premises as applicable.”
Defences to trespass charge
3. “A person may not be convicted of an offence under section 2 in relation to premises if the person’s action or inaction, as applicable to the offence, was with (a) the consent of an occupier of the premises or an authorized person, (b) other lawful authority, or (c) colour of right.” (GPR: “In Canada’s Criminal Code, colour of right is a defence where one forcibly enters land that is in the actual possession of another (section 72), or commits theft of property…”) (GPR: “Colour of right is the legal concept in the UK and other Commonwealth countries of an accused’s permission to the usage or conversion of an asset in the possession of another”). (GPR: Colour of right “means an honest belief that an act is justifiable”).
From R v Dorash, Saskatchewan Court of Appeal - Justice Bayden (credit to duhaime lawyers @ duhaime.org lawyers):
“A colour of right can have its basis in either a mistake of civil law...or in a state of facts. The mistake is each case must give rise to either an honest belief in a propriety or possessing right to the thing which is the subject matter of the alleged theft or an honest belief in the state of facts which if it actually existed would at law justify or excuse the act done.”
From Justice Martin of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Demarco:
“The term colour of right generally, although not exclusively refers to a situation where there is an assertion of a proprietary right to a thing which is the subject-matter of the alleged theft.” “One who is honestly asserting what he believes to be an honest claim cannot be said to act without colour of right, even though it may be unfounded in law or in fact.” “The term colour of right is also used to denote an honest belief in the state of facts which, if it actually existed, would at law justify or excuse the act done.” “The term (colour of right) when used in the latter sense is merely a particular application of the doctrine of mistake of fact.”
(GPR: So, when Consolidated Bailiffs private sheriff service attends to 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC in the mid morning of July 14, 2014 with a moving company and two RCMP Officers from Coquitlam detachment in tow with a Writ of Seizure signed by the Deputy Registrar of the Vancouver courthouse, BC Supreme Court, they MAY have a mistaken belief of colour of right, however, in no circumstance can the RCMP say that they do, because the RCMP have no lawful right to the colour of right claim, because they have no statutory role in the foreclosure process, nor is there any provincial law (as in roadside checks) which provides them the excuse. The RCMP, claimed in Statute are apparently trained, one would assume therefore that both RCMP Officers attending that morning, had to know, or should have known that would not have any such defence in the event of mistake of facts, should a mistake arise as it did in this circumstance. Did the RCMP possess a warrant? Answer “No”. Did the RCMP possess an order from the BC Supreme Court stipulating their attendance? Answer: “No”. Did the Bailiffs possess a valid vacant possession order? Answer: “No”).
When Glen P. Robbins told both the Bailiffs and RCMP (politely) to leave and informed them of their mistake... (the vacant possession order was obtained during a stay of execution and was a fraud on the court), {the writ of seizure order normally follows a vacant possession order the first signed by an authorized person at the court}, the latter must be signed by a judge} did they leave as the law demands? Answer: “No”.
In the instance of the foreclosure process under H130330, the Judge (Smith) who signed the fraudulently obtained vacant possession order, likely was also mistaken belief that the ex parte application of crooked *Jewish lawyer Ronald Bakonyi was legitimate (though this is a little hard to believe given the court file should have been provided to him, and the ex parte nature of the application ought to have triggered a competent judge to do a little investigation)...both Bailiff and RCMP should have departed the premises, performed due diligence to obtain the facts and obtained advice as to next steps.
This ought to have been sufficient for both Consolidated Bailiff and their underlings the RCMP to reasonably question their colour of right. When Glen P. Robbins informed both the Bailiff and the Police to contact their superiors, this should have added to reasonable and serious trepidation regarding colour of right, but it did not. The RCMP flatly refused to contact their Supervisor, while the Bailiff telephoned *Jewish-crook lawyer ® Ron Bakonyi -. Bakonyi responded by attempting to negotiate a deal through the Bailiffs, whereby Ita Robbins would consent to a Conduct of Sale order in a written email from Ita Robbins and once this was done would call off the Bailiffs and the Police. (The Appeal of the Conduct of Sale was dismissed on ex parte application by Bakonyi by BC Justice Davies, (like the vacant possession order) during a Stay of Execution and fraud upon the court). (Bakonyi also obtained a dismissal of GPR’s application to be added as party under similar fraud).
When Glen P. Robbins refused Bakonyi’s offer, Bakonyi directed the Bailiffs to order the RCMP to detain Glen P. Robbins and anyone else who denied the theft of the Robbins house, possessions (and land). The two very stupid RCMP Officers and over zealous (very stupid as well) private Sheriffs hearing this, should have run, not walked, from the premises. Instead, under threat of RCMP physical arrest (they have guns) Glen P. Robbins was detained and made to stand on the other side of the street while his wife sobbed and neighbours watched the humiliating events unfold.
There was no mistake that a dispute regarding the colour of right was more than likely, and even if were not, it was sufficient that the RCMP should have certainly second guessed their attendance, while Bailiffs operating under the Sheriff Act should have left too. Had they done so, and Glen P. Robbins was shown to be incorrect, the Petitioner and its lawyer Bakonyi could then in legitimate circumstances have applied to the Court and asked for further direction or orders and passed on any costs to the Respondent Ita Robbins through Special Costs. Bakonyi could not have done this, because he was deep into the fraud and Contempt of Court which would have been discovered, instead he, the Bailiffs, and the very stupid, poorly trained RCMP officers, gambled, detained Glen P. Robbins was under threat of arrest, and threatened to detain or arrest both his wife, the homeowner and his daughter VR (“Jane Doe”).
This was NO mistake in colour of right. Colour of Right was unequivocally held by Ita and Glen Robbins on that Day.
In another BC Supreme Court involving BC Justice Barry Davies and an Asian female respondent illegally operating a hostel in her North Vancouver townhouse, lawyers for the Petitioner went back to Court numerous times including obtaining a Contempt order against the Respondent BEFORE applying successfully for a Court Order authorizing police attendance. (GPR - not a surprise given the preferential treatment granted to visible minorities over the majority).
6 (1) “On the demand of an occupier of premises, or of an authorized person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is on or in the premises, or was on the premises, in contravention of section 2 (1) or (3) the person must provide the person’s correct name and address to the occupier or authorized person.” 6 (2) “A person who contravenes subsection (1) committed an offence.” 6 (3) “A person who contravenes subsection (1) and remains on the premises commits an offence.”
Arrest without warrant
7 (1) “In this section, “peace officer” means (a) a peace officer, as described in paragraph © of the definition of “peace officer” in section 29 of the Interpretation Act….” 7 (2) “A peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found on or in premises if the police officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that the person is committing an offence under section 2 in relation to the premises.” 7 (3) “If a peace officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a person has committed an offence under section 2 and has recently departed from the premises, the peace officer may arrest the person without warrant if (a) the person refuses to give the person’s name and address to the peace officer on demand, (b) the peace officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that the name or address given by the person to the police officer is false.”
Court may order compensation
8 (1) The Provincial Court on application by an occupier of premises or another person..may order a person convicted of an offence under section 2 in relation to those premises to pay restitution for the damage or loss sustained by the occupier or other persons as a result of the commission of the offence. 8 (2) If an order is made under subsection (1) against a defendant, no action for damage for trespass lies against the defendant for the damage or loss sustained by the occupier or other person as a result of the commission of the offence.” “An occupier (Glen & Ita Robbins) is therefore entitled to use reasonable force both to initiate the status of the arrest and to maintain it.” “The ability to use force is necessary to the efficacy of the arrest power because it often provides a necessary precondition to securing the submission of the person arrested. The use of reasonable force is therefore supported not only by the incidents of arrest at common law..by s. 28 (b) of the Ontario Interpretation Act.” “The latitude shown to police officers,...will not necessarily be shown to an occupier who is under no duty to arrest and who instigates a confrontation with a trespasser.”
The Robbins family property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC was fenced in for privacy and for two dogs (also ordered by the police to be placed in the backyard at time of GPR’s detention under threat of arrest). The back of the property was 50 feet or so from David Street, completely private, while the front door was situated some great distance - from the street. (The backyard fence had been mostly replaced just weeks prior to the state sanctioned home invasion).
R v Asante-Mensah, Neutral Citation: 2003 Supreme Court of Canada 38 (from Ontario Court of Appeal):
“The word “arrest” has a well-understood meaning at common law”. “It is a term of art”. “Unless the content otherwise dictates, the court should interpret the word as it appears in s. 9 of the Trespass to Property Act.” (GPR: the Province of Ontario has a provincial police force, municipal forces and RCMP {while BC has municipal forces and RCMP}). “RCMP “O” Division has primary authority in federal law enforcement in Ontario..(U)nder the authority of the RCMP Act and RCMP Regulations (2014), the Federal Policy mandate is multi-faceted with law enforcement authorities provided under more than 260 Acts)”.
“Otherwise, there is no guidance at all to occupiers about how to arrest somebody, let alone what conduct the occupier is permitted, and conversely, what are the rights of the alleged trespasser?” “Arrest” in the context of the TPA should therefore be seen as a continuing status initiated by words accompanied by physical touching or submission and ending delivery to the police...with a force that is no more than reasonable in all the circumstances. The occupier is permitted the means (reasonable force) to fulfill the duty (delivery of person arrested) to achieve the purpose of the arrest (to terminate the trespass). “The TPA relates to a highly specific and limited offence. The effect of denying the occupier the right to use any degree of force would be to subject him or her to tort claims because of the attempt to deliver the arrested person to the police in compliance with s. 9 (2) of the TPA.” “The legislation should not be taken as intending to lay on the occupier a duty to deliver the person arrested to the police and at the same time impose civil or criminal liability for the use of reasonable force necessary for its fulfillment.”
Sheriff Act (RSBC 1996) Chapter 425
Definitions: “process” includes a writ, petition, warrant or order issued under the seal of the court, or judge’s summons or order, a notice, subpoena and other proceeding at law or otherwise; “warrant of execution” includes an order for seizure and sale issued under the Small Claims Rules; “director” means director of sheriff services. (GPR: Keep in mind, that no order or provision under this Act is in the possession of either the Consolidated Bailiffs or the RCMP at the time they attend to the subject property). Court bailiffs: 3 (3) “Nothing in this section authorizes a court bailiff to execute court orders to arrest persons.” (GPR - Hello, break out the Bubbly). Duties of Directors: 4 (1) “The director is responsible to the minister for (b) the director of sheriff services generally, and (c) the establishment and maintenance of programs for the selection and training of sheriffs and other persons appointed under this Act”. “The director is a sheriff.” Officer of the Court: “A sheriff is an officer of all of the courts in British Columbia.”
Threat or risk assessment: 6.3 (1) “In this section: “threat or risk assessment” means the identifiable and assessment of threats or risks to a person, facility, building or property to which the sheriff has a power, duty or responsibility referred to in section 4.1.” 6.3 (4) “For the purpose of conducting a threat or risk assessment, a sheriff may, if authorized by the director, collect personal information and other information, including, without limitation, (a) personal information that is in the Canadian Police Information Centre database or any other database administered by a law enforcement agency, and (b) personal information that is the custody or control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or any other law enforcement agency.” (GPR: Glen P. Robbins is vetted by the Children & Family MInistry related to a private contract-with deep forensic by RCMP - clean bill of ‘health’ (2019). GPR is vetted on application to the Canadian Senate - including deep forensic RCMP - clean bill of ‘health’ (2016)).
Only the sheriff may serve and execute certain court orders: 7. “A person other than a sheriff appointed under section (2) or 3 must not serve or execute a judgment summons, an order of committal or writ or warrant of execution issued in respect of civil matter.” (GPR: the vicarious liability of RCMP in this circumstance suggests that the bailiffs were in breach by using the RCMP (other person) to effect a civil process.” Solicitor responsible for sheriff’s cost: 9. “A solicitor or other agent whose name appears on any process served by a sheriff is responsible for the fees and expenses of service or execution.” (GPR: did Bakonyi (solicitor for Cambridge Mortgage also pay the RCMP under this section, or did the Bailiffs, or was Bakonyi and the Bailiffs leaning on the taxpayer, placing the RCMP in conflict in the process?)
Regulation of the Lieutenant Governor in Council: 15 (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Lieutenant Governor...may make regulations as follows: (a) in relation to the duties and responsibilities that may be undertaken by sheriffs, authorize the director to determine the circumstances in which duties and responsibilities are under undertaken and powers exercised.” (GPR: The Lieutenant Governor is the Executive Cabinet essentially - were the Bailiffs involved in the state sanctioned home invasion sanctioned by the then BC Liberal government?
From the Alberta Civil Liberties Research Centre:
“Justice, the Police and Human Rights.: “Privacy Rights”, “Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Section 8: Everyone has the Right to be Secure Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure. “The right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure has been interpreted as a right to privacy. It protects individuals against state intrusion into their private life and affairs where those individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.” “As Justice LaForest explained, “grounded in man’s physical and moral autonomy, privacy is essential for the well-being of the individual.” It protects individuals against state intrusion into their private life and offences where those individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
“To be protected by section 8, a person must establish that they have a reasonable right to privacy. This is determined by examining the totality of circumstances surrounding the specific case. This would include factors including, but not limited to, whether the person was present at the time of the search, has control or possession of the property being searched, owned the property being searched, or had a subjective expectation of privacy that was reasonable (R v Edwards (1996) 1 SCR 128 at para 5).
“If a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, any search must be reasonable. To be reasonable a search must satisfy three criteria. It must be: authorized by law, the law which authorizes the search must be reasonable, and the manner in which the search or seizure is conducted must be reasonable. R v Collins, (1987) 1 SCR 65.”
GPR: Because Section 8 is grounded in reasonable expectation of privacy, this presumes the mindset of Ita Robbins and her husband residents at the time at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam BC. Also, because every single bit of property including detached house, land, and other valuable possessions insured in total to nearly $200 a month by Wawanesa Insurance, the RCMP must be considered to have trespassed on their property July 14, 2014 intentionally or through ‘dumb as a rock’ stupidity and abject deficient lack of training (demanded of them under the RCMP Act) in breaching the right to privacy of Ita and Glen Robbins.
Ita Robbins and her mother “FM” were both on (indefeasible) title of the property at the time of the state sanctioned home invasion - so FM also suffered directly from this unlawful activity, even though she did not reside at the property. Glen P. Robbins who had an interest in the property (not indefeasible), and he also possessed a registered Enduring Power of Attorney (registered by legal counsel Ross Davidson) on the property. ((GPR) has also observed the Cullen Commission Inquiry most recently evidence adduced regarding Land Title). “A ‘search’ (GPR breach of presumed privacy) can be authorized in several ways. Most typically, a search is authorized by a warrant. Indeed, when the state can show appropriate circumstances, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable.”
GPR: The male and female RCMP officers attending to 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, B.C. on July 14, 2014 was presumptively unreasonable. {“Presumptive” meaning: an attitude or belief dictated by probability; grounding, reasoning or evidence lending probability to belief.} “Unreasonable” meaning: Not guided by or based upon good sense (what GPR calls stupidity or a state of mental challenge). So the moment the RCMP attended Ita and Glen Robbins home on July 14, 2014 we must presume they have on balance of probability (civil standard) made an error in judgment. They are trespassing. At this stage the ‘fuse’ onus for the RCMP attending has been lit. They possessed no warrant.
“This presumption (related to warrantless searches) is complicated by the common law (also known as judge made law). Judges have ruled that searches “incident to arrest” (a search immediately following the arrest of the area within an arrestee’s immediate control) are authorized.” “The scope of this authority (warrantless searches) has been expanding, causing some people to question whether warrantless searches are actually treated as presumptively unreasonable. Specifically, the recent decision in R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 permits the police to conduct warrantless searches of cell phones as part of their “incident to arrest” powers.
(GPR: So we can see from the Supreme Court of Canada case law on the subject based on either Statute or judge made law, there is no basis for RCMP attending to 1355 Honeysuckle on July 14, 2014. There is no cause for consideration of a “search” of the property either by warrant or incident to arrest).
The only ‘portal’ of explanation for RCMP attendance would thus be on the basis of keeping the peace. The RCMP ACT demands that the keeping of peace be controlled by the proper administration of justice. There is nothing written in statute or in ‘judge made law’ that provides for police to be guided by intent to facilitate the improper administration of justice, the latter being precisely what occurred caused by their trespass and unlawful interference.
This is a good point to close the portal of the tiny window of explanation for the police on keeping the peace (tied more to International concepts of keeping the peace, then attending to ordinary homes like thugs collecting for the Mafia. In order to avoid accusations of trespassing the RCMP would need to be informed of potential trouble at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane. Glen P. Robbins is the only male at Honeysuckle. His wife and one daughter are in the home when the police and bailiff home invasion occurs. This is provided for in the Sheriff Act (BC).
Only as recently as a year ago, following an in depth search of Glen P. Robbins ‘history’ (going back many decades) as a requirement for an employment opportunity under requirements of the Children and Families Ministry, Glen P. Robbins was given a clean bill of health. GPR had also been cleared numerous times by this very RCMP force (Coquitlam, BC) for various coaching jobs he had. GPR was also invited to apply to become a member of the Canadian Senate and went through a rigorous investigation of his background (including criminal background check), with a squeaky clean outcome from that.
The RCMP will not be able to show cause why they were trespassing on July 14, 2014.
The Supreme Court of Canada has been clear that any other attendance by RCMP must be based on information which would strongly suggest that danger or a breach of the peace was likely to occur. Notwithstanding the point that court orders signed by a BC Supreme Court Judge for vacant possession and Writ of Seizure were predicated on court frauds by lawyer Ron Bakonyi for Cambridge Mortgage (BCSC Foreclosure H130330), there was nothing in the orders specifying police attendance. This attendance was either undertaken on the basis of direction from the lawyer Bakonyi or the bailiffs, Consolidated Bailiff.
Rights Against Arbitrary Detention:
Section 9 of the Charter protects against arbitrary or unlawful detention. Detention is a “suppression of the individual’s liberty through (sic) physical or psychological restraint (R v Grant, (2009) 2 SCR 353 at para 44). There are three ways a person can be detained: 1. Physical detention - a person being physically restrained, 2. Legal detention - a person would face criminal consequences for failing to comply with a police officer’s demands..” 3. Psychological detention - a person submits to or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty reasonably believing that the choice to do otherwise does not exist (R v Thomas, {1985} 1 SCR 613 @ pg 44.” “Section 9 dictates that detention cannot be arbitrary. An act is arbitrary if “there is no criteria, express or implied, that governs its exercise (R v Hufsky, {1988} 1 SCR 621. In R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that a detention would be arbitrary if: “It is not authorized by law, the law under which it was carried out was arbitrary, or the manner in which it was carried out was arbitrary.”
“Any unlawful detention will be considered arbitrary.”
“The presence of unlawful authority to detain someone can be set out in a statute (like the Criminal Code), or permitted by common law.” “Courts have permitted the expansion of police powers through an application of common law and the adaption of ancillary powers doctrine.”
‘This doctrine cloaks the police with implied power (including detention that are necessary for the carrying out of public duties. (Dedman v The Queen, (1985) 2 SCR 2: R v Hufsky, (1998) 1 SCR 621; R v Ladouceur, (1990) 1 SCR 1257; R v Mann, (2004) 2 SCR 59). The ancillary powers doctrine has attracted criticism from judges and commentators who (question its merit) believe these powers should be provided by Parliament, not the court to expand police powers. Despite this criticism, as the law currently stands, police investigating powers are supplemented by this doctrine, which can act as lawful authority to detain someone.’
Dedman v The Queen, (1985) 2 S.C.R. 2, File No: 16726 (from the Court of Appeal Ontario). Appellants case dismissed. Present: Dickson CJ and Beetz, McIntryre, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ. Dickson C.J. and Beetz and Chouinard JJ dissenting.
“Police officers, when acting or purporting to act in their official capacity as agents of the state, only act lawfully if they act in the exercise of authority either conferred by statute or derived for their duties at common law.” “Mr. Dedman was stopped by police while driving his vehicle with no apparent breach of law for stopping him. Dedman subsequently refused a breathalyzer.”
“Common law authority for the random vehicle stops, for the purpose contemplated by the R.I.D.E. program (Ontario Motor Vehicle), may be derived from the general duties of police officers on the basis...laid down in R v Waterfield, (1963) 3 All E.R. 659. The right to circulate in a motor vehicle on the public highway may be described as a liberty; however, when assessing the interference caused by a random vehicle stop, it cannot be regarded as a fundamental liberty like an individual’s right of movement, since it is a licensed activity subject to right and control for the protection of life and property.”
“Applying the Waterfield test, the random vehicle stop has a primae facie unlawful interference..since it was not authorized by statute. The random stop does fall within the scope of public duties to prevent crime and to protect life and property as these were the very object of the R.I.D.E program, a measure intended to improve the deterrence and detection of impaired driving.” “The random vehicle stop was not an unjustifiable use of police power because it was both necessary to the execution of police duty and reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference.”
“Per Dickson C.J. and Beetz and Chouinard JJ, dissenting: “The police only act lawfully when they exercise authority conferred upon them by statute or at common law. Having regard to the authoritative and coercive character of police requests, submission to a police officer’s exercise of apparent authority...cannot be characterized as voluntary, unless it was clear to the person at the time that he or she was free to refuse to comply.”
“It has always been a fundamental tenet of the rule of law that the police, in carrying out their general duties as law enforcement officers have limited powers and are only entitled to interfere with the liberty of property of the citizen to the extent authorized by law. It is necessary to distinguish the duties of police officers from the power, or lawful authority they (ED: actually) possess to execute those duties. The fact that a police officer has a general duty to prevent crime and protect life and property does not mean that he or she can use any and all means for achieving these ends.”
“Short of arrest, the police have never possessed legal authority at common law to detain anyone against his will for questioning or to pursue an investigation. Under the R.I.D.E (Ontario), the police are stopping and detaining motorists arbitrarily to investigate whether or not they might be committing a criminal offence. These random stops by the police under the R.I.D.E program are indistinguishable from detention for questioning or investigation and, without...enacted legislation to support them, are unlawful. It would be contrary to the long standing protection accorded individual liberty by the common law and detrimental to the individual’s fundamental right to be free from arbitrary interference to conclude that this action of the police was authorized and lawful. It is the function of the legislation, not of the courts, to authorize arbitrary police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a violation of rights traditionally protected by law.”
Supreme Court of Canada R v Stenning (1970) S.C.R. Date: 1970-03-20
Held: “The appeal shall be allowed and a verdict of guilty substituted.” “The constable was on the premises to investigate an occurrence which had happened earlier in the evening, which involved the firing of a rifle. He was on duty. Whether on the facts of this case the constable was technically, a trespasser or not, he was engaged in the execution of his duties at the time he was assaulted by the respondent, and at the time there had been an unlawful interference with either the liberty or the property of the respondent.”
From Martland J. (page 633)
“At this time Constable..noticed someone moving inside the offices part of Quality Motors. This person moved into the rear of the officer and out of sight. The constable also saw that there was a light on inside the building and that a side window was open about two inches.” “He (the officer) became apprehensive that someone had broken into the building. Because of his knowledge that there had been a shooting earlier, he decided to seek assistance before making any further investigation. As a result, Constable “W” was dispatched to the scene and arrived shortly thereafter. Constable “P” waited for him in the rear apartment with Constable “K” and “M” (the respondent).” “Constables “W” and “P” then attempted to gain entrance into the building. They tried the rear door to M’s apartment, but it was locked. They called through the open window and identified themselves as police officers, but received no response. By this time, Mrs. “M” had returned and she brought them a chair from her apartment which Constable “W” used to go through the window. He thanked Constable “P” through the front door.”
“There was evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. “M” knew who was in the building. If either of them did know, the information was not disclosed to police officers.” “Once inside, the two officers searched the first room and found traces of fresh blood on the floor. They went into the secure room and saw the respondent and another man “A”. …”The respondent was sitting in front of the desk with his head down on the desk.” “According to the respondent’s evidence, he and “A” had been drinking heavily at the office over a period of some two hours or less. During that time the respondent’s father had returned to the office. He and the respondent got in an argument and “there were a couple of light punches thrown and he left.”
“Constable “W” shook the respondent and asked him three or four times what business he had in the office. The respondent refused to answer. His only reply was: “It is none of your business. The trial judge found that at this time the respondent attempted to use the telephone, but was prevented from doing so by Constable “W”. The respondent said (sic) that he never tried to telephone anyone.” Constable “W” then told the respondent that he will be arrested if he did not disclose his identity. The respondent suddenly arose from his chair and struck Constable “W” in the face, breaking his nose and injuring his eye. To stop this attack Constable “W” hit the respondent with his night stick and Constable “P” hit him in the face with his fist.”
(Pg 635) “Subsequently, it was determined that the respondent was the son of the owner of the building. It was also ascertained that in the disturbance earlier that evening it was only “M” who had fired any shots.” “The trial judge acquitted the respondent because, he said, the police officers were not in the course of their duty at the time they broke into the building.” This statement is based upon the following (judicial) finding: ...I am satisfied that at that point in time, there were, in law, trespassers upon the premises and that, in law, neither “A” or “S” were obliged to cooperate with them.”
“But he made the following finding of fact (as well): I am satisfied that “W” was on the premises for the purpose of investigating some occurrence which had happened earlier in the evening. That he was in uniform, that he had reason to believe that the two persons inside the premises---that is “S” and “A” - were in some manner involved in..the disturbance which he had been called there to attend or investigated. I am also satisfied that both “W” and “P” had attempted to get inside the building or to attract the attention of the person or persons they thought were inside the building by calling to them, and I am satisfied that when “P” and “W” got inside the building that they went into the inner office and found “S” and “A” where they were located. This evidence would appear to be uncontroverted.”
“The offence with which the respondent was charged is defined in S. 232 (2) (a) of the Criminal Code, as follows: (2) Every one who (a) assaults a public officer or peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty, or a person acting in aid of such an officer,...is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.” ““W” was a peace officer in uniform and he was assaulted by the respondent. The only (pg 636) issue, in law, is as to whether “W”, in view of the finding as to the reason why he was on the premises, could be held not to have been engaged by the respondent. In reaching his conclusion that “W” was not engaged in that duty, the trial judge appears to base it on the ground that “W” was a trespasser when he entered the building. Argument was submitted to us as to whether, on the facts, he was or was not a trespasser. But even if he was a trespasser he was not trespassing on the respondent’s premises. The respondent may have been entitled to be on those premises, but there is no evidence that, prior to assault on “W”, he advised “W” as to this, that he questioned “W”’s right to be there, or that he asked him to level. There had been no interference by “W” with the person or the property of the respondent prior to the assault.”
“Assessing that “W” did, technically, trespass on the premises, the fact remains that he was there to investigate an occurrence which had happened earlier in the evening, which involved the firing of a rifle. He had been sent out there for that purpose. He (“W”) was charged under s. 47 of the Police Act, R.S.O. 960, C. 298.” “We were referred to a number of English authorities and some Canadian cases, all of which turned upon facts which differed from the facts found in this case. Their effect is stated in the judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Waterfield”:
“In the judgment of this court it would be difficult, and in the present case it is unnecessary, to reduce within specific limits the general terms in which the duties of police constables have been expressed.”
The formal Complaint document will be signed by Ita and Glen Robbins, and as I have stipulated forwarded by fax to the person responsible, as well sent by Binder through registered Mail to the address provided.
This communication is provided in advance in order to give the actors responsible an opportunity to get their heads wrapped around the matter, and rather than look for places to hide, resolve the matter.
Ita Robbins
Glen P. Robbins

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