Robbins SCE Research
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Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (4)
  Apr 16, 2019

Commentary
Ad hoc Authority: “A recent well publicized cross-border joint effort was the development of “enhanced driver's licences” by Washington State and British Columbia. The legislation posed by Washington State stated: “The department [of licensing] may enter into an agreement with the Canadian provinces of British Columbia for the purposes of implementing a border-crossing initiative.” From Beals v Saldonha, S.C.C.; Neutral Citation: 2003 SCC 72, subject matter: “Conflict of Laws” - “Foreign judgments”-”Enforcement”-”Constitutional Law”-”Charter of Rights” - “Fundamental justice”-”Whether section 2. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights can shield a Canadian defendant from enforcement of foreign judgment” Held (Iacobucci, Binnie, and LeBel JJ dissenting): “The appeal should be dismissed. The judgment of the Florida court should be enforced.” Per the majority in dismissing the appeal inc: McLachlin C.J and Gonthier, Major, Bastarache, Arbour and Deschamps JJ. “International comity and the prevalence of international cross-border transactions and movement call for a modernization of private international law. Subject to the legislatures adapting a different approach, the “real and substantial connection” test, which has until now only been applied to interprovincial judgments, should apply equally to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.” “The test requires that a significant connect exist between the cause of action and the foreign court. Here, “real and substantial connection” test is made out. The appellants entered into a property transaction in Florida when they bought and sold land. As such, there exists both a real and substantial connection between the Florida jurisdiction, the subject matter of the action and the defendants. Since the Florida court properly took jurisdiction, its judgment must be recognized and enforced by a domestic court provided that no defences bar its enforcement.”
“While fraud going to jurisdiction can always be raised before a domestic court to challenge the judgment, the merits of a foreign judgment can be challenged for fraud only where the allegations are new and not the subject of prior adjudication.” “Here the defence of fraud is not made out.” “The defence of natural justice is restricted to the form of the foreign procedure and to due process and does not relate to the merits of the case. If that procedure, while valid there, is not in accordance with Canada's concept of natural justice, the foreign judgment will be rejected.” “In the circumstances of this case, the defence does not arise.” “The appellants failed to raise any reasonable apprehension of unfairness.” “Negligent (legal advice) cannot be a bar to the respondents of the respondent's judgment.”
“The public policy defence prevents the enforcement of a foreign judgment which is contrary to the Canadian concept of justice, and turns on whether a foreign law is contrary to our view of basic morality.” “The award of damages by the Florida jury does not violate our principle of morality such that enforcement of the monetary judgment would shake the conscience of the reasonable Canadian.”
“The sums involved, although they have grown large, are not by themselves a basis to refuse enforcement of the foreign judgment in Canada. The public policy defence is not meant to bar enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign court with a real and substantial connection to the cause of action.....the recognition and enforcement of the Florida judgment by a Canadian court would not constitute a violation of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Given that section 7 does not shield a Canadian resident from the financial effects of a foreign judgment rendered by a Canadian court, it should not shield a Canadian defendant from the enforcement of a foreign judgment.”
Per Iacobucci and Binnie J.J. (dissenting): “The real and substantial connection” test provides an appropriate conceptual basis for the enforcement of final judgments obtained in foreign jurisdictions.” “While there is no doubt the Florida courts had jurisdiction over the dispute since the land was located in that jurisdiction, the question is whether the appellants in this proceeding were sufficiently informed of the case against them then to allow them to determine, in a reasonable way, whether to participate in the Florida action, or let it go by default: In this case the appellants came within the traditional limits of the natural justice defence and the Ontario courts ought not to give effect to the Florida judgment.”
Per LeBel J (dissenting): “The real and substantial connection test should be modified significantly when it is applied to judgments originating outside the Canadian federation. Specifically, the assessment of the propriety of the foreign court's jurisdiction should be carried out in a way that acknowledges the additional hardship on a defendant who is required to litigate in a foreign country. The purposive, principled framework should not be confirmed, however to be question of jurisdiction. The impeachment defences of public policy fraud and natural justice ought to be reformulated.” “A judgment based on inadequate notice is violation of natural justice. A default judgment that rests on such violation should not be enforced.”
“Lastly, the respondents complaint did not indicate that they were claiming damages on behalf of corporations, whose names appeared nowhere in the pleadings, in which they had an interest, and that they would be seeking damages for a corporations lost opportunity to build an undefined number of homes on land to which neither the respondents nor the corporation held title.” “Nor were the appellants served with the court order for mandatory mediation which provided that all parties were required to participate or, as required by the Florida rules, with notice of the experts the respondents proposed to call at the damages assessment.”
“Furthermore, a party must be made aware of the potential jeopardy faced.” “The appellants were not made aware of various events occurring in the Florida court”, “a 1987 court order striking out the claim for punitive damages, against the other defendants – the realtor and the title insurers – on ground applicable, had they known about it, to the appellants. There were not told, after being noted in default and before jury trial, that the respondents had made a deal with the realtor to delete claims for treble damages, punitive damages and statutory violations.”
“To make an informed decision, they should have been told in general terms of the case they had to meet....and been given an indication of the jeopardy they faced in terms of damages.” “The appellants decided not to defend the case set out against them...the case was sufficiently transformed.”
“Driving Force Legal (Institutional) Con”
The ‘driving force’ ‘language con’ – distracts from the clear boundaries created in the Grauer J. decision. Grauer J. clearly establishes that only a barrister appears at courtroom hearings. A non lawyer can “advocate” or “assist in the drawing of a document” – (ED: In this case the Notice of Claim document) but not commence, prosecute and defend of a proceeding (the verb content in 15(5) “as a solicitor was won’t to do” .
(ED(1): The original language of 15(5) is as confusing as Grauer J. originally described it. It remains as or more confusing following amendments made by Royal Assent (May (2012)) and now Adair J. in Boyer makes a redetermination of Grauer J.’s decision (no judicial comity, stare decisis) that the imagined words “driving force” extracted from Grauer’s characterization of the solicitor’s role in subsection 15(5) without any basis for so doing). (ED(2): One can see how LSBC Enforcement Officer *Kleisinger purposefully acts in contempt of Grauer J.’s actual Reasons for Judgment (as Fenlon J. *Ellis Roadburg (BMO) and *Bakonyi do).
Grauer J.’s assessment that the point of breach of subsection 15(5) occurs at the BC Superior Court registry (ED: In this case at 800 Smithe Street) would seem to be in conflict with the fact that the BC Superior Court registry is the responsibility of State actor Government of BC and not under the command and control of the Law Society of British Columbia. (ED: A Memorandum of Understanding is signed by the 3 Chief Justices, the Attorney General and the BC Government Employees Union involving the administration of the court - the core of the Agreement involves primarily the operation of the court registry).
No State Actor would have any authority over matters involving the preparation (ED: By non lawyers practicing law) of documents for court down at the local community library – as it were. People – non lawyers may be driving to the library to work on court documents intended for filing at the registry – but the events occurring there would not constitute driving a claim. The State Actor is engaged for the first time by a court document filer at the point of the registry which possesses it own BC Civil Rules which are equivalent to statute. The BC Civil Rules linked to document and administration of Superior Court filings would thus have legal primacy and authority over the Legal Profession Act (BC) (practice of law including before those aforementioned courts). The BC Civil Rules can take a document intended to be filed with the registry with the LPA the core subject matter for adjudication – and render it invalid.
Nothing in the LPA can render the BC Civil Rules invalid.
Glen P. Robbins proved this by having the Notice of Claim he signed and “commenced” become the legitimate originating document in the process. The record in the BMO matter reveals that Glen P. Robbins neither “defended” nor “prosecuted” any part of the BMO matter. GPR cannot possibly ever be ‘truly guilty’ of ‘crazy & confusing subsection 15(5)’. Should the State administrator established to watch over ‘paid for’ lawyers have their territory ‘permits’ empowered this great distance into court process including right of audience matters? To suggest that LPA subsection 15(5)stretches from the court registry to the constitutional justice and his or her overriding constitutional discretion - is dangerous- and suggests a conclusion that currently working lawyers possess superior access to justice than ordinary Canadians. Is this intended? If Glen P. Robbins is guilty of incorrectly “commencing” the BMO claim, there is no evidence that he has EVER “prosecuted” or “defended” any part of the BMO (or any case in BC Supreme Court).
Since 15(5) was amended by Royal Assent of the British Columbia Legislature as the earlier Hansard excerpt establishes. Following Grauer J. the language has changed. As indicated by discussion of judicial decisions since Royal Assent. The Grauer J. order already confusing was not changed. The provisions – the words were no longer the same. Doesn’t this properly suggest that Grauer J.’s order could not be used as it must be presumed to have been changed by the amendments? Who in their right mind would make amendments to legislation because it is clumsy – only to characterize it later in court as being the precise language as Grauer J. in his order?
Bruce J.’s recognition of balkanizing the verbs in subsection 15(5) “commence”, “defend”, and “prosecute” in (2015) in Bryfogle is important to the discussion moving forward because at no time did Glen P. Robbins breach all three conditions of subsection 15(5) no matter its crazy provisions circa Grauer J. or just as crazy provisions approved by self congratulatory flatulence of MLA’s forced by Grauer J. and Royal Assent. Proof could only be found that GPR commenced the action (BCSC 106413), but there is no evidence that this was intentional as GPR like most everyone else including Grauer J. could not understand the provisions.
Glen P. Robbins did not perform two of the three constituent ‘action’ parts of that subsection “prosecute” or “defend” – he is therefore (at worst) one third guilty of legal provisions no one can truly comprehend – which are already in conflict and confusion with another subsection (15(1) – which itself has no bearing or authority on constitutional discretion. As the play on the axiom goes – can a person be one third pregnant?
-and Fenlon J.’s decision not only to ignore the Reasons for Judgment appears even more contemptuous of not only Grauer J. but certainly of Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins given her apparent judicial indiscretions in Cambridge might well result in some foreseeable disaster. (ED: GPR says that Forrest Gump says “Stupid is as stupid does”). What would we call the settlement agreements Glen P. Robbins negotiated on behalf of IRobbins (ED: parties on the public record)? These half dozen settlements are signed by all paid for members of the Law Society of BC – and then sent around for everyone else’s signature to each with IRobbins signing off on them.
Testimony before Grauer J. included admissions that Glen P. Robbins had helped individuals before in legal proceedings without being paid or receiving a benefit. What is this document filed in court registry under BCSC 106413 by those lawyer members with IRobbins and FM’s signature? Doesn’t this affirm in conjunction with an order made on the merits with Costs that the Notice of Claim is a valid document as it is and should never have been the basis of a separate action undertaken by the Law Society of BC? Where do these documents occur in the “defence” or “prosecute” lexicon? None of these lawyers participating ever met either IRobbins or FM, yet they concluded Consent Agreements with IRobbins and FM, as well as with Glen P. Robbins. The implied intent must be seen to be that either these Law Society members accepted Glen P. Robbins as well as the two plaintiffs as parties to the conflict and to the settlement or that Glen P. Robbins was attorney/agent for the two women. Their clients all signed Consent Orders in a file which had a defective and (apparently) unlawful Notice of Claim. That can’t be good can it?
What about the response to BMO’s Rule 8 Application to dismiss IRobbins Notice of Claim – also signed by the plaintiffs IRobbins and FM? To be consistent with Grauer J.’s Reasons regarding Glen P. Robbins commencing the action in breach of subsection 15(5) as a solicitor there is no evidence that he prosecuted or defended the claim. What subsection is that in breach of? (ED(1): One third of confusing subsection 15(5). (ED(2): None).
State actor Government of BC is responsible for the goings on at Court registry, be serious - the Law Society of BC as State actor does not (and should not) possess authority to control the court registry. This would put the interests of the public as represented by the BC Attorney General (Cabinet) in conflict with the Law Society, which would in turn conflict the public interest. By applying subsection 15(5) to the actions of a solicitor or solicitor of record (specifically at the point of court registry) based on the Notice of Claim document (the centre piece document in evidence) Grauer J.’s decision is in conflict then with subsection 15(1) which would permit Glen P. Robbins to do anything a paid for profit lawyer can do including signing the Notice of Claim so long as he did not receive a fee or benefit.
Glen P. Robbins has never been accused of being in breach of section 15(1) of the Legal Professions Act. Subsection 15(5) is also in conflict with itself because of IRobbins affidavit declaration that she invoked her own Legal Right under subsection 15(1) to commence, defend and prosecute her own claim. Glen P. Robbins cannot be guility of subsection 15(5) if the actual party to the action IRobbins had invoked it for herself. IRobbins and FM (the other plaintiff).
FM’s attendance to the Bakonyi Cambridge application of April 7, 2014 reflects her personal desire to defend her application and joint application for a stay of execution which was given by Kloegman J. Both IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins operated at all points in time and in all instances in good faith. Who of the so called professionals involved here can make the same claim? Why not?
GPR read the “exception” under 15(1) and received no fee or benefit from his wife – and ignored 15(5) because as Grauer J. strongly suggests – it makes no sense. Grauer J. also says that in modern law the solicitor and barrister is often one and the same person, appearing to contradict his other assertion that they are separate persons in context of determining who may and who may not file documents in the court registry. One cannot Reason an issue by holding to varying applications of that reasoning to the same subject matter. If the solicitor and barrister are now one and the same person among paid for lawyers as Grauer J. Reasons – it follows that they must theoretically also be one and the same person for the non lawyer practicing law without fee or benefit.
If the person seeking a right of audience (the role of the barrister) feels no authority from 15(1), then it follows the solicitor – may similarly feel no weight of its authority – as barrister and solicitor are mutually equivalent from the Law Societies perspective. It would follow that what solicitors or ordinary persons performing filings like a solicitor do should be free like Grauer J. says the barrister is – to practice law as they please free from the interference of the Law Society of BC. Grauer J. made Glen P. Robbins a barrister for certain – in doing so didn’t he then by extension make him a solicitor as well? (ED: A right of audience argument cannot be predicated on breach of subsection 15(5) – Fenlon J. knows this, otherwise why does she ask Bakonyi lawyer for Cambridge if there is a vexatious litigant order?)
Think about this, the Statement of Defence and other applications must be served under the BC Civil Rules by way of personal service - - it is not as if a person can file and sign documents on behalf of another and not be found out very quickly. If IRobbins did not direct Glen P. Robbins to act on her behalf she would find out soon enough at time of personal service of the multiple defences produced by paid for lawyers. She signed multiple settlement agreements including those with Robert Ellis’s lawyer. Besides in January 2014 IRobbins swears out affidavit that she commences all action on her own. (ED: Case law shows that where persons have signed for someone else that signature is valid so long as permission was given in the signing of a document).
Webster QC for BMO lawyer and defendant Robert Ellis filed a defence to IRobbins Notice of Claim clinging to the provisions of section 15(5), and obtained a settlement on that basis with IRobbins. IRobbins decision to settle with Robert Ellis was based in large part on the defence mounted by Daniel Webster QC. (ED(1): This and the fact that Glen P. Robbins in GPR v Law Society (SCC) had previously consented to orders asked for in the original petition filed by Law Society should also have made GPR a winner on Costs). (ED(2): Why wouldn’t the Law Society of BC have accepted GPR’s response to petition giving into their order demands?) Given Ellis’ personal settlement and Consent Order with IRobbins, he should thereafter NOT have been BMO’s lawyer at trial, and BMO ought to have settled as the others did.
The Law Society of BC case should not have gone forward considering the settlement included matters relating to 15(5) as the defence would be presumed to be captured by the Consent Order. A settlement is a settlement.
BCSC S111171 Justice Grauer LSBC v Glen P. Robbins
On the same date (Feb 2011) Adair J made her decision in IRobbins v BMO in BCSC 106413, the Law Society of BC filed petition against Glen P. Robbins for his actions related to BCSC 106413. GPR filed a response to the petition (ED: giving the Law Society more in settlement than it eventually got at trial). GPR also signed an amended response to petition following receipt of Law Societies amended petition agreeing to all demands of Law Society of BC (again). GPR agreed to Law Society of BC’s initial demand (original petition) not to breach subsection 15(4). In March 21, 2011 BC Supreme Court docket S111171 filing – Response to Petition by Glen P. Robbins (Respondent) at “Part One: ORDERS CONSENTED TO”: Glen P. Robbins writes at page 1 paragraph 1 “1. “The Respondent agrees henceforth to comply in all instances and at all times with Section 15(4) and any and all other applicable Sections of the Legal Profession Act.”
This is a blanket Consent from Glen P. Robbins.
The Law Society of BC did not include subsection 15(5) in the original petition. Was this because the law society knew the language was confusing. The Law Society of BC amended petition was the first notice to GPR about breaching 15(5). 15 (1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except…….. (g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.” Both paid lawyers and non lawyers are permitted to practice law - how can a non lawyer not be a practicing lawyer if they comply with the rules? What is the extent permitted under the rules? It appears that the rules involve the distinction of not earning money or taking a benefit for ‘non-lawyering’.
Any ordinary person who is a non lawyer reviewing the Legal Profession Act would likely believe that they could practice law like a paid lawyer so long as they weren’t paid or receiving a benefit because this makes sense. Subsection 15(5) of the BC LPA makes little to no sense. From Para (21) BCSC S111171 Law Society v GPR: “Just how these provisions apply to a person like Mr. Robbins, a non-lawyer who is acting for free as the representative of litigants to whom he is related in matters in which he has in interest, is not entirely clear……”
Grauer J. clearly reveals what is clear in Para (22) of his October 2011 Reasons that: “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law”. It includes such matters as “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling….a document used in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and “doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim for damages.” Also from Para (22): “It specifically does not include, however, “any of those acts if not performed for in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, for the person for whom the acts are performed.”
The language here at this point in time is crystal clear...it is libertarian in nature – like the wind blowing through the trees and who may stop it? Brown J. and Cote J. in dissenting opinions in TWU say the Law Society of BC should be responsible for educating lawyers and then licensing them. Would they agree that the Law Society of BC has pushed its authority too far against Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins?
What would Brown or Cote JJ. ‘say’ (now) about the Law Societies conduct in this matter? Are contempt of court processes and judicial orders part of what they would say constitutes a command of the interests of justice in Canada? Grauer J. reveals a bias in reasoning at Para 22 “So by definition, the “practice of law” does not include, for instance, appearing as counsel or advocate if one does not charge a fee for doing so” as this seems to only support the actions of the barrister lawyer. Grauer defines “the practice of law” to this minimum protected territory of the courtroom hearing using the language from Court documents identifying persons who attended to speak – they “appear”; language “appearing” relates to appearing before justice or judge at hearing only. A person does not ‘appear’ at court registry to file documents (or not).
Under no reasonable circumstance can Grauer J.’s order relating to 15(5) be seen in any way as diminishing Glen P. Robbins in seeking a right of audience. Fenlon J. does not have the authority to employ the order in abstract from the whole of Grauer J.’s Reasons for use as a basis for making a determination on granting or denying GPR right of audience. Her decision is based on a faulty interpretation of subsection 15(5) and a failure to take a few judicial moments to actually understand that orders relations to the total of Grauer J.’s order. In fact 15(1)’s “exception” to permit all the same activities of a paid professional lawyer would appear to include the much confusing 15(5), which is not (originally when GPR confronted it) an exception…rather it is a new provision. Section 15(5) made (and still makes) no sense….Grauer J. came to the same conclusion in his Reasons. (ED: 15(5) still makes no sense post amendment – while lawmakers patted themselves on the ass and generally kissed ass with the Law Society).
Glen P. Robbins asserts that the Law Society of BC claims the public interest as a cover to pursuit of its own interests for its own benefit and gain. It’s all about the legal cartel and the cash and not the public interest. (ED: The other kooks have been right all along). “It specifically does not include, however, “any of those acts if not performed for in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, for the person for whom the acts are performed.” The language prior to 2012 Royal Assent provided that a person could be a lawyer so long as they did not receive a fee or any benefit for so doing.
The language prior to 2012 Royal Assent provided that a person could be a lawyer so long as they did not receive a fee or any benefit for so doing. Here is the evidence from trial before Justice Grauer from trial September 2011 on who can act as a lawyer: At Page 8 Para (32) of Grauer’s Reasons: “The progenitor - - (ED: (noun) ‘a person or thing from which a person, animal, or plant is descended, an ancestor or parent’) - -of the present subsections 15(1) and (5) would appear to be sections 67 and 74 of the 1895 Act, which statute did not define the “practice of law”. (ED: Consider the inference of sarcasm by Grauer J. about language (and Bill Bennett’s boast in Hansard of being English major) – by Grauer J’s use of the world “progenitor” {literally can mean animal}).
“67. Save as provided by the Inferior Court Practitioners Act (ED: courts without inherent jurisdiction, federal court small claims provincial courts) no person shall carry on the practice of profession of a Barrister or Solicitor unless he has been duly called or admitted under the provisions of this or some former Act of the Province of British Columbia and save as aforesaid no persons, unless themselves plaintiffs or defendants in a proceeding, except Barristers and Solicitors or their students-at-law and articled clerks, when permitted by the present practice in that behalf, shall appear in any cause or matter in Chambers or before any master, referee, registrar or examiner.” “74 In case any person, unless himself the plaintiff or defendant in a proceeding, commences, prosecutes or defends without being enrolled as a Solicitor as aforesaid, he shall be incapable of recovery any fee, reward or disbursement on account thereof, and such offence shall moreover, except in cases provided by the Inferior Courts Practitioners Act be deemed guilty of contempt of court.” (ED: In fact Grauer J.’s historical comparison is somewhat weak because the person not enrolled cannot recovery a fee, not being enrolled does not specifically prohibit a person not enrolled from filing documents).
At Page 9 Para (33) Grauer J. writes: “I observe that the 1895 Act distinguished between the practice of a barrister and that of a solicitor’s commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding was linked in section 74 with the practice of a solicitor.” (ED: It may be connected, but section 74 better highlights the inability to recover any fee – when a non lawyer performs the act of solicitor). Section 74 could be interpreted to mean – go ahead and commence, prosecute or defend the case – but don’t take a benefit or fee.
At Page 9 Para (34) Grauer J. writes: “By 1955, the distinction between the practice of the barrister and that of a solicitor was no longer maintained, and the legislation included a definition of the “practice of law”……” “That definition included some the same matters I quoted from the current definition, and ended similarly with the proviso that the practice of law does not include ‘any of the actions’ if not done for or in the expectation of any fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from any other person…” “This appears to have replaced the fee aspect of the former section 74.” (ED: So Grauer J. agrees with GPR – this point of his is inconsistent with his reason for characterizing the signing of the Notice of Claim as against the “practice of law”)
So Grauer J. recognized the historical progression of the language – the practice of the barrister and that of a solicitor was no longer maintained – the legislation now included the “practice of law” 15(1). So it follows that subsection 15(1) permits any person to “practice law”, with only those who have been (1) admitted to the Bar and (2) our members of good standing with the Law Society of BC – able to obtain benefit for professional $ervice$ rendered—[a provincial tax number as well for this work etc..] “Commence, defend and prosecute” and the entirety of the provisions subsection 15(5) are worthless and confusing. They were at circa Grauer J. in Robbins v. – they remain thus in 2018.
At Page 9 Para (35) Grauer J. writes:
“The general restriction on the practice of law, formerly set out in section 67 was contained in section 72 of the 1955 Act, in a form quite similar to that in the present section 15(1).” “The balance of the former section 74, precursor to the current section 15(5), was set out in the 1955 Act in section 75 as follows”: “75. In case any person, unless himself a party to an action or proceeding, commences, prosecutes or defends in his own name or in that of any other person any action or proceeding without being a member of the Society, he shall….be deemed guilty of contempt of the Court…” (ED: This rendition of the LPA circa 1955 says something completely different. It appears on its own to suggest that non lawyers practicing law without receiving a fee or benefit are in contempt).
“As was in the case in 1895, and as remains the case now, the prohibition against non lawyers commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding was set out in a section separate from the general prohibition against persons other than members of the Law Society practicing law. The reference to solicitor, however had disappeared, presumably due to the evolution of the structure of the profession.” (ED: I don’t believe the historical case provides a basis for this presumption). At Page 10 Para (37) Grauer J. writes: “In my view, that historical distinction is important to the interpretation of these provisions and helps clarify the confusion to which the inelegance of the drafting has given rise.”
Why at Glen P. Robbins ‘guinea pig’ expense? (ED: “Inelegance” defined: (adjective) “lacking in refinement, grace or good taste”.
IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins ought not as ordinary persons accessing the justice system (also) be required to concern themselves with trying to interpret clearly irresponsible legislative drafting of the Legal Profession Act specifically Section 15 “Authority to Practice Law” which apparently captures both of them under 15(1)’s permission to practice law – when non lawyers aren’t getting any fees or benefits or aren’t members of the Law Society. Regular ordinary persons should not be regulated by law societies based on the conflict inherent to subsection 15(5) and all persons legal entitlement to practice law- but with the distinct exception relating to one group (members) being allowed to charge fee$, and the other group (ED: inclusive of Glen P. Robbins, IRobbins et al and everyone else) not able to do so. “It provides the key to understanding the difference between “appearing as counsel or advocate” and other actions included in the “practice of law” if done for a fee on the one hand, and the reference in section 15(5) to commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding, on the other.”
“It provides the key to understanding the difference between “appearing as counsel or advocate” and other actions included in the “practice of law” if done for a fee on the one hand, and the reference in section 15(5) to commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding, on the other.” “The former, particularly including the barrister’s work of appearing at a hearing as advocate for a party, do not constitute the practice of law if done for free.” “The latter, incorporating the litigation solicitors practice of commencing, prosecuting and defending a proceeding does, whether done for a fee or not.” “This distinction survives today in the use of terms “solicitor” or “solicitor of record” to designate..” a firm responsible for the conduct of the litigation; and term “counsel” to designate ‘the lawyer’ who will appear in court on behalf of that party. The two need not be the same individual.” (ED: So “solicitor” and “solicitor of record” have historically been included in the court documents filed-particularly the commencement documents such as notice of claim or petition).
Page 10 Para (38) Grauer J. writes (again):
“It follows that if a person in the position of Mr. Robbins does nothing more than assist a party by appearing to speak on his or her behalf at a hearing for free then he is not practicing law and the Law Society is in no position to intervene. That person will be subject only to the court’s overriding discretion, in the case of any persons who are neither litigants nor lawyers”. Bakonyi for Cambridge and Ellis for BMO – along with Fenlon J. have no right to intervene in Grauer J.’s determination and Reasons for Judgment to create a false impression of those Reasons.
Fisher J. on Grauer in 15(5) case Law Society v Parsons (2015)
In Supreme Court of British Columbia, Vancouver Registry – order “Entered” July 8, 2015 between the Law Society of British Columbia and Parsons heard May 6, 2015 before Madam Justice Fisher subsection 15(5) again rears its confused ‘progenitor’s’ head Fisher J. describes the LPA (alleged) prohibition at Page 3 Para (6): “This subsection has been interpreted to prohibit non –lawyers from coordinating the overall prosecution or defence of a proceeding in court on behalf of others whether or not a fee is charged.”
(ED: If this slightly different angle is accepted than GPR has only commenced the claim under 15(5), as the only other document filed by IRobbins v BMO is an application response (defence) which was signed by the plaintiffs – so GPR could not technically be guilty of the overall “prosecution” or “defence”, only the “commencement”).
At Page 3 Para (7) Fisher J. writes:
“This interpretation was followed by Bruce J. in LSBC v Bryfogle, 2015 BCSC 59. I agree with her comments (at para. 54) that Grauer J.’s interpretation of s.15 properly explains the “interplay” between section 15(1), which prohibits acts that constitute the practice of law when rendered for a fee, and section 15(5), which prohibits the conduct of a solicitors practice by a lay person whether or not a fee is charged.” In Law Society of BC versus Boyer (2016), BCSC Vancouver, Docket: S1510713—on Page 3 Para (7) Adair J. writes: “In May of 2005, Former Chief Justice Brenner ordered that Mr. Boyer be prohibited from commencing or continuing any proceedings in the Supreme Court, except if he is represented by a solicitor”
From Page7 of Para (29) Fisher J. writes:
“Section 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act prohibits….and I refer in that regard to Mr. Justice Grauer’s decision in Law Society v Robbins.”
--this from Adair J.:
“Subsequent to the decision in Robbins, the Supreme Court has found that a person will breach section 15(5) if he or she is the “driving force of the litigation, has conduct, carriage, or the overall direction of litigation, or is acting like a lawyer”. (ED: GPR says if he tried to interpret something this poorly his mind would blow). (ED: Subsequent to the Grauer J. decision (2011), we have Royal Assent of the changes pursuant to Grauer J.; the Fisher J. decision (2015); – clearly affirming Grauer J. and prior to the shenanigans in Cambridge. Bruce J. then followed (2015); – again affirming Grauer J. …(A)nd then we have Adair J. in 2016 citing the previous solitary in Judicial Comity between and among Grauer J., Fisher J., and Bruce J. but purposefully attaching the “driving force” language to those decisions all relating back to Glen P. Robbins in LSBC v Robbins (ED: GPR says-a lovely box with a nice bright bow).
The only case in between these primary examples of stare decisis and Judicial Comity is IRobbins v Cambridge where the Grauer J. Reasons for Judgment were contemptuously disregarded by Fenlon J. a former employee of Elizabeth Lyall at Vancouver law firm Fasken Martineau who 1st prosecuted Glen P. Robbins. Adair J. needed to put on the record where the Supreme Court ‘found this’ “driving force” thinga majigger. Law Society of BC v Bryfogle, 2015 BCSC 59 before Madame Justice Bruce at line 2 quoting Page 14 Para (35) in reference to Smith J.A. quoting his honour at line 2: “However, Mr. Bryfogle is not a party to the action and therefore, also lacks standing to appear on the appellant’s behalf.” (ED(1): Smith’s comments at 2012 are in conflict with Grauer J.’s Reasons for Judgment. In Robbins not being a party does not preclude one from ‘appearing’ in court. Is this the same Justice who signed Bakonyi’s vacant possession order during the stay of execution, thus averting having to file that order with court clerk’s notes?)
(ED(2): We will later see BC Justice Nathan Smith’s funny business with Ron Bakonyi for Cambridge Mortgage during the period of stay of execution). “Mr. Bryfogle argues that the assistance he provided to Ms. Holland does not “amount” to “prosecution” of litigation on a legal matter….” “While Mr. Bryfogle acknowledges that he cannot “prosecute” an action for someone else, even when he is not being paid for his services, he argues that helping his wife…draft documents, filing affidavits in support of her claims, arguing her files and managing documents….is not prohibited by the term “prosecution”. “Alternatively, Mr. Bryfogle maintains that the broad definition given to the term “prosecution” by the Court was unknown to him and could not retroactively render his actions contemptuous.”
At Page 19 Para (42) Bruce J. writes in 2015:
*“In granting this order, I recognize that there is, apparently, some debate as to whether s.15(5) of the Legal Profession Act prohibits a person from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding as an agent for another person if the person acting is not being paid for that service.” (ED: The language here with Bruce J. is a little imprecise – relating to Bruce J.’s use of the term agent, as there is a Court Agent Act which permits non lawyers to represent others from areas where there are no lawyers for some distance. This matters because it impresses on aboriginal cases before the court and who may speak). Bruce J.’s comments must be Interpreted in context of the provision in the mandate of the State Actor Law Society of BC relating back to Section 15 “Authority to Practice Law” and specifically subsection “Practice of Law” which any person may do, but only licensed professionals may charge a fee or receive a benefit. Bruce J. has in effect put 15(5) in more fulsome conflict with 15(1) than Grauer J.’s Reasons for Judgment did. Bruce J. would extend subsection 15(1) authority on practice into the BC Court Registry making subsection 15(5) erroneous or at least redundant or de minimus in conflict.=
=Given that 15(1) grants all stripe of lawyer both paid and unpaid authority to practice law, and subsection 15(5) is prohibiting actions from one group of all lawyers than it is easy to accept the obvious conflict between the two from any angle of debate.
At Page 19 Para (43) Bruce J. writes: “In Yal v Minister of Forests, 2004 BCSC 1253, Halfyard J. appears to have assumed that S.15(5) does extend that far. More recently, in Law Society of BC v Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277, Williams J, appears to suggest that it does not.”
At Page 19 Para (52) Bruce J. writes: “Although it is clear from the above passages that the Order was intended to prohibit “prosecution” of litigation without expectation of fee or rewards, there is no discussion of what is meant by the term “prosecution”. (ED: Bruce J. (2015) effectively eradicates subsection 15(5) as legal provisions owing to inherent conflict with other provisions or difficult to draw any conclusion about - because of the confusing language. Royal Assent of the Legislative changes made as a consequence of the Grauer J. order (2011) citing confusing redundant and (“ironically”) inelegant language of subsection 15(5), Minister Bennett’s comments on Hansard recording reference English language and lawyers (“awareness”) in 2012 coupled with the Fisher J. in Parsons and Bruce J. in Bryfogle (2015)).
“In Robbins, Grauer J. had occasion to review the case authorities addressing the meaning of section 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act…” “Grauer J. summarized the conduct he included within the term “prosecution” at para 38 of the judgment: “(38) It follows that if a person in the position of Mr. Robbins does nothing more than assist a party by appearing to speak on his or her behalf at a hearing for free, then his is not practicing law and the Law Society of BC is in no position to intervene.” (ED(1): Nothing more than appear at hearing is not practicing law – appearing is not within the Law Society of BC purview). (ED(2): Glen P. Robbins adds at this point in response to Bruce J. and to Halfyard J. that for subsection 15(5) to be related to documents filed in the BC Court Registry would cause to push the Law Society of BC, and BC Bar and specifically The Legal Profession Act (BC) and subsection 15(5) into the same jurisdiction as the BC Attorney General’s and thus Cabinet as the BC Attorney General sits at Cabinet).
In her May 9, 2013 Fenlon J.’ decision to deny GPR a right of audience on the basis of subsection 15(5) refusing to read Grauer J.’s actual Reasons for Judgment – in the face of Glen P. Robbins’s desperate pleas to do so – she refuses—why refuse? (ED: GPR says she is put up as judge to aid and abet the fraud of IRobbins home). Did Fenlon J. have a conversation with any person relating to the case during the recess period? Does Fenlon J. understand her constitutional (indiscretion) failed to stop an obvious case of private and institutional fraud involving an entire unregulated sector of bank financing with real estate as collateral (mortgage)-which had it been heard, the fraud and deceptive practices exposed in case law at this time (2013)-would we now be facing a housing market crash with equity of thousands of homes under water – MIC unregulated subprime mortgages at conservatively one in 8—houses taken off the market already underwater or part of some other irregular classification from normative? Fenlon J. interprets the order incorrectly [GPR says on purpose-Fenlon’s in on the fraud] to give Ellis and Bakonyi the upper hand when she had the entirety of an afternoon court recess to determine that Grauer J.’s order of subsection 15(5) had nothing whatsoever to do with right of audience, a distinctly different legal exercise.
This puts Fenlon J. squarely at odds with Judicial Comity of the Grauer J. decision and in light of her past relationship with Elizabeth Lyall (ED: GPR’s original Law Society prosecutor) her actions appear more opportunistic than judicial in nature. Also, any originating document (Notice of Claim, Petition) or subsequent documents (Rule 8 Application) filed in any provincial superior court registry which apply to a hearing before a federally compensated provincial superior court justice - are intended for consumption by that decision maker alone, and would appear in light of the refusal to check documents at BC Supreme Court registry, – to become the full responsibility of that decision maker who also possesses the constitutional authority for right of audience and who is expected to be familiar with the goings on in the file. This should have put Fenlon J. in the position of being in charge of checking the defective notice of hearing or the deficient petition filed by Cambridge Mortgage. The BC Civil Registry is abdicating its responsibility as gatekeeper to document filing at court registry and passing it off to the BC Justice - in a climate where everyone in the justice system is waiting for this case to be resolved so that more justices – the system requires desperately they say – can be hired.
[We will later see proof absolute through the combined efforts of Michael Kleisinger, former law partner Chris Hinkson (Harper Grey) – introduced as Chief Justice of the BC Supreme Court – how fast a trial can obtained].
The philosophical logical extension of BC Court registry ‘smile and file’ court document (ED: misfeasance-malfeasance is construed as disregard of Judicial Direction (same as order of the court)) suggests that the Constitutional appointed justice must take custody of the proper vetting of documents at hearing, extending (at least theoretically) the greater power of the constitutionally appointed justice over the provisions of the flatulent erroneous and ridiculous language in subsection 15(5) involving Grauer J.’s solicitor or solicitor of record at court filings. A breach of subsection 15(5) can in no way be sufficient to deny a right of audience – and if Fenlon J. wishes to claim it falls within her constitutional discretion – when in fact it marks activities completely unrelated to right of audience and therefore reasonably lies fully outside that constitution discretion, than the BC Court appeal file initiated by IRobbins satisfies appellants IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins claim to be heard on this matter through a constitutional right of appeal , particularly when Fenlon J. conflates provisions of subsection 15(5) and constitutional right of audience matters-in proclaiming her decision to deny right of audience. {GPR - A cynic of all things might think Fenlon J. was GPR’s confederate in all this}.
Most importantly, there was no breach of subsection 15(5) in the filings of IRobbins under H130330 Cambridge v IRobbins. An appeal was made by IRobbins to BC Court of Appeal relating to Fenlon’s procedural order on right of audience for want of prosecution is a Final Order appealable to the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis of unique circumstances. The BC Court of Appeal docket number used to initiate IRobbins application for leave to appeal at Supreme Court of Canada (35772) in IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage – relates directly to this matter involving subsection 15(5) and Fenlon J.’s reasoning on that subject in Cambridge v IRobbins – that (somehow or in some way) it would be possible that provincial administrative law would have force and effect than Constitutional powers.
Fenlon’s mistaken order on the procedural question or right of audience under Cambridge-Bakonyi is nevertheless an order of the court. It occurs prior to the granting of the order nisi. If the Fenlon J. mistake conflating the provincial Legal Profession Act (BC) with the Constitution of Canada does not occur, the respondent IRobbins would have gotten heard and the matter likely would have been handed over to trial. Cambridge Mortgage would be ‘toast’ if this occurs as the criminal agreement with Peet & Cowan Financial would be discovered as would the ‘fraudulent and fake’ mortgage registration of Cambridge Mortgage at Land Title BC. – so this important element of the May 9, 2013 foreclosure petition of Cambridge Mortgage - -the denial of right of audience, the procedural matter preceding the substantive matter the foreclosure–tripped up on the basis of a constitutional misstep by the Fenlon J. particular as Freedom of Speech – the right to speak exists in the Charter of Rights – added to the Constitution of Canada in 1982—is appealed to the BC Court of Appeal.
The next question is but for the erroneous order what would then become of the order nisi obtained? If the Court determines that the matter would have likely gone to trial, then Fenlon J.’s order nisi would thus be set aside and the Notice of Claim filed in New Westminster by IRobbins et al and Glen P. Robbins PRIOR TO Cambridge filing its Petition for Foreclosure – would be an appropriate court file to follow an appropriate order in the circumstances. When we add in the (erroneous/criminal) Order Made After Application of Bakonyi (Cambridge) and Ellis Roadburg (BMO) filed – served and then used to manipulate the BC Master Tokarek at application for Conduct of Sale-we can visualize two fuses set to detonate this entire matter from front and *back (*SCC application 35772). From the front end - not only the errant petition for foreclosure (ED: affidavit fails to disclose triable issues), notice of hearing is false on its face – no service of notice of hearing, then the May 9, 2013 hearing).
From the front end - not only the errant petition for foreclosure (ED: affidavit fails to disclose triable issues), notice of hearing is false on its face – no service of notice of hearing, then the May 9, 2013 hearing). From the back end another fuse lit from the point of Supreme Court of Canada and most particularly SCC 35772 IRobbins v Cambridge, but including Glen P. Robbins v Law Society 35302 on the basis of an automatic stay of execution extending from the Supreme Court Act (Canada) to the BC Court Registry where the stay of execution order was made and literally connecting the appeal of the conduct of sale order with the mandatory provisions governing the S.C.C. pursuant to Rule 66(2) linkage of SCC and appeal orders involving stays of execution. As provided for herein, an application was made to the SCC by IRobbins for a Stay of Execution.
IRobbins through Glen P. Robbins seached for legal help following the April 7, 2014 adjournement of vacant possession application and stay of execution order and the horrid events of April 23, 2014 and April 24, 2014 but was unsuccessful in the hiring. Now, someone might argue that Kloegman’s stay of execution order referenced only the appeal of the conduct of sale award in context of stay of execution. IRobbins would argue it is a stay of execution order not a stay of procedure order and all orders are thus in play. Remember Glen P. Robbins had advanced the interest he had in the case via a Rule 8 application to be added as a party, consented to by both Respondents IRobbins and FM. (ED: Following Justice Grauer’s Reasoning that Glen P. Robbins had such a legal interest). The limited scope of time on the stay of execution (April 7, 2014 until April 30, 2014) might lend one to assume the stay was in fact attributable to the appeal specifically, however in context the appeal of the conduct of sale order is directly relating to loss of opportunity for a fair hearing on the right of audience matter. Also, the conduct of sale order must precede the vacant possession – as the latter is sought only when the former is ignored. IRobbins has not ignored the conduct of sale award, she has appealed it. The appeal of a decision of a Master can be heard by a BC Supreme Court Justice (BC Court of Appeal).
As referenced, this absolutely creates unbreakable chain linkage between the appeal of the conduct of sale – the stay of execution of the underlying conduct of sale order and the provisions of the Federal Supreme Court Act governing the Supreme Court of Canada. Kloegman J. takes up Bakonyi’s request after he has lost – that his application for vacant possession be heard immediately following the decision on the matter to be heard – the appeal of the conduct of sale order. If a party has no authority to sell a home in order to enforce its foreclosure order – what is the benefit of vacant possession order? The Supreme Court of Canada dockets have introduced something new. They have introduced a header notice indicating that not all decisions on leave to appeal applications. This begs the question – did any of the justices hearing 35772 decide for the appellant? The point here is that if the S.C.C. said…
The point here is that if the S.C.C. said… … “look” the automatic Stay of Execution from federal Supreme Court Act is intended to link up with the lower court stay of execution (Kloegman J,. April 7, 2014)- only to the extent that both stay orders would relate to the conduct of sale order and appeal – and the subject matter of the leave application under 35772 is only for extension of time to appeal the order nisi – (ED: which Glen P. Robbins links back to the orthodox BC Court of Appeal of Fenlon J.’s decision on right of audience)… …the application for stay of execution of the lower court decision at BC Court of Appeal…(ED: the first appeal relating to the foreclosure order) to deny an extension of time for leave to appeal application) – …where IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins did not attend owing to the false (erroneous) threats in writing by Michael Kleisinger that such attendance would be contempt of Grauer J.’s order is a lie of such magnitude –------------------ the police need to be called.
The point here is that if the S.C.C. said… … “look” the automatic Stay of Execution from federal Supreme Court Act is intended to link up with the lower court stay of execution (Kloegman J,. April 7, 2014)- only to the extent that both stay orders would relate to the conduct of sale order and appeal – and the subject matter of the leave application under 35772 is only for extension of time to appeal the order nisi – (ED: which Glen P. Robbins links back to the orthodox BC Court of Appeal of Fenlon J.’s decision on right of audience)… …the application for stay of execution of the lower court decision at BC Court of Appeal…(ED: the first appeal relating to the foreclosure order) to deny an extension of time for leave to appeal application) – …where IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins did not attend owing to the false (erroneous) threats in writing by Michael Kleisinger that such attendance would be contempt of Grauer J.’s order is a lie of such magnitude –------------------ the police need to be called.
IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins would deprive this faint hope by asserting the interests of justice – and fact that the stay of execution order and other orders made by Kloegman J. were never disclosed to the S.C.C. that in and of itself sufficient to deprive Cambridge Mortgage of any relief against IRobbins. A Foreclosure process has independent decision makers hearing it at each point. In the case of a Conduct of Sale it is not a Final Order and that is why the Master (Tokarek) heard it. The dismissal order on the appeal of conduct of sale – could never occur by virtue of Kloegman J.’s order on any basis of interpretation of the stay of execution order she made April 7, 2014. The Vacant Possession could not have been heard – no matter the contemptuous treatment of Kloegman J.’s order for stay of execution—until the matter of the appeal of the Conduct of Sale order had been concluded. The extra order Bakonyi obtained from Kloegman J. at hearing end, may have been the action helping to seal his client’s fate.
To compensate – and to keep faith in the wealthy community he resides in South Cambie BC – Bakonyi was willing to commit criminal malfeasance – obviously hoping that if he could ruin IRobbins – she might not be able to fight back and he, his client, his law society and members of the Judiciary would get away with their crimes against her. We can never know how that might have turned out – Bakonyi-Cambridge Mortgage spoiled that. But let’s imagine in isolation of the appeal of the conduct of sale order. So IRobbins is successful on the merits, what then? The conduct of sale order is inextricably tied in process and procedure to the *first order (*order nisi – foreclosure) which is tied inextricably to the BC Court of Appeal of the denial of right of audience order of Fenlon J. in terms of succession of orders (ED: Fenlon J.’s mistake caused the order nisi) Bakonyi-Ellis –
Cambridge BMO fake Order Made After Application is inextricably tied to the May 9, 2013 hearing (ED: Along with misrepresented submissions in contempt of Grauer J.’s Reasons) – which fake order is directed at the procedural denial of right of audience which (again) caused the order nisi – and written up for Master Tokarek so as to further interfere with the entire foreclosure process, or at least, the conduct of sale application (which it did successfully). This links the (outstanding)hearing of appeal of the conduct of sale order made by Master Tokarek (ED: A BC Supreme Court Justice has authority as appeal justice to Master’s order) to the BC Court of Appeal of Fenlon’s decision relating to Glen P. Robbins speaking on behalf of IRobbins and thus capturing the order nisi in between. (Remember) on January 2014 IRobbins swears affidavit and provides it to the Law Society of BC - that any claims she was ever involved in were “commenced, defended and prosecuted” by her and not Glen P. Robbins. (Remember) IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins hired Surrey law firm – and BC Lawyer Ross Davidson – (October 2013) who was the solicitor of record filing Enduring Powers of Attorney at BC Land Title and specifically for IRobbins home at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC.
IRobbins proclaimed this on the basis of law that a person can give another person permission to sign a document on their behalf. It is perfectly legal to sign on another person’s behalf so long as you use your own signature and not theirs. Glen P. Robbins could not be guilty of breaching subsection 15(5) (“commence”, “prosecute”, “defend”)– his wife IRobbins admitted she was the culprit. How can IRobbins be in breach when she is party to proceeding. Short Answer – She can’t be in breach because IRobbins can “commence, defend and prosecute” a claim on her own behalf – just as she can “practice law” (15)(1). That is precisely what IRobbins was doing in Robbins v BMO and in Cambridge v IRobbins. It’s reasonable to say that IRobbins perception of subsection 15(5) is likely as good as any reasonable person armed with the facts – or even justices on the bench – well paid for lawyers for certain – and she was entitled to proclaim in Affidavit her right to practice law 15(1) including her right apparently under subsection 15(5) to commence, defend and prosecute claims. In effect what IRobbins had ingeniously done by swearing that Affidavit – was make herself co counsel conjunctive with and to her husband Glen P. Robbins in both the BMO and Cambridge matters. IRobbins also filed this Affidavit Declaration with the BC Supreme Court (BCSC H130330).
This Canada Married Couple Co Counsel Coalition (“CMCCC”) was thus consistent with Enduring Powers of Attorney provided by GPR and IRobbins – each to the other. So – bottom line IRobbins officially appealed the treatment of ‘HER lawyer – husband’ = Glen P. Robbins at hearing May 9, 2013. She has yet to have that matter properly heard. Because BC Court of Appeal shut the file down by final order for want of prosecution – it remains a final order and is nonetheless part and parcel of this unique set of circumstances – where with an order for extension of time from the SCC – leave to appeal the procedural order denying Glen P. Robbins right of audience to speak on his wife IRobbins behalf. The Supreme Court of Canada unwittingly permitted Bakonyi-Cambridge Mortgage to steal everything IRobbins owns – a house valued at $1,600,000 – property insured for tens (hundreds) of thousands of dollars – no family pictures, nothing – not even dirt from the property.
Continued @: Commentary for Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (5)

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