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Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (3)
Greta Van Fleet - Black Smoke Rising  Apr 03, 2019

Commentary
Continued from: Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (2)
The legislation also replaces the victim's special compensation fund with trust protection insurance, a professional liability insurance program. Now, it's not exactly a happy occasion. The name of Martin Wirick is well known to legal circles in British Columbia — a lawyer who, as we say in the profession, went bad, resulted in the loss of tens of millions of dollars, potentially, to a number of institutions and individuals. Unlike some other bodies and some other jurisdictions and some other places, the Law Society, in fulfilment of its mandate…. The lawyers of British Columbia stepped up to the plate, and nobody lost a nickel.” (ED: planning their next robbery). “It is something to take a certain amount of pride in as a professional, and it's something that British Columbians should take pride in, in terms of the lawyers of British Columbia, representing the common sense and honesty and decency of British Columbia's citizens, did their duty, met their responsibility and in fact compensated the victims of Mr. Wirick's nefarious behaviour.
The victims' special compensation money is now going to be replaced with trust protection insurance, but that will again guarantee that if ever there is an occasion where a lawyer doesn't meet the high standards of the bar, British Columbians, their clients — whoever — are not going to suffer as a result of that. It also adds a review board and replaces benchers with review boards for the purpose of reviews on the record of assessments of cost. It allows the Law Society to appeal a decision of a panel review to the Court of Appeal. Finally, it allows the Law Foundation to retain outside lawyers. I think it was an old Socred saying about legislation being more good news. Well, I think one can say that, in fairness and to drag up an historical expression, Bill 40, the Legal Profession Amendment Act, 2012, represents more good news, not necessarily from this government but just more good news for British Columbians. It brings the legal profession and the Legal Profession Act, I think, up to date in a way that has been sought for a very long time.
There is no question that this represents a great deal of work. I want to recognize the contribution of the Law Society of British Columbia, its executive director and others who have, for a number of years, worked with government — and, frankly, worked with the opposition — seeking support, who have consulted broadly to ensure that the legal profession was included and to ensure that the bill that came forward represented progress, brought the profession up to date and gave the ability to the Law Society to function in the effective way that it needs to in order to ensure the objects and duties of the existing legislation, which, as I read out earlier, reflect a number of important things, but also by modernizing it and codifying once again the high standards that are expected of being a lawyer in British Columbia.” “I know there are other members of the chamber, apparently, who wish to speak to this today, so I don't wish to be labour the point. But I want to thank the Minister of Justice and Attorney General for bringing this forward. I want to, again, extend my thanks to members of the Law Society who've worked on this, to extend my congratulations to those who have brought forward another example of how in British Columbia some of what we do in this chamber is actually just good common sense. It asserts the public interest. This legislation puts the public interest first. It makes it absolutely clear that the public interest is the number one priority. Indeed, it is the only priority, and it is the only object and duty of the Law Society of British Columbia.
I would hesitate to contemplate a day when we would[ Page 11505 ]want to have self-governing professions like the Law Society abolished and government take over the management of our professions. I think it is an important aspect of freedom, most particularly for lawyers in a democratic society, that they be a self-governing profession. You can think of all of the great social activists, all of the great defenders of democracy around the world, in this province, in this country, who have enjoyed the high calling of the legal profession, who have enjoyed the honour and privilege it is to practise. They are great names, and they have made great progress.” [1500] “As a matter of fact, next week in my community there's going to be a very interesting conference on the Douglas treaties, which are important in British Columbia. The keynote speaker on Thursday night will in fact be a former Supreme Court Justice, Thomas Rodney Berger, QC, I think one of British Columbia's most amazing lawyers and, like the member for West Vancouver–Capilano and myself, another good fellow Scandinavian, a person whose fame and repute and honour and integrity are well known.
That's the kind of leaders that come out of the legal profession. They are to be honoured. This bill, certainly for me, represents all that is good about the profession. Again, my thanks to the Attorney General.
B. Bennett: It's a pleasure to follow my friend from Nanaimo. I'm going to say many of the same things, perhaps, and hopefully in a different way. But I do agree with what he had to say. It is a pleasure to stand in the House today and say a few words about the positive changes being made to the Legal Profession Act. The act is the legislation that empowers the Law Society of B.C. to regulate the 10,000-plus lawyers that work in the province today. The Law Society was created by statute in 1869. The Law Society, as the former speaker said, is a self-governing body that ensures that B.C. lawyers act with independence, integrity and honour. As a self-regulating body, it's essential to public confidence in the legal profession that the Law Society of B.C. be viewed by the public as the regulator and not as an advocate for the interests of lawyers. The organization here in British Columbia that does advance the interests of lawyers, which in my view is a very progressive organization — it focuses heavily on legal education — is the Canadian Bar Association. There is an important distinction between the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society of B.C., and I think one of the easiest ways to make the point about the distinction is to compare the College of Physicians with the B.C. Medical Association. The College of Physicians obviously is more the regulator and the B.C. Medical Association, more advocating for the interests of physicians. The same distinction is true of the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society.
I'm dividing my remarks today into five different sections. They're very, very short. I want to make some introductory comments about the act. I want to comment on the mandate of the Law Society, which is changed by these amendments; the Law Society's powers of investigation, their powers of discipline and their use of hearings and appeals. I'm going to conclude with some positive comments about lawyers, as my friend did — just so that members are forewarned. The act hasn't been substantially updated since 1988. It really does need to be modernized in order to make sure that the Law Society can regulate in the public interest. I should say, along with what the former speaker said about more good news, that this actually is more good news in terms of the government's record of justice system reform led so ably by the Minister of Justice.” “Amendments to the Legal Profession Act add to the initiatives already completed, such as the Family Law Act, which I think everyone supported here and was a big step forward; the new Limitation Act; and also the ongoing reform initiative led by Geoffrey Cowper, QC. (ED: Geoffrey Cowper is another Fasken Martineau lawyer along with Elizabeth Lyall (1st lawyer for Law Society of BC thumped by GPR – and BC Justice Fenlon (Cambridge judge in mainframe case IRobbins v Cambridge introduced later).
As the minister has so adeptly done in her tenure, she is presiding over these positive changes that go to the quality of the justice system and the accountability of the justice system to the public, without indiscriminately throwing large amounts of public money at it. That's saying something, hon. Speaker. That's not easy to do, and that needs to be said. The Law Society wants the public to have confidence in lawyers, in the legal profession, and to their credit, the Law Society regularly measures the public's confidence in lawyers. In recent years they've done some work to determine whether the public has confidence in lawyers and in the Law Society.” [1505] “Just recently they did a study and determined that 66 percent of the public, in fact, believe that the Law Society does a pretty good job of handling complaints; 63 percent of the public believe that the Law Society has the ability to and does a good job of disciplining lawyers who are in violation of the standards; and 72 percent of the public are confident or very confident that the Law Society is able to ensure that lawyers operate with ethical standards. So there is already, I think, good confidence in the public about lawyers and the Law Society.
Let me just say a few words about the mandate of the Law Society. If the act is passed, the mandate of the Law Society of B.C. will be changed to more strongly and [ Page 11506 ] clearly reflect the Law Society's primary role as the regulator. The object and duty of the Law Society will continue to be to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice. But it will include an objective of supporting and assisting lawyers in fulfilling their duties rather than advancing the interests of lawyers, thereby clarifying the distinction that I talked about between the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society of B.C. It is an important change to the existing language, and it will make clear to the public that the Law Society is focused entirely on the regulation of lawyers and the protection of the public interest.” Investigations. These amendments will expand the powers of investigation. They will allow the Law Society to regulate law firms as opposed to just regulating individual lawyers. My friend from Nanaimo made this point. I think it's an important point to make. I think it's inconvenient and quite cumbersome, currently, for the Law Society to try to regulate law firms by regulating individual lawyers. This will help with that. I think there are some new rules that will allow the Law Society to require lawyers and others that work for the law firms to answer questions and to produce records. The Law Society will now be, if these amendments are passed, allowed to send an officer or an employee of the Law Society to a lawyer's place of business. That sounds pretty ordinary, but currently they can't do that.
Lawyers will be required to disclose information where the information is subject to confidentiality and privilege. We probably all are aware, I'm sure, and have had occasion to retain a lawyer at one point or another in our lives, and we know about solicitor-client privilege. In fact, when the Law Society is faced with an investigation, at times that solicitor-client privilege gets in the way of a proper investigation. I don't know this for a fact, but thinking about this, probably that solicitor-client privilege also gets in the way, in some cases, of lawyers defending themselves against complaints. So the Law Society will now be able to obtain that confidential information. But of course, the Law Society will then stand in the shoes of the lawyer, and they will owe a duty to the client so that the information is still kept confidential. When it is necessary to protect the public interest, under these new amendments the Law Society will have the authority to suspend a lawyer who is under investigation before the investigation is complete and a hearing is held. That's new. The Law Society will be able to place conditions on the lawyer's practice pending outcome of an investigation. You can imagine how that might apply.” “The Law Society will be able to require a lawyer to submit to a medical examination before a citation is issued against that lawyer so that medical problems can be dealt with outside of the disciplinary hearing context, which is important both to the Law Society and to the public interest, but also to the lawyer who is subject to the investigation.
Finally, the Law Society will be able to prevent a lawyer from resigning from the Law Society of B.C. when they are under investigation. Again, it's pretty easy to imagine that if you can resign from an organization, you could take the position that it no longer has the authority to investigate you. Discipline. Maximum fines will be increased from $20,000 to $50,000 for lawyers and from $2,000 to $5,000 for students. The Law Society will be able to collect fines and costs by filing the order in Supreme Court. They'll actually be able to collect these fines in situations that require a court action. They can't do that today.” [1510] “Benchers will be able to suspend or disbar lawyers who are convicted of serious crimes, and that will include lawyers who have been convicted of serious crimes outside of the country. Hearings and appeals. I wanted to just very briefly mention that there is what I'm calling a new appeal mechanism within the amendments. Decisions of the Law Society's disciplinary panels will be reviewable by a review board, which will include non-lawyers. That always, I think, is an important thing — to make sure it exists in any sort of process like the one we're discussing today. Hearing panels will be able to suspend a lawyer who has committed a discipline violation for an indefinite period to enforce compliance with conditions or other requirements. In conclusion, these improvements to the Legal Profession Act will improve public confidence in B.C. lawyers and will enable stronger oversight by the Law Society of British Columbia. But it is important for me as a lawyer to say that generally lawyers serve their clients very effectively and with very few complaints from the public, as my friend from Nanaimo said.
Of the 1,200 complaints received by the Law Society each year in British Columbia, 80 percent have no legal merit, 13 percent are referred to a disciplinary panel and only 2 percent actually result in the review of a lawyer's competence. In case anyone thinks that 1,200 complaints in a year is a lot, I would ask you to think about the fact that we have 10,000-plus lawyers practising in the province. Figure out how many files they open in a year, and we're talking about hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of files. So 1,200 complaints — particularly when you end up with only 2 percent that actually result in a review of the lawyer's competence — is a pretty good record for the profession, hon. Speaker.” (ED: don’t believe this). “I practised law for ten years. For the last 11 years I've been an MLA. Prior to being a lawyer, I ran fly-in fishing and hunting lodges in northern Manitoba and the Northwest Territories and one on Hudson Bay. I've done the entrepreneurial thing from start to finish. I had occasion to hire lawyers a lot when I was in business. I know that we don't hear this often, and I was actually pleased to hear the member for Nanaimo say this. My experience [ Page 11507 ] with the lawyers that I've worked with on all of my files — and I worked with lawyers from across the country — was very positive. I found that the lawyers I dealt with were, for the most part, of good character. They were reliable, and they were honest. I know that if I received a legal undertaking…. Members may not be aware of what a legal undertaking is. Perhaps they are; perhaps they aren't. If you receive an undertaking from a lawyer, you can absolutely expect that undertaking to be achieved by the lawyer who's made it. I knew that I could rely on that undertaking without question. I have heard all the lawyer jokes. I've even told a few. As an English graduate, I do know the reference that the member for Nanaimo made to Shakespeare, and there's no way that I'm going to quote Shakespeare on this one here today. Somebody else can do that if they want to, but I'm not going to do that.
There was a very interesting study done quite a few years ago by the American Bar Association, and I'll never forget it. They asked several thousand people in the United States what they thought of lawyers, and a great many people didn't think very highly of lawyers. I know that's a terrible surprise, hon. Speaker, to you personally, but that was what came back. But there was an interesting exception. There was one kind of lawyer that, actually, most people really liked. They really thought highly of one kind of lawyer, and that one kind of lawyer was their own lawyer. It was the lawyer that acted for them. They liked that lawyer, but they generally didn't like lawyers. If there's a message there — and I think there is — I think that the very best test of the profession is whether the clients that a lawyer serves are happy with the service they get and the job that's done by the lawyer. And generally speaking, people are.” “Again, congratulations to the minister for bringing the amendments forward. This will strengthen the Law Society's capacity to look out for the public interest and, I think, strengthen the credibility of the profession that I'm a member of in our province.”
Does anyone really know what the Legal Profession Act and Subsections 15(1) “practice of law” and 15(5) ((‘)“commence”, “defend”, “prosecute”(’) actually mean?
Are we to take the three words together-“commence-defend-prosecute” or is each a separate action (ED: presumed undertaken by Grauer J.’s solicitor) “Commence”; *“Defend”; !“Prosecute”? (GPR says it’s an excuse to deny access).
Given that Glen P. Robbins only signed his name to the Notice of Claim “commence” – when he was not yet a party (could be a future third party as well under the rules) and thereafter all documents including an array of settlement documents were signed by IRobbins & FM and IRobbins affidavit of January 2014 asserting to Law Society of BC that all times and all places she was “commencing”, “defending” and “prosecuting” these actions on her behalf and further that she and FM paid the court costs – Why go after Glen P. Robbins? State Revenge – is the only explanation.
On its face, how many in the public would have any idea of the meaning of these provisions of section 15(5) under the State actor Law Society of BC’s statutory mandate the Legal Profession Act (BC), given that the provisions in 15(1)) (which precedes 15(5)) inform the {alleged} public interest that a person who is not a ‘professional paid for member of the Law Society and Bar Lawyer’, may lawfully act as a lawyer for another person so long as they don’t seek a fee or benefit?
That is what GPR understood, and IRobbins, his wife, believed it to be true as well. (ED: and so would 100/100 respondent citizens who are not practicing lawyers). (ED: The existing language post Legal Profession Act amendment is still confusing, and the facts of this case will confusion to assist in the largest case of institutional malfeasance in Canadian history – IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation). In fact, section 15(5) {verbs} (ED: action words)‘commence, defend and prosecute’ relates only to the filing of the documents at court registry (Grauer J.): “as a solicitor was won’t to do” “Solicitor of Record”) and not the goings on involving arguments made to decision maker in the (C)ourtroom itself (barrister judicial/constitutional discretion).
Notice of Claim Form: GPR signed his name to IRobbins “Notice of Claim” against BMO. The Notice of Claim form had replaced the historical “Statement of Claim”. GPR based his decision on the Legal Professions Act BC which permits anyone to be a “lawyer” (ED: In this case to his wife of many decades) so long as he (or anyone else) performing the work does not benefit (fee or other similar benefit) from work and effort provided and the fact the confusing new form only had a single line for “Lawyer for Plaintiffs”. The exception to the practice of law occurs within section 15(1), and not between 15(1) and 15(5). (ED(1): Definition of “Exception”: (noun) “a person or thing that is excluded from a general statement or does not follow a rule.” 15(1) was the original Exception to 15(5) in LSBC/GPR (before Grauer J.) “(5) Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court”. (ED(2): GPR says ‘We’re Rich’)
This is the amended version of LPA subsection 15(5). The exception in this amended provision still defers to section 15(1), and 15(1) is amended (2012) as follows: 15 (1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer to the extent permitted under the rules.” (ED: Here is the extent of those exceptions): (3) A person must not do any act described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the definition of "practice of law" in section 1 (1), even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, if (a) the person is a member or former member of the society who is suspended or has been disbarred, or who, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, has resigned from membership in the society or otherwise ceased to be a member as a result of disciplinary proceedings, (b) the person is suspended or prohibited for disciplinary reasons from practising law in another jurisdiction” “Except as permitted by the rules” is only ‘explained’ through (a) and (b) subsections by ruling out actual professional lawyers who have run afoul of the Law Society of BC.
It does not come near capturing Glen P. Robbins.
This would not capture the average individual who is not a “professional paid off Lawyer”. “No person other than a practicing lawyer” returns us full circle to the fact that any person is a practicing lawyer who does not collect a benefit or fee. Again subsection 15(5) points back to provisions of 15(1)…the amended language is as bad as that Grauer J. criticized. This is from Page 6 Para 21: “Just how these provisions apply to a person like Mr. Robbins, a non-lawyer who is acting for free as the representative of litigants to whom he is related in matters in which he has an interest, is not entirely clear. Previous decisions of this Court are not consistent, and the Court of Appeal has yet to resolve the inconsistencies. The problem arises from what I consider rather clumsy legislative drafting. Given that the legislation in question is the Legal Profession Act this observation is not without irony.”
Keep in mind the finding of Grauer J. that Glen P. Robbins had an “interest” in his Honeysuckle Home. (ED: The issue of “standing” refers generally to those person referenced in the Style of Cause the front page of the Notice of Claim or Petition that lists plaintiffs, defendants, petitioners, respondents, third parties etc.). In most generic foreclosure petitions other respondents often referred to as Jane or John Doe Tenant are included. Since Glen P. Robbins paid the mortgage could he not also be interpreted to be a Tenant?
Page 6 Para 22 from Grauer J.: “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law”. The definition is non exhaustive. It includes such matters as “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling…a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and “doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages.” “It specifically does not include, however, “any of those acts if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect from the person for whom the acts are performed.” (ED: So drawing (producing) a document for use in a court proceeding...could refer to a notice of claim or a petition. How would anyone know for sure what approach to take to the Court in all this legal *legal goat talk (“LGT”)). The fee benefit stipulation excludes all of the acts if those acts are linked to a fee or benefit in the case of non lawyers. So philosophically and linguistically if no fee is collected any non lawyer can actually do as they please including filing of documents at Court Registry.
Let’s be serious, Cambridge Mortgage obtained 3 court orders during a stay of execution and later rigged its filing and service document to avoid declaring this fact to the Supreme Court of Canada in IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage (35772).
From Page 6 Para 23 Grauer J: “Given that such acts as appearing as counsel, drawing documents for use in a judicial proceeding and negotiating settlement do not constitute the practice of law if done for free, one might reasonably assume, as does Mr. Robbins, that the Law Society would have no interest in such conduct…it is concerned, after all, only with the practice of law, authorized or not.” If a non lawyer is the author of the Notice of Civil Claim produced in collaboration with family members – and is not accepting a fee or benefit why shouldn’t they sign as “Lawyer”?
From Page 6 Paragraph 25 Grauer J: “It is not immediately obvious why subsection 15(1) (a) permits an individual party (whatever that means (ED: Grauer’s words) to a proceeding who is acting without counsel on his or her own behalf to engage in the practice of law, when by definition, the practice of law would appear to include such activity. One must assume, I suppose, that since the definition is non exhaustive the practice of law may be taken to include other activities not covered by the definition, even when no fee is charged.” The nature of this assumption is unclear.
From Page 6 Paragraph 26 Grauer J: “It is also unclear why subsection 15(5) includes the redundant words “in the persons own name”. Given the provisions of subsection 15(1) and the definition of “the practice of law”, these words would appear to be superfluous, and detract from the clarity of the subsection.” Grauer J. has also taken the two subsections (15(1) and 15(5)) and tied their linguistic deficiencies together – making it better to conclude that as a result both provisions lend greater confusion to one another.. and should certainly not form the basis for any order against the ‘ambushed’ Glen P. Robbins and by extension IRobbins et al. Subsection 15(5) of the LPA is redundant or repetitive (meaning the subsection is unclear for redundancy because it dealt with in 15(1) under general authority to practice law making 15(5) not only unclear but unnecessary). (ED: I can hear comedian Jerry Seinfeld mocking this whispering… ‘what do they mean... what do these people want me to do?’)
If 1,000 respondents were asked in a public opinion poll by RSR ROBBINS the most accurate public opinion pollster in the World: if they understood section 15(5) as it was before or after Grauer J. how many would answer “Yes”? How many would understand the present ‘condition’ of language in Legislative amended (Royal Assent) subsection 15(5)? (ED: GPR says the language problem in subsection 15(5) both on its own and considered in context of other provisions including particularly subsection 15(1) {practice of law} is sufficient to demand it be totally rewritten). In return- (the art of a BC Deal) the legal profession was permitted to sign off on mortgages registrations they knew to be illegal.
Mass Settlement of Parties in BMO: All defendant parties except BMO settled the matter of BCSC 106413 including Daniel Webster for Robert Ellis. The settlement arrangement was then filed as Consent Order between and among all parties, and was acknowledged and accepted by Adair J. In Ellis/BMO’s case his lawyers and all other lawyer’s signature (a stipulation demanded by Daniel Webster) included the entire defense of the claim. BMO was offered settlement on the same basis as all other parties but refused despite the agreement by all lawyers at Trial Scheduling desk including Daniel Webster – who did most of the talking—to do so. The deal was everyone settled and everyone signed off, which was done…except BMO.
The settlement involved No payment of Costs by any party. Since the claim against Ellis was settled, and he is a legal insider, and member of State actor Law Society of BC, to State actor BMO Bank under federal legislation, than Robert Ellis is himself a sub State actor, and those pleadings of HIS defense that are thus settled should never have permitted him to stay on as legal counsel as it placed the proceedings in a state of conflict with that settlement in his role as Insider to the Bank. Robert Ellis did not contest the Consent Order signed by himself and his legal counsel Daniel Webster QC and delivered to IRobbins and all other parties. The 15(4)(5) defence Ellis’s lawyer Daniel Webster QC would be presumed in good faith to be included in the Consent Order with Robert Ellis and is thus precluded from further ‘prosecution’ by BMO. (ED: Michael *Kleisinger the lawyer responsible enforcement of the Legal Professions Act empowered and paid by the Law Society of BC was in court for both appearances before Adair J. inclusive of trial as a spectator. He had sat as 2nd chair to Elizabeth Lyall of Fasken Martineau (now Fasken), high profile insurance lawyer in Law Society of BC v Glen P. Robbins (S111171), where Lyall was ‘thumped’ so badly by GPR’s response to her submissions that Grauer J. spent an afternoon of trial contemplating GPR’s theoretical takes on right of audience and Catholic theology, which made it to the Vancouver Sun where Grauer J’s Reasons reported the justice referring to Glen P. Robbins as ingenious).
(ED: Davies J. makes order GPR ‘be treated as lawyer at all times’ (1996), Linda Loo J calls GPR “heroic” (1997), Grauer J. calls GPR a “genius” (sic)).
He was also aware of Robert Ellis’s defence relating to pleadings prepared by his solicitor Daniel Webster as these related to the Statement of Defence prepared and filed on behalf of Law Society State agent Robert Ellis. IRobbins through GPR also claimed on Court Transcript before Adair J. BMO had never filed and served a Statement of Defence. (ED: Michael Yamamoto, a long time process server for BMO, who sometimes spoke with GPR (and GPR’s associate) for short periods of time at IRobbins Honeysuckle Lane residence, handled ALL of the process serving for BMO in the case (and generally), admitted he never served a statement of defence to either IRobbins or FM).
At trial, Justice Adair agreed with BMO’s Rule 8 application that the Notice of Claim filed by IRobbins was res judicata the previous foreclosure process. At both hearings Glen P. Robbins attended to speak for his wife with her consent with Powers of Attorney and most importantly with her direction. Justices of Superior Courts in Canada have discretion to approve or deny a right of audience to any person before them. Justice Christopher Grauer acknowledged this Constitutional reality (“of this there is no doubt”) in LSBC v Glen P. Robbins (BCSC S111171), (Glen P. Robbins v Law Society of BC at Supreme Court of Canada (35302)). At the initial IRobbins BMO hearing Justice Adair directed that Glen P. Robbins be permitted to speak on behalf of the plaintiffs at trial so long as one of the parties (IRobbins) attended to the court with him. Adair J. apparently had no difficulty hearing from GPR, (she just wanted at least one of the plaintiffs in the room). She set conditions for granting a right of audience, a choice which falls under her constitutional authority.
She approved GPR for right of audience with condition. Any breach of subsection 15(4) OR 15(5) was of no bother to her.
How did Fenlon J. get it so wrong in Cambridge Mortgage? Was it her intention to appear to be mystified by the language of subsection 15(5) much like the wrestler being distracted by crazy people at ringside yelling at them, distracting them to error? (ED: ‘Empress’s (sic) new clothes). Or was Fenlon J. more clever than that, taking the recess break – to concoct a decision to say that invoking the Grauer J. order in the abstract of subsection 15(5) (Ed: with different words than in the new amended language from Royal Assent) divorcing the subsection from the Reasons for Judgment -as being within her constitutional discretion (ED: to help out her former boss Elizabeth Lyall at Fasken Martineau)? Constitutional discretion does NOT include reinterpreting a fellow Justices Reasons for personal or professional benefit.
Further, considering not only the troublesome nature of the language in the provisions of both subsections 15(1) and 15(5) and the fact that the version which existed at the time Fenlon J. made her decision was not the same version in the Grauer J. order –and the obvious lack of linkage to subsection 15(5) to any matters involving right of audience – there were no substantive grounds to support Fenlon J.’s misapplication of her discretion to include administrative law of the Legal Professions Act. …and the grasp of legal concepts stare decisis and judicial comity-how unfair is it that the outcome of the BMO case where right of audience was granted with attendance by a party – ultimately denied Glen P. Robbins a proper hearing on right of audience? The Transcript evidence reveals Fenlon J. did not know or did not want to appear to know anything about the Legal Professions Act. What was she doing? (ED(1): GPR had conducted a trial hearing in 1997 before Justice Tysoe then of the lower superior court in Coast Paper v Sunsphere Enterprises, where GPR defended Sunsphere on behalf of principle Murray Cameron. Current BC Supreme Court Justice Arne Silverman then a lawyer acted for Coast Paper. Murray Cameron was in attendance. GPR had Silverman’s application thrown out).
(ED(1): GPR had conducted a trial hearing in 1997 before Justice Tysoe then of the lower superior court in Coast Paper v Sunsphere Enterprises, where GPR defended Sunsphere on behalf of principle Murray Cameron. Current BC Supreme Court Justice Arne Silverman then a lawyer acted for Coast Paper. Murray Cameron was in attendance. GPR had Silverman’s application thrown out). (ED(2): Sunsphere Enterprises included a 20 year list of monies having been loaned to Mitch and Nadine Tannis as part of a Ponzi type scheme.
Given that Adair J. (IRobbins v BMO) had no problem in granting GPR a right of audience on condition that at least one of the plaintiffs be in attendance, and given that she amended HER original order to permit GPR under that same constitutional discretion to speak to costs on behalf of those same persons she deemed ought to be there, doesn’t this then raise the obvious question as to whether a procedural order of right of audience for Glen P. Robbins to speak on behalf of IRobbins had in fact occurred? The ascension by the hand of judicial powers to a right of audience must be an important thing or is it just an ordinary thing? If we accept that procedural approval was made by Adair J. for Glen P. Robbins to speak (ED: Given he does a lot of speaking on the Court Transcript in this BMO case) on IRobbins behalf than he was acting as a barrister and not provided with full opportunity to make IRobbins case in contravention of her Legal Rights.
It should mean something – the cause and ‘affect’ of these contrary actions and orders-cost IRobbins et al $6,000. The value of IRobbins paying this amount is that a dollar amount of some note imprints the case where she (the plaintiff) was not provided with Legal Rights including (but not limited to) equal access to the court registry or to the courts on the basis of fraud. This $6,000 is an actual charge levied by Adair J. against one party who has suffered an episode of cancer. Who in their right mind would not have lent some compassion to the situation – what was the prejudice to the big bank – BMO Banks? The $6,000 + in court fees solidifies the legally inferred proclamation of Adair J. that the originating document – the controversial Notice of Claim was credible, the degree to which the pleadings attained a high degree de minimus standing is of no matter—to the central reality that a trial date was set by order of a justice who also seized herself of the trial and made a decision (rightly or wrongly) on the merits of the case.
The controversial Notice of Claim document featuring Glen P. Robbins including his name under the forms line at the end of the document for signing “Lawyer for Plaintiffs”—is a valid legal document with unimpeachable connection to a number of orders on the file. If it were not a valid legal document then BMO could have simply made application for an Order for Dismissal on the basis of no claim on the basis of the defective Notice of Claim. BMO sought out a decision from Adair J. to make her decision to its application for dismissal on the basis of Res Judicata. In a way this was a tactical mistake by BMO as it gives further credibility to the entire case inclusive of the Notice of Civil Claim? How can the contents of this document as the originating document in commencing the action – with BMO not seeking any additional orders relating to the ‘condition’ of the Notice of Claim at its application to dismiss-including Glen P. Robbins signing his name as “Lawyer for Plaintiffs” .
The Notice of Claim document must be deemed to be a valid original filing in case No.: BCSC 106413 IRobbins v BMO Bank and any of so called prohibitive actions be deemed to have been dispensed with by Adair J.’s decision with Grauer J.’s decisions subsequent to that were res judicata to BCSC 106413. The $6,000 Costs assessment in comparison to other similar cases was excessive and should have in context – been seen by the Law Society of BC has more than sufficient financial penalty. What was the point in going after Glen P. Robbins (BCSC S111171) or BCSC 1310 (ED: or whatever new docket # used to hide the bodies) or any new case file dreamt up behind GPR’s - IRobbins back)? Both IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins not only have their basic and legal rights trampled, their freedom of speech is also subverted by these actions.
If Adair J. really had the interests of IRobbins et al on her mind as she proclaimed on Court transcript to one and all in open court, why would that include a decision to permit Glen P. Robbins to then speak to Costs without satisfying the condition she imposed on the file relating to his speaking on behalf of the plaintiffs? Adair J’s decisions reflects a type of lapse of consistent focus and unclear reasoning, particularly as this concerns her comments on Transcript Record of the Court that she was aware of the Davies J. order of 1996 that Glen P. Robbins “be treated as a lawyer at all times”, her acknowledgement that the Davies J. order exists, and further comment that she did not interpret it that way puts even greater doubt on the overall process of this matter under BCSC Action 106413 – the “progenitor” of Law Society of BC v Glen P. Robbins (S111171) (ED: Note that this file # S111171 has been changed (manipulated) by the court to another file Number and applied in other cases where Glen P. Robbins case is oft cited).
Now Davies J. might have intended a number of things. He might have intended his order to be relevant only to that case. He might have intended it to mean anytime in the future GPR attended to speak in Court. GPR attended once without party and then attended again with party. Madame Justice Loo refers to Glen P. Robbins as “heroic”, Mister Grauer J. refers to Glen P. Robbins as “ingenious”. (ED: GPR obviously can handle himself well in any courtroom). Does GPR come under assault by the Law Society, the Government of British Columbia and particular unaccountable appointed justices because he is unworthy of speaking on behalf of others, or is he simply better at making arguments than most lawyers he is free of charge and in legal compliance under subsection 15(1) of and has 15 rounds of fight in him? Is it possible that Glen P. Robbins is better at law than many of the justices appointed even if he hasn’t one day of law school training? Is it possible? (ED: Keep in mind that Supreme Court of Canada Judge came from being a lawyer without judicial experience). Read on… Certainly Adair J.’s reference to Davies J. 1996 order and her position that is not how she thinks he intended it is unfair. What was the rush…why not seek simple clarification from Davies J.?
(ED: Later readers will discover that in one of the three orders Bakonyi obtains for Cambridge Mortgage during Stay of Execution order of Kloegman J. made April 7, 2014 {and later defrauds Supreme Court of Canada with} was dismissal of application by GPR to be added as a party – deceived Davie J. himself (2014) who is one transcript saying he would have heard from GPR save for Hinkson CJ/Michael Kleisinger fraudulent filings and 3 week notice Hinkson CJ kangaroo court).
One Party needs cancer emergency cancer surgery – a short delay for compassion’s sake. On the evening before the 2nd attendance under Trial designation a plaintiff related to IRobbins (“FM”) had a serious episode relating to life threatening cancer she had developed. Naturally she could not attend the trial date and IRobbins decided to support her mother through emergency visits to Specialist and to support her while her husband GPR sought a continuance. (Even) Robert Ellis for BMO told the court that his office phoned the specialist involved in FM’s matter confirming the seriousness of the cancer. (ED): How Ellis was able to do this and breach privacy is still unknown but is on the transcript of the proceedings?). “FM” was operated on for her cancer a few weeks later and remained in hospital for some time afterward. (ED: GPR for IRobbins had in fact utilized boilerplate type provisions from other filed documents involving for profit lawyers, anticipating this mainstream media type of editorializing in the court might arise. GPR riddled…. The…… transcript… with… sufficient… material… to make this clear (if Adair J. herself hadn’t been receptive to this clarity).
Moreover, GPR had included some elements of the evidence within the pleadings knowing that the filings were a public document. (ED: He had done this previously with member(s) of the Law Society in large settlement matters covered by keep quiet provisions). The transcript of the IRobbins-BMO matter was sent by GPR to Canadian Judicial Council including transcript evidence exposing Adair J’s inconsistent positions that on one hand the notice of claim was incomprehensible, and the other, that she had not read the notice of claim. (ED: The devil in the Transcript will do little to assist any potential spin to Adair J.).
Adair J. in Law Society of BC v Boyer on section 15(5) (2016). Adair J. does not understand how section 15(5) works. Law Society of BC v Boyer is proof of this. If Glen P. Robbins is guilty of breach of subsection 15(5) as Grauer J. determines, then the Notice of Claim document should be a legal nullity and IRobbins and FM should not be paying any Costs. What did they do wrong? In Law Society of BC v Boyer (2016) Adair J. sits on a Law Society of BC case involving section 15(5). Her Ladyship suggests that new case law since Grauer J. intended 15(5) is to be interpreted to mean a person could not be a “driving force”. Adair J. ‘appears’ ‘ to be trying hard’ ‘to make it appear’ that these two words (“driving force”) are linked in some way to substantive case law from the Legal Profession Act and subsection 15(5), when in fact there is NO connection whatsoever.
There is in fact only Grauer J.’s characterization of section 15(5) using words (“driving force”), to characterize the distinctive actions of a solicitor filing documents at BC Government court registry. (ED: Like using the words ‘launching’ a lawsuit—the legislation rules and regulation would find little opportunity to use words like “driving force” or “launch”). Grauer J. explains this in his Judgment, distinguishing between the current practice of “Solicitor of Record” on documents filed at court registry, and “Barrister” who appears at public hearing before a Judge. Yet in Boyer, Adair J. references the Glen P. Robbins – Law Society of BC case decided by Grauer J. and predominantly used by Adair J. in her Reasons, incorrectly applies the actual Grauer J. reasons to this erroneous language of driving force heaped on top of the already nonsensical subsection 15(5) (“commence, defend and prosecute”), or alternatively “commence”, “defend”, “prosecute” not actually reflected in Grauer J.’s Reasons and is a deliberate attempt by a Justice of the Court to confuse and distract from the fact that Grauer J.’s conclusions that subsection 15(5) had nothing to do with right of audience matters.
Adair J. would have us believe that “driving force’ boundary would include (1) husband and wife at local College discussing legal circumstances and what should be included in lawsuit; (2) the filing of documents at court by an actual party in the case, and (3) attending to court – acting like a lawyer. (ED: Law Society of BC should focus a little more on education). 15(5) wasn’t the primary reason to go after the respondent Boyer in LSBC v Boyer– there were a litany of other negative assessments of his conduct involving situations where incarceration might occur. (ED: providing essentially the cover for the driving force con).
In my hypothetical case where a real lawyer – a solicitor files – a Notice of Claim on his client’s behalf provides a bill for services, and then the client takes over the matter – would a change of solicitor be required? Of course not. Who would be the driving force in this scenario? Would the original real lawyer solicitor filing the commencement document be the driving force or would Joe or Jane Plaintiff who conducted their own 15(1) prosecution and or defence of the claim be the driving force? Or would it be a joint driving force situation? This tends to make a discerning reader believe Adair J. volunteered to slip into alternative made up -lingo- “driving force” to aid and abet the Law Society of BC to intermingle this confusing language (to the already confusing language) the actual substantive provisions in the Legal Profession Act (BC) a finding made by Grauer J., … …in an attempt (it would seem) to ‘rinse out’ or otherwise deplete the force and effect of the case record of the Grauer J. decision, or otherwise reduce its impact for proper enjoyment by Glen P. Robbins, (and in this case) his wife IRobbins.
The right to deny this legal right is discretional to the judge, but the judge (Fenlon J.) did not have the Legal authority to misrepresent the meaning of the subsection 15(5) order (ED: flimsy as it is on its face) in context of the actual Reasons provided by Grauer J.. Fenlon J. also did not have the Legal Right to ignore Glen P. Robbins pleading with her to read the Reasons – at recess. This is part of her job. In the end Fenlon J. failed miserably in her job as justice – either she was in on it with BMO and Cambridge – or she is lazy and incompetent for the job. Glen P. Robbins made both of these out arguments through the substance of a criminal case against Bakonyi, Cambridge, Ellis, BMO, Hinkson CJ, Fenlon J and others---- in Google v Equustek and Intervenor application, (IRobbins) and Glen P. Robbins effort to get attention of the Supreme Court of Canada onto the fraud Bakonyi and Cambridge perpetrated on their Court under this file number (S.C.C. 35772). - as a consequence of Fenlon J. interpreting subsection 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act as being one and the same as matters pertaining to right of audience is farcical to embarrassing (for the State).
-Fenlon J. could apologize and say she was wrong – and reconcile the mistake she made by refusing to take an afternoon court recess to read the Reasons of Justice Grauer 2011 asserting that 15(5) was unrelated whatsoever to the constitutional discretionary authority entitled to a justice with respect to right of audience matters. If Fenlon J. admits this was a mistake – we are half way to discovering the problem and closer to a solution. Isn’t this what everybody wants? Fenlon J. did not have the breadth of constitutional discretion to link the matter of right of audience to the matter of subsection 15(5) as the constitutional discretion comprising all right of audience as subsection 15(5) relates to the provincial mandate for the Legal Profession Act and the other relates to constitutional discretion of a provincial justice of a superior court in the Province – who is an employee of the Federal government of Canada by virtue of the Judges Act.
Fenlon J. clearly enunciates a causal legal connection between BC LPA subsection 15(5) and Constitutional discretion and does so by (incorrectly) reinterpreting the Reasons of Judgment of a fellow justice (Grauer J.), (ED: an exhibition of contempt toward that justice if there were any). GPR and the plaintiffs believe that Fenlon J. was purposefully misinterpreting 15(5) from Grauer J. as an excuse to deny the right of audience and put the order nisi in place to give Cambridge Mortgage and Peet and Cowan Financial an advantage in foreclosing the property. Fenlon J. had Grauer J.’s ‘eezy peezy’ to read Reasons for Judgment (available to her at the long court recess and would have seen her former boss’s name “Elizabeth Lyall” as representing the Law Society of BC in the matter heard by Grauer J.). Fenlon J. might have appropriately elected to have granted an adjournment order and recused herself, not ‘rewritten’ Grauer J.’s judgment for her former colleague and other lawyers benefit. A subsequent justice hearing the matter could then have been provided with a distinctly separate application from the foreclosure petition relating to right of audience. The Reasons of Justice Grauer could have been properly considered at that time and a right of audience decision made.
Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins Legal Rights are trampled by deception, guile and malice by persons with superior access to the courts or who have ultimate power in the court – who are determined to deny both of them basic human rights let alone Legal Rights provided under the Charter. The negative effect and imprint on their lives is enormous. This is a breach of stare decisis and judicial comity impacting both Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins Legal Rights under Charter because Adair J. like Fenlon J. is unfairly reinterpreting Grauer’s Reasons for Judgment as something other than it is. (ED: The law society of BC doesn’t want the language in the Legal Profession Act (BC) dealing with section 15(1) “Authority to Practice Law” to be clear, the only explanation is that ‘it’ prefers to hunt using flashlights (as it were).
There is no such case law or legislative (substantive law) required to produce the aforementioned ‘case law’ – Grauer J. had used to characterize the law generally as “driving force” ™. (ED: The actions of the solicitor are now known as “driving force” from new Canadian Ninja Law) BC Civil Rules demand the filing and proper personal service of a Statement of Defence, prior to filing an application for relief. (ED: Keep in mind a Counterclaim can accompany the Statement of Defence).
Section 15(1) BC Legal Profession Act (during the Grauer J decision 2011): We are all lawyers under the law like we are all people. Section 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act (BC) says so, every citizen can do anything a ‘for profit lawyer’ does, on the condition that he or she doesn’t receive a fee or benefit. This distinction alone is the only (relatively) clear aspect of Section 15 under LPA “Authority to Practice” at subsection 15(1). At the time of the Grauer J. decision (BCSC S111171), the provisions of subsection 15(1) inclusive of the exclusion to the practice of law has override over subsection 15(5) because the exception occurs in subsection 15(1) and not in subsection 15(5). The difference with professional lawyers (and the rest of us) is that they can become filthy rich (or just get by) during their working life performing only legal work, while (legally) the rest of us are incapable of doing this in the environment of professional law. The ‘rest of us’ have no choice in the matter, that is the law. It is really that simple. To the for profit professional lawyer this is vocation, it is not for the non lawyer. This is common sense. The common sense becomes lost when we read this legislation: “No person shall commence, defend or prosecute”.
Section 15(5) must reasonably be considered to be a trap set for non lawyers by the Law Society of BC and BC Attorney General to protect their industry. (ED: Many States in the U.S. accommodate 3 times the self litigants that BC and Canada does). How else could people apparently well educated in law tolerate the confusion for so long? It is like a common psychological impediment to an entire Institution. Grauer J’s decision (2011) may be the best rendition relating to 15(5) over a decade it certainly acts as a bridge to Chief Justice Brenner’s comments in (2005). Grauer J.’s determination is affirmed by Fisher J. in LSBC v Parsons (2015) and then again later by Bruce J. in LSBC v Bryfogel (2015). Grauer J.’s 14 page (double spaced) Reasons are fraught with error (or other) and a lack of particularly cogent reasoning, particularly as this concerns subsection 15(1) and its accompanying exceptions. The lurching awkward overreach from linguistically challenged subsection 15(5) was mocked by Grauer J. The opportunity to save others in the public from its confusion was lost by Grauer J. and by the legislators who acted on Grauer J. but failed to fix the provisions.
Grauer J. did manage however to place the actions described in 15(5) in the lap of the solicitor alone, and differed from the constitutional right of audience he recognized constitutional discretion of the Court, a clear distinct and separate matter directly linked to the Constitution and Judges Act. (Remuneration as federal employee). (ED: Grauer J.’s clear disengagement of the barristers role in court hearing makes Fenlon J.’s later reasoning faux pas – incredible). Glen P. Robbins still does not agree with Grauer J.’s determination and is attempting through this ‘filing’ and declaration of “unique circumstance” in the “interest of justice” – to first show that subsection 15(5) is still in significant conflict with 15(1) the “Authority to practice law” beyond the aforementioned “exception” contained in 15(1), and second to show that no one from the lawyers to non lawyers to justices really understands the meaning of 15(5). and thus none of the ‘punishments’ fits the crime as this concerns both subsections 15(4) and 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act (BC) as it was before and during Grauer, amended months later.
Fisher J. referenced the Grauer J. order verbatim (ED: And with volume in Law Society of BC v Parsons (2015 BCSC Vancouver registry). She reiterated Grauer J’s distinction between the acts of a solicitor and that of a barrister. (ED(1): IRobbins through GPR had filed a 120 page submission to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015 further examining this distinction. The submissions were returned when Chief Justice Wagner (then a justice) sat of the fraud riddled IRobbins v Cambridge matters (35772) and declared the process vexatious, not knowing that he like a quorum of fellow judges had been seriously suckered by LSBC member Ron Bakonyi who lied to the court by not informing it he had received orders during a stay of execution). Either Adair J. did not know the law or as IRobbins believes she was being dishonest to disingenuous in her case with IRobbins v BMO & LSBC v Boyer.
Given Adair J.’s weak performance in IRobbins v BMO and the fact that both Grauer J. (the leading decision) and Fisher J. in LSBC v Parsons (2015) were clear on 15(5), the fact that Adair J. couldn’t figure this out 2016 by makes her overall conduct suspicious to dubious. GPR believes the Adair J.’s ‘seasoned reasons’ in Boyer are= designed to find an escape route for her friend Fenlon J. whose own suspicious actions in IRobbins v Cambridge =are both intended to ‘re spin’ an interpretation of Grauer’s Reasons (and will be featured later on direct from Transcript) details Cambridge v IRobbins). How many cases have the Law Society of BC and specifically Michael *Kleisinger pursued-- with more than a little help from dishonest judicial reasoning (ED: or what GPR calls ‘seasoning’ (like salt)) like Adair J. or Fenlon J. or McNaughton (Nanaimo) ---on the subject of 15(5) pushing this “Fake Law ™” driving force.
At Para [38] Grauer J. states: “It follows that if a person in the position of Mr. Robbins does nothing more than assist a party by appearing to speak on his or her behalf at the hearing for free, then he is not practicing law and the Law Society is in no position to intervene.” This is a conclusion made in Reasons for Judgment. The Law Society of BC did not appeal the judgment. Grauer J. is separating the actions of the Barrister and the Legal Profession Act entirely. Using Grauer J.’s Reasons it would be impossible as Fenlon J. mistakenly did in Cambridge v IRobbins, to intermingle any aspect of the LPA to the constitutional concept of “speaking” to the Court. Keep in mind Glen P. Robbins attendance to the court to speak on his wife is a voluntary action. The order(s) obtained by LSBC are from subsections 15(4) & 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act. The LPA subsection 15(5) order made by Grauer J. and cited as legal foundation by Fenlon J. in Cambridge Mortgage v IRobbins for denying Glen P. Robbins a right of audience – and her failure to read the Reasons for Judgment as a reasonable person would have done – and her failure to correct her errors despite being made aware of them, or alternatively, to apologize to Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins for her part in the contempt of court and fraud of court processes and procedures – should force her resignation.
“That person will be subject only to the court’s overriding discretion, in the case of persons who are neither litigants nor lawyers, to grant or withhold a right of audience.” “Where however, a person takes in hand not only advocacy or assisting in the drawing of a document, but also the overall “prosecution” or” defence” of a proceeding, “as a solicitor was wont to do”-then the Law Society may intervene.” Again – Fenlon J. in Cambridge Mortgage had to be deliberately and consciously in contempt of Grauer J.’s Reasons for Judgment in LSBC v Glen P. Robbins. Here is an excerpt from Glen P. Robbins application submissions to the Supreme Court of Canada – read by Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of Canada a case where Fenlon J. was also the judge:
“The court has an obligation to act in good faith. By ignoring Google proper- opportunity to defense in lawsuit particularly where the defendants response to civil claim was struck, and presumably default judgment is available, Google was not permitted opportunity to fairly and properly determine what the to what extent the plaintiff was responsible in part for any losses it claims, and for any opportunity missed to mitigate damage. It appears as if Justice Fenlon was acting more like a lawyer for Equustek than an independent justice. This is the same type of conduct my wife and I experienced in Robbins v Cambridge Mortgage. Simple arguments made unnecessarily confusing. In my opinion both courts abused its powers and authority a similar assessment which we would apply to the decision makers involved. Business loss to Equustek: Was there no estimate of business loss to Equustek by the defendant's actions? If Equustek was not satisfied with the volunteer actions taken by Google to assist it in mitigation of its damages.
The position of Schulman J. of Manitoba Court of Appeal in Dakota v Woods supports the contention that a declaration of ex parte hearing can be made in instances where a claim is undefended. We believe this case is precisely the type where this principle ought to be applied for default judgment. Google responded to the injunction application of the plaintiff, out of an extreme abundance of caution, likely fearing that if it did not, the lower court justice might have made an order against it if it did not. Given that Google is not a defendant, and the fact that the court struck the response to civil claim, is it fair to conclude that the application for injunction against Google involves essentially an undefended case. The rules pertaining to applications do not implore the respondent by using the word “must”, it says it “may” respond. The plaintiff and the court both knew a company with as much as Google has could not resist 'the bait'. What choice did it actually have?
B.C. Directors (Equustek) Directors: The Business Corporation Act (SBC 2002) Chapter 57 under Definitions @ section (1) “In this Act”: “affidavit”, when used in relation to a person, means; “(b) .. “the person is a corporation, or officer of the corporation (or legal department). “Foreign corporation” means a corporation that (b) has issued shares”. “Foreign corporation's jurisdiction” means, in respect of a foreign corporation (a) the jurisdiction in which the corporation was incorporated.” Corporate Relationships: 2.1) “For the purposes of this Act, one corporation is affiliated with another corporation if (a) one of them is a subsidiary of the other; (b) both of them are subsidiaries of the same corporation; (c) each of them is controlled by the same person(s)” *(see Robbins et al v Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation-Peet and Cowan Financial Corporation- BCSC H130330 and BCSC 149328). Section 32 stipulates: “Extraterritorial capacity” - “Unless restricted by its charter or by the Act, each British Columbia corporation has the capacity (a) to carry on its business....and exercise its powers in any jurisdiction outside British Columbia, and (b) to accept any lawful authority outside British Columbia powers and rights concerning the corporations business...” Under “Division 4- Company Offices” and section 34 (1) “Subject to section 40, a company must maintain a registered office and a records office in British Columbia.” Under Part 5 “Management” “Division 2” “Powers and Duties of Director, Offices, Attorney, Representation and Agents”; “Powers and function of directors”: Section 136 (1) stipulates: “The directors of a company must, subject to this Act, the regulations and the memorandum and articles of the company, manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the company.”
If a massive legal person like Google can be treated this way, the little person stands no chance, and the public interest must be claimed given the numbers of Canadians who operate on the Internet, and the millions who expect access to freedom of speech and expression through it. The court processes, particularly at appeal levels focus on the public interest. I provide the following in the public interest: According to Wikipedia (that's right – Wikipedia) “Economist Lok Sang Ho in his Public Policy and the Public Interest (published 2011) argues that the public interest must be assessed impartially and..defines it (sic) as the “ex ante welfare of the representative individual.” “Under a thought experiment by assuming that there is an equal chance for one to be anyone in society and thus could benefit or suffer from a change, the public interest is by definition enhanced whenever that change is preferred to the status quo "ex ante". This approach is ex ante in the sense that the change is not evaluated after the fact but assessed before the fact without knowing whether one would actually benefit or suffer from it.”
Lok Sang Ho is an Economist. The better economists will tell you that the discipline of economics can be an much art as science, though most people around commerce prefer to claim it more for its scientific implications (unless and until they fail to predict recessions as the economists at the top chartered banks did), than it is claimed for its art suggesting the art of the discipline is more difficult to grasp than the science). Lok's impression of public interest connotes “impartial” assessment, (certainly a criteria in presumption of judicial involvement). His position on the “ex ante welfare of the representative individual” is most interesting particularly in context of legal matters relating to legal class actions, historically, a relatively new court process. However, Lok Sang Ho describes the “enhancement” feature which ought to be sought for the public interest as “preferred change to the status quo” does not properly reconcile with the matters of class actions as the represented individual in the class action does more to reconcile legal efforts for efficiency and convenience with scarce resources, but does not presume to consider public interest “before the fact” given that, a class action is not commenced until there are lawful grounds for so doing.
Fenlon J. features case law of class action lawsuits in her reasons (well tied to participation of the SCC Chief Justice's decision making on the case), in order (it would seem) for reasons that escape us. A class action features a representative party, (but party nonetheless). In the Google matter, the defendants filed a response to civil claim which is a defending document. The plaintiff filed a successful application to have the response(s) to civil claim struck. It was so ordered by Fenlon J leaving only a plaintiff with no defendants. There is no longer a bona fide defence to the claim. From this vantage point a default judgment would be the anticipated move in fulfillment of the prosecution of the claim. The plaintiff could have sought a default judgment and made the case for a host of head of forecasting damages including punitive ones, the sky was the limit. Why wasn't this done? Which of the commencement, defence or prosecuting of claim did Google participate in? Google was “innocent” so none of the damages either obtained in fact or could have been obtained and made ready for enforcement were available to leverage Google. John Stuart Mill explained that “human happiness, even one's own, is in general more successfully pursued by acting on general rules, than by meaning the consequences of each act, and this is still more the course of general happiness, since any other plan would not leave everybody uncertain what to expect, but would involve perpetual quarreling.” It is difficult to apply John Stuart Mill's position on public interest to the Google case precisely, save that anyone proceeding under Lok Sang Ho's description to pre consideration of public good, would come to conclusion that an unsuccessful appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada will surely lead to a lot of “quarreling”.
Mills contribution is important to this case in the sense of his description of an understanding of general rules. Even the most fanciful of court litigators and justices must be wary of drifting beyond the general rules. The general rules understood in any litigation occurs in an adversarial process where the facts of the matter under the rule of law are placed before a person capable of making assessing on a case by case basis with full consideration of similar events which preceded it. In Robbins v Cambridge Mortgage matter before Fenlon J. (BCSC H130330), failed to recognize the reasons of colleague Christopher Grauer J. made October 3, 2011 under S111171. Simple judicial comity within her own court. Fisher J. later comes to Grauer J's rescue in Law Society of BC v Parsons in 2015 declaring as Grauer J clearly did on page 3 of his October 3, 2011 reasons in Law Society of BC v Robbins that anyone could seek leave to speak on another’s' behalf at court hearing. Lauri Fenlon J. also failed to recognize the obvious fact that the Grauer J. decision involved counsel opposing Mr. Robbins as being her former boss Elizabeth Lyall acting for the Law Society of B.C. in that matter. Robbins et al have made complaint that Fenlon J. did so on purpose calling into serious question her integrity and credibility.
The point here is that if Fenlon J. is not able to comprehend her constitutional authority in a file involving a circumstance as simple as someone seeking leave for right of audience and is unable to determine when it is 'right under her nose' that a provision in the Legal Profession Act cannot override that constitutional discretion in matters of determining right of audience, certainly Fenlon J. is not the right person to be determining this Google matter involving the progression of decision pertaining to International Comity, and is certainly not the person to have confidence in, in matters relating to the Constitution of Canada and the associated Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The plaintiff in the Google case is but one B.C. company. Indeed, virtually no information about the companies’ operators is available online. We do not know who any of the persons in charge of the company (Directors etc.) are. We are not told how many employees there are, or what annual revenues are, something which most companies like this are willing to speak about 'publicly'. We know that the entire province of British Columbia produces 12% of Canada's nearly $2 trillion economy (11th in the world). Ontario's GDP is nearly 40% of the Canadian total giving it a ranking of 20th in the World (Source: Wikipedia). BC government revenues annually are estimated at 44 billion (2014), while Google's for 2013 are estimated at $14 billion annually. Google operates 70 offices in 40 countries including office in Nova Scotia, Canada. We do not know Equustek's annual revenues.
In November 2012 the International Federation of Accountants published a consultation paper establishing its own perspective of the public interest. Entitled “Policy Position Paper #5 “A Definition of the Public Interest”: “The International Federation of Accountants defined the public interest as the net benefits derived from, and procedural rigour employed on behalf of, all society in relation to any action, decision or policy.” “The Assessment of Costs/Benefits evaluates the extent to which something is in the public interest in terms of costs and benefits while the Assessment of Process evaluates the extent to which something is in the public interest as a process – an undertaking that should reflect the qualities of transparency, public accountability, independence, adherence to due process, and participation that is inclusive of a wide range of groups in society.” We doubt that the International Federation of Accountants would consider this judicial decision in Google either at lower court or court of appeal to have produced “net benefits derived from, and procedural rigour.....on behalf of, all society in relation to the (sic) action, decision or policy.”
Google isn't a defendant, it isn't a third party, or any party for that matter. Google is declared an “innocent” business operating as “virtual” “In Rem” business enterprise. Fenlon J. designates the word “virtual” to the defendants who she determines to be “guilty” later striking their defense for not submitting to court process. In effect, Google has replaced the actual defendants as de facto defendant. The defendants who are 'guilty' benefit, while Google which is “innocent” become the losers, made responsible for the defendants who ought to be the losers. The plaintiff Equustek produces a physical product. Making this product requires buildings and manufacturing capacity. The plaintiff's product must be handled by the producer (the plaintiff) and by any purchaser of that product. It has size and is three dimensional. Google on the other hand does not produce a physical product in the same sense as we understand physical industrial products (i.e. motor vehicles, washing machines, blenders, toasters etc.).
Google on the other hand does not produce a physical product in the same sense as we understand physical industrial products (i.e. motor vehicles, washing machines, blenders, toasters etc.). The Internet is capable of producing three dimensional products but this is very new, the products are quite small and this capability cannot be reasonably compared to the industry of the plaintiff. The defendants operate in the same way as the plaintiffs (from what limited factual information the court derived) except the defendants produces their product in a “clandestine” manner. The fact that it is “clandestine” and not “virtual” as determined by the BC Court of Appeal, and suggests that the defendants are operating in secret, they do not want to be discovered because what they are doing is against the law. The defendants are the opposite of Google who is “innocent”. In what reasonable judicial application should a non party who is “innocent” be made responsible for a defendant party who is “guilty”? What isn't explained is how the defendants are able to continue to operate if they are in Canada as is suggested without running afoul of tax agencies in Canada or outside of Canada Wouldn't the court be able to provide an order on application of the plaintiff to obtain tax information from the defendants? Wouldn't tax returns of the defendants who had resigned from properly representing themselves as defendants provide some insight within functioning of available court order enforcement rules as to whether or not the individual defendants were earning money from the sale of product in contravention of Canadian Trade Mark laws?
To our mind there is a deficiency in the fact finding where there was a long period of time available to discover such information through court order enforcement provisions which would follow a default judgment. A company which produces a manufactured product which is physical cannot be “virtual”. Such a company operates “In Personam”. Google's “virtual” world of operation occurs in the midst of mostly copyright issues, and not in “Trade-mark” “markings” or even “Patent” considerations. This concept of being “virtual” is more realistically hinged to (“In Rem”) concepts including arguments relating to legal concepts. Left to its own abstract device “virtual” would not condemn the defendant by inference of the language to have done anything wrong. What it was doing wrong was involved “In Rem” activity. If this logic is accepted, then it is surely a stretch to make Google and “innocent”, “non party” the quintessential “In Rem” party the de facto defendant in a case involving damages to a plaintiff which is operating “In Personam”. The wrong doing occurs between two “In Personam” parties. A good apple and a bad apple. Google is not a fruit in this context, or even a vegetable, perhaps a cloud (for continuity of the abstract).
If the defendant's 'virtualness' is actionable as the case at lower court has determined than this 'virtualness' is unrelated to proof of the actual sale of physical product produced by the plaintiff and stolen by the defendant for its own sale. Websites showing the product for sale are claimed as “virtual” “guilt”. Do we have proof of actual sales of these products to a bona fide purchaser in order to support claim as economic loss? The court it seems has foregone its obligation that trial would have offered to make assessment of economic loss. Why wasn't this depth of process pursued in order to provide some substantive reasons for the depth of the losses suffered in order to better ascertain the damage to the Trade-mark prior to pivoting to the extremely onerous action by the court of bringing an innocent non party to place of injunction. If the defendants were operating outside of Canada as Groberman J.A. - believes, and the lower court as fact finder has deduced, then how did they do so? Canadian citizens cannot reside in the United States for instance for more than six months of the year unless they become U.S. Citizens.
On Intellectual Property: According to Legal Zoom.com a “Comparison Chart” within the realm of defining intellectual property concerns are described here as follows: (1) “Copyright” - “Authors, artists, choreographers, architects and other creative professionals”; (2) “Trade-mark” “Business and product owners”; (3) “Utility Patent” “Inventors”; (4) “Design Patent”: “Inventors and designers”. A virtual company operating “In Rem” like Google would unlikely be related to item (2) “Trademark”, and is more likely to become involved directly or indirectly with “Copyright”. The Internet is related to creative works as it is offered in Web design containing design or existing within words and language, as well as other “artistic” endeavours available through “links” which “links” are available to access to the aforementioned material. The Websites of the defendant by themselves are examples of artistic impression contained in charter rights of freedom of speech. A person or persons designed the Website. We don't who designed the Website, whether it was the defendants themselves or another group. We do know that the links and other information within the Websites is constantly changing. The defendant Website is controlled by certain parties presumed to be the defendant, or associated with the defendant. Both courts admit that links upon these Websites were moved around this proprietorial (“artistic”) Website.
Both levels of court agree that this movement in and about a Website alleged to be controlled by the defendant's whose location could not be identified was not Google's responsibility. The presumption of the lack of communication from the defendants as admitted by Fenlon J, at lower court, and the subsequent striking of defence, would suggest that the defendants believed the BC court could not get at them where they were at based on the volunteer actions undertaken by Google compelled by the direction the court took. This would suggest that the approach to furnishing a just outcome taken by Fenlon J. was faulty. The better approach would have been to move to a scenario involving default Judgment. The court has wide discretion in making determination in cases like this and ought to have availed itself of the opportunity to do so and to have had faith in the provisions available under court order enforcement rules.
In the Beals case (supra) there is talk about negligence of lawyers for the appellants involved. What of the lawyers for the defendants in the Google matter? Did the defendant’s lawyers advise their clients not to participant further in the court process realizing their clients would be better served after assessing the courts actions? The defendant would be in breach of Trademark in circumstances where a product under the scope and authority of that lawful Trademark were determined to have been produced from an unauthorized plant or other place for purposes of sale to interested third parties in relation to contract. Neither court level properly determined where the defendant contracts occurred although it is strongly suggested that it is outside Canada. If the plaintiff is not aware of business being conducted by the defendant within Canada but believes Google to be responsible on the basis that Google is doing business in BC, we must conclude that the provisions of the Act used do not apply to the defendants because they are not doing business in BC. How can the defendants in breach of the plaintiff's Trade-mark but not doing business in BC or Canada, and Google, not situated in BC, but selling ads to Websites in BC be made ultimately responsible? It would seem to me that in the moment there is relatively certainty the defendant is operating outside B.C. (Canada) then the BC court really doesn't command jurisdiction the way it did when the defendant were in breach while operating in B.C. (Canada), and the provision of the BC rules utilized to make order for injunction was used inappropriately.
Would it not have been easier for the court to assess damages against the defendants following the striking of defence inclusive of punitive damages, daily fines etc and permit Equustek to go after these through Court Order Enforcement rules? From Canada-United States Law Institution “Constitutional and Legislative Authority for Intergovernmental Agreements Between U.S. States and Canadian Provinces”: “{H}undreds of arrangements, agreement or memorandums of understanding exist directly between American states and Canadian provinces, without federal participation.” These sub national arrangements are (sic) known as “micro diplomacy”. “While the actual agreements that exist have been relatively well documented, the legislative and constitutional authority which allow the agreements to exist is rather ambiguous and can differ greatly from state-to-state or province-to-province.” “For state/provincial agreements to be legitimate, they must occur within certain constitutional parameters of the U.S. or Canadian federal systems.”
“Agreements, made directly between sub national units (states, provinces, territories, cities) are never governed by international law; rather, they may be considered either as contracts, governed by the national law of the parties, or simply informal understandings or arrangements which create a legal obligation.” “During the their 14th and 88th sessions, Congress issued statements clarifying its stance on the issue of foreign agreements made by the states, holding out that no transborder interaction required their consent, and that they will generally allow states to enter into agreements so long as the states actions did not threaten the centrality of the U.S. Federal government.” “Congress interpreted the aforementioned constitution clauses to imply that “the terms 'compact' and 'agreement' – with (sic) the prohibition being (sic) directed at any combination of these tending to increase the potential power in the States which may encroach upon or interfere with the joint supremacy of the United States.” “Canadian provinces are substantially more empowered than their American counterpart...when dealing with foreign power. The Constitution Act of 1867, on the issue of treaty power declared that”: “The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing their obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof....arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries...”
“Treaties, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, are” “international agreement(s) ...between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument, or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” “Similar to the American Constitution, this Canadian clause seems to have exclusively designated treaty making as a federal power. However, the paramount difference lies in the structure of the Canadian federal system. While the Canadian government retains the authority to make treaties, the power to implement treaties is divided according to the division of powers as per the Constitution Act.” “If a treaty affects an issue exclusively within the provincial realm, its ratification would require supporting laws to be passed within the province or territories.” “In Labour Convention Case, Lord Atkin holding that the Canadian federal government “could not..clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution.” “Nevertheless, though provinces wield some power when it comes to treaty making, the ongoing of their international interactions are still through the same informal agreements and arrangements that their American counterparts use.”
“The Canadian Supreme Court has also upheld the distinction between a treaty and an arrangement. In Attorney General of Ontario v Scott, the court examined the legality of a child support arrangement between Ontario and England. The court defined a treaty as “an agreement between states, political in nature, even though it may contain provisions of a legislative character which may, by themselves or their subsequent enactment, pass into law. But the essential element is that is it produces binding effects between the parties to it.” “In that case, the agreement at issue was upheld, with the (Supreme Court of Canada) finding that it contained nothing binding, as “the enactments of the two legislatures are complementary but voluntary; the application of each is dependent on that of the other: each is the condition of the other; but that condition possesses nothing binding to its continuance. The essentials a treaty are absent.”
Continued @: Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (4)

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