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Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (2)
  Mar 22, 2019

Commentary
Continued from Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (1)...
From Law Society of BC (Ontario – companion cases) v Trinity Western University (Supreme Court of Canada “In Brief” {synopsis}): “The Law Society of British Columbia regulates lawyers in B.C., while the Law Society of Ontario does the same in Ontario.” “One of their roles is to protect the public interest in deciding who can practice law in those provinces.” “Usually, a person who wants to become a lawyer must have a degree from an approved law school.” “(In TWU) Law Societies objective to protect the public interest included promoting equality by ensuring access to the legal profession.” (ED: This ties the practice of law in provinces to “usually” having a degree from an approved law school with the overarching “objective” of “protecting the public interest (how??).. “promoting equality ensuring access to the legal profession”). (Would Glen P. Robbins or any other ordinary person then be an unusual case – given his right to practice law is secure under subsection 15(1) ?).
The Law Society of BC interfered with Glen P. Robbins and IRobbins et al’s Legal Right to ‘practice law’, equal and fair access to the court registry as any other person, as well as Legal Right to a fair hearing including fair application of the Civil Rules and the law. (Then) “Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin’s view (sic) was that courts reviewing administrative decisions challenged under the Charter should first look at whether a Charter right has been breached. If so, the state act that mandates the decision has to show that the infringement was reasonable in a free and democratic society.” (ED: Note for later reading in context that BC Court of Appeal regular appeal filed by Glen P. Robbins – Ita Robbins was not an appeal of the foreclosure order. This ‘regular appeal’ has not been heard despite the error on Supreme Court of Canada saying it was so. Docket: IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage (S.C.C.35772).
(Both) “McLachlin C.J. and dissenting Justice Rowe said the analysis must focus on Charter rights (not values)…and “(T)he state actor (law societies) bear the burden of justifying those rights.” “Justices Suzanne Cote and Russell Brown…(W)riting in dissent…said the laws that gave the Law Societies their powers limited what they could consider in deciding whether to approve a law school.” “For them, the decision was only about whether graduates would be fit to practice law (competent and ethical).” “TWU v Law Society of BC (LSBC), Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) reveals the true nature of Law Society of BC scope of administrative Authority in a particular province: Its sole mandate is to educate and then license lawyers.” (From Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada) Rendered: June 15, 2018) (ED: In context stunning dissent, including Madame Justice Cote 1st lawyer never a judge to be placed on S.C.C. Bench and Brown J.).
Commencing at Part B of Judgment and Para (13) per the majority “Scope of the LSUC’s Mandate”: “The LSUC has the statutory authority to establish requirements for the issuance of a license to practice law in Ontario.” “In this context, it has set out a procedure whereby it accredits law schools for the purpose of recognizing degrees that will satisfy…(sic) the requirements for a license.” “At issue in this case is the LSUC’s decision not to accredit TWU’s proposed law school as a route to the legal profession in Ontario – a decision following within…LSUC’s role as the gatekeeper to the profession.” (ED: ‘Gatekeeper’ to the profession not to the Court itself’). “A question that arises is whether the LSUC was entitled to consider factors apart from academic qualifications and competence of individual graduates.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (14): “In our view, the LSA (the ACT) requires the Benchers to consider the overarching objective of protecting the public interest in determining the requirements for admission to the profession…”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (15): “The LSUC’s functions, and the principles it must apply in carrying out its functions, are…set out is s.s 4.1 and 4.2 of the LSA”: “Function of the Society”: 4.1 “It is a function of the Society to ensure that: (a)All persons who practice law in Ontario or provide legal services in Ontario meet standards of learning, professional competence and professional conduct that are appropriate to the legal services they provide; and (b)the standards of learning, professional competence and professional conduct for the provision of a particular legal service in a particular area of law apply equally to persons who practice law in Ontario and persons who provide legal services in Ontario.”
“Principles to be applied by the Society”: “4.2 In carrying out its functions, duties and powers under this Act, the Society shall have regard to the following principles: 1. The Society has a duty to maintain and advance the cause of justice and rule of law. 2. The Society has a duty to act so as to facilitate access to justice for the people in Ontario. 3. The Society has a duty to protect the public interest”. 4. The Society has a duty to act in a timely, open and efficient manner.” 5. Standards of learning, professional competence and professional conduct for licensees and restrictions on who may provide particular legal services should be proportionate to the significance of the regulatory objectives sought to be realized.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (16): “The LSUC is therefore tasked with, among other things, regulating the legal profession in Ontario, ensuring standards of professionalism and competence among lawyers, and fulfilling in various functions in accordance with its duty to protect the public interest.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (17): “Section 4.1 of the LSA establishes that ensuring standards of professional competence and their application to lawyers and paralegals is a function of the LSUC. However, the very language of that provision indicates this to be “a function”, not “the function” or “the only function” of the LSUC.” (ED: There are enough identifiable groups of professionals like paralegals, insurance or bank representatives or even officers of companies that are “able to practice law”. There is case law about who might represent aboriginal claims in courts. The point is that there are many listed exceptions and then there is the provisional exception (no fee or benefit) to support the theory that this is unreadable and incomprehensible legislation). The case law following Glen P. Robbins v Law Society of BC has not established sufficient clarity to be further workable). “That the LSUC’s mandate is further confirmed by the nature of the principles in S. 4.2, which task the LSUC with advancing the cause of justice, the rule of law, access to justice, and protection of the public interest. (ED: Keep in mind that IRobbins and Glen P. Robbins are members of the public & not members of any State organization which would include Law Society and BMO Bank as State actors. Provincial Superior Court Justices (paid handsomely under the Federal Judges Act) are State actors).
S.C.C. Majority at Para (18): “By the clear terms of S. 4.2 of the ACT, the LSUC must have regard to the principles set out in that section – including its duty to protect the public interest – in carrying out all of its “functions, duties and powers” under the LSA.” The LSUC as a regulator of the self governing legal profession is owed deference in its determination as to how these principles can best be furthered in the context of a particular discretionary decision.” (ED: This discretion would not include Reasons for Judgment of another Justice (Fenlon J. ignores Grauer J. (on purpose)(S111171) in IRobbins v Cambridge (SCC 35772), or original Cambridge v IRobbins Vancouver (BCSC H130330 (ED: Where most of the crimes occur). (This discretion would not include obtaining 3 orders without IRobbins in attendance during a period of BC Supreme Court ordered stay of execution (Kloegman J. April 7, 2014 order valid until April 30, 2014 to accommodate Trial Scheduling process at Vancouver courthouse set for May 1, 2014. 3 orders illegally obtained by Ron Bakonyi April 23, 24, 2014 during the stay period).
S.C.C. Majority at Para (19): “In this case (TWU v Law Society of BC, the LSUC (Ontario), the LSUC interpreted its duty to uphold and protect the public interest as precluding the approval of TWU’s proposed law school because the mandatory covenant (ED: TWU’s) effectively imposes inequitable barriers on entry to the school. The LSUC was entitled to be concerned that inequitable barriers to law schools would effectively impose inequitable barriers on entry to the profession…” “Ultimately, the LSUC determination that the approval of TWU’s law school, as proposed, would negatively affect equitable access to and diversity within the legal profession…which would be inconsistent with the public interest.” (ED: Given the nexus of substantive law particularly section 15(1) “practice of law” between paid for lawyers and non lawyers wouldn’t non lawyers – regular ordinary citizens deserve equitable access to the courts given the Courts are funded by all tax payer dollars in the first place?). (Wouldn’t the filing fees paid equally be evidence of this?) Legal Rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms remain legal rights for “all inclusive” of IRobbins & Glen P. Robbins.
S.C.C Majority at Para (20): “In our view, the LSUC was entitled to conclude that equal access to the legal profession, diversity within in the public interest in the accreditation context, which necessarily includes upholding a… public perception of the legal profession.” (ED(1): Shouldn’t the obvious deference paid to LGBTQ law students – in the public interest If that interest is contextualized to public perception include ordinary citizens not of the bar but who wish to practice law in their own way pursuant to the Rules of the Court and their own personal choice?) (ED(2): And IRobbins wanted to hire legal counsel who indicated it would cost her $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes to defend the foreclosure and attempt to have the mortgage struck from the registry and the original contract with Peet & Cowan Financial (sister company to Cambridge Mortgage (to save $400,000). (ED(3): Glen P. Robbins was merely seeking a recess to acquire documents and assist Ita Robbins with hiring of lawyer but not an appeal lawyer. The Court Transcript from the Cambridge Mortgage matter reveals Glen P. Robbins asking for the Notice of Hearing document and seeking an adjournment.
S.C.C. Majority at Para (21): “To begin with (ED: Akin to ‘commencement’) it is inimical (ED: harmful) to the integrity of the legal profession to limit access on the basis of personal characteristics.” (ED: “Personal characteristics” in terms of general language “limit access” can be read to include other groups of persons beyond the LGBTQ community ‘alone’). Ignoring IRobbins presumes special rights for the LGBTQ community as that community alone would have benefit of support of the Court. Are the courts unable to reconcile group or minority rights under the Charter and the rights of the Individual or a group of people in a family?
S.C.C. Majority at Para (22): “As well, eliminating inequitable barriers to legal training and the profession generally promotes the competence of the bar.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (23): … “Accordingly, ensuring a diverse legal profession, which is facilitated when there are no legal barriers to those seeking…access to justice and it promotes the public interest.” (ED: The language here speaks to access to justice conjunctive to the primary objective of “perception by the public” of the State actor “promoting” the “public interest”).
S.C.C. Majority at Para (25): …”(T)hat the LSUC should be concerned with maintaining and advancing the cause of justice in our view permitted the LSUC to consider potential harms to…as a factor in its decision making.” (ED: “Advancing the cause of justice” is “a factor in its (Law Society) decision making”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (30): “Administrative decisions that engage the Charter are reviewed based on the framework set out in Dore and Loyola. The Dore/Loyola framework is concerned with ensuring that Charter protections are upheld to the fullest extent possible…”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (31): “Under the precedent established by this Court in Dore and Loyola, the preliminary question is whether the administrative decision engages the Charter.” “If Charter protections are engaged, the question becomes “whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of Charter protections at play” (Dore, at para. 57; Loyola).
From Sub heading (2) Proportionate Balancing – S.C.C. Majority at Para (35): … “(T)he Charter protection must be “affected as little as reasonably as possible in light of the State’s particular objectives. “(R)easonableness and proportionality are synonymous.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (36): “The reviewing court must consider…” “an option or avenue reasonably open to the decision maker.” “The reviewing court must also consider how substantial the limitation on the Charter protection was compared to the benefit to the furtherance of the stated objectives…” “In the context of a challenge to an administrative decision where the constitutionality of the statutory mandate itself is not an issue, the question is whether the administrative decision maker has furthered his or her statutory mandate in a manner that is proportionate to the resulting limitation on the Charter right.”
S.C.C. Majority at Para (42): “Given the significant benefits to the statutory objectives (public interest) and the minor significance of the limitation on the Charter rights at issue, and given the absence of any reasonable alternative that would (sic) further these objectives; in our view, the decision made by LSUC represented a proportionate balance.” “The decision “gives effect, as fully as possible to the Charter protections at stake given the particular statutory mandate.”
Court filings related to central case @ BCSC H130330 IRobbins v Cambridge: “The Background”: The genesis of the problem: BCSC 106413: IRobbins vs. BMO (1)
In September 2010 Glen P. Robbins (“GPR”) “Not a lawyer” ™, files suit against BMO on behalf of IRobbins (his lawful wife). Powers of Attorney are granted to Glen P Robbins (“GPR”) by IRobbins and are placed on the court file known as IRobbins et al v BMO Bank of Montreal. The case IRobbins makes against BMO is predicated on contract conversion (and other pleadings) related to a BMO foreclosure of the family residence owned by IRobbins since 1993. From DLA Piper Publications: ‘On September 19, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “Court”) ruled in Bank of Montreal v Marcotte (“Marcotte”) that Quebec’s consumer legislation is applicable to federally related banks such that it provides the basis for consumer class actions in Quebec against the banks. In so doing, the Court rejected the bank’s constitutional arguments and held the banks were not immune from Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) with respect to the disclosure of credit card conversion’ and for “failing to disclose the conversion charges.’
The Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed: “There is no sweeping immunity for banks from provincial laws of general application” and there are “many provincial laws providing for a variety of civil causes of action that can potentially be raised against banks. The silence of the Bank Act cannot be taken to mean that civil remedies are inconsistent with the Bank Act.”
IRobbins v BMO (“The Causation”) IRobbins lawsuit (2010) asserts that BMO had initiated foreclosure proceedings against her property located at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, B.C., and (“Honeysuckle”) (2009) without 1st providing any Notice as it must lawfully do. IRobbins was in the 2nd year of a five year term contract with BMO, and wanted to maintain her rights under the agreement. The request for this 3 month break had been delivered through email to appropriate bank officials from the email account of IRobbins and via facsimile (both acceptable legal alternative) to her manager, (who she never heard from again). [ED: Given that CHMC asserts upwards of one in two Canadian mortgages is coming due this year (2018) and Glen P. Robbins asserts from years of investigation that one in six of these is a Made in Canada predatory loan, isn’t it time as we face rising interest rates that we confronted this problem and isn’t IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage just the case to do this?].
The lawyer for BMO bank (ED: A legal “Insider” under the Bank Act) Robert Ellis of Ellis *Roadburg failed to provide IRobbins with proper and lawfully required Notice of his client’s demand for arrears, prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings against IRobbins & her Honeysuckle Lane Home ™. No demand Notice was made for the whole of the amount owing (as indicated $198,000). (ED(1): Keep in mind IRobbins mortgage on her Honeysuckle Lane property at the time was $198,000 against a value of near $700,000 (now $1.6 million)). (ED(2): IRobbins’ mortgage payment of under $1,000 is soon to triple that amount because of the irresponsible foreclosure actions of BMO and its lawyer Robert Ellis subverting due process of foreclosure and disregarding a BC families basic rights in mortgage contract (and other breach of Charter Rights)). (ED(3): Keep in mind in IRobbins notice of claim (BCSC 106413), Ellis, the professional for profit lawyer is featured in IRobbins’ Notice of Claim as a defendant separate from BMO).
Canada’s State Bank Act demands that Ellis, a big bank & State actor BMO Insider, owes a “Duty of care” to IRobbins including no less in his additional capacity as a professional lawyer, a de minimus standard of conscience as an “officer of the court”, sufficient to recognize the foreseeable harm he and BMO were causing (and going to) cause to IRobbins, (including to her privacy). “158(1) Every director and officer of a bank in exercising any of the powers of a director or officer and discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer shall (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the bank; and (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.” (ED: The fact that paid for lawyers also members of the law society are referred to as Officers of the Court ratchets up the leverage for those law society members to act in the pursuit the justice, far beyond the expectations of the ordinary Canadian facing the same decisions. Lawyers are also depicted in legal folklore as ‘Attorney Generals’ by similar measurement of obligation. Unlike elected legislators lawyers do not swear any oath to Her Majesty, suggesting (if anything credible) a sense of neutrality with overarching duty to uphold the law – one reason Glen P. Robbins wants to see high up people do jail time).
No Notice – 1st contact between BMO and IRobbins – Lis Pendens – a public document (Breach of Privacy) The first time IRobbins becomes aware of any legal action taken against her Honeysuckle Home ™ (abruptly ending in the 2nd year of a five year agreement with BMO), occurs when she is personally served with Lis Pendens by BMO Bank. (ED(1): A Lis Pendens is filed by BMO Bank with Land Title Registry in New Westminster (ED: GPR Investigation reveals that like BC Superior Courts, Land Title does not check documents). (ED(2): So in terms of actual order of things, the accusation by IRobbins is breach of contract, the method undertaken (and discovered in full at Taxation of Bill of Costs) the evidence of it, along with subsequent filing of the Lis Pendens, create two clear causes of action (under consideration for running of time under Limitation Act BC), with new running of time instigated at point in time of Taxation of Bill of Costs, which reset in terms of Limitation Act (2 years for certain) does not conform to Foreclosure ‘enforcement’ process – at one year), and more particularly represents and unfair capturing of the presumed demand for IRobbins to defend her property from foreclosure petition when the very core of her defence are (at least) two clear causes of action permitting the petitioner (BMO) to gain unfair advantage. Why reward the petition which itself was improper as it failed to inform the court of the disputes and filing indiscretions?). So for context, the initial Notice must be provided by the lender State actor (BMO) to the borrower (IRobbins) pursuant to Law Society of BC directives for conducting foreclosures but does not have to be filed with the court along with the petition (as evidence the petitioner is making full disclosure of any triable issues). Why not?
The 1st document that breaches IRobbins privacy is the Lis Pendens, a document filed in two public State registries, Land Title and Vancouver Courthouse, Smithe Street, Vancouver, B.C. The lack of Notice is a separate cause of action based on the Law Society member (Ellis’s) obligation to faithfully serve the LPA State mandate- including the process the State Actor LSBC established for foreclosures of private property and enforcement of foreclosure and subsequent orders. Lack of Notice was material to the petition affidavit filed and wasn’t provided by BMO as it was lawfully required to do in the petition including the affidavit and exhibits.
For the Court to suggest it was IRobbins responsibility to follow the already flawed court process “commenced” by Robert Ellis of Ellis *Roadburg to correct it-- is asinine (ED : stupid or foolish) and certainly a dishonest breach of the BC Civil Rules. It must also be a fact therefore that by not ensuring Notice is provided to IRobbins she was thus unfairly disabled from fairly “defending” herself from foreclosure of her home-- with boatloads of equity in it. A distinctly constructed barrier to justice put up against IRobbins, Glen P. Robbins and their family like one might see in a South American country run by drug cartels, or an African country run by militants. (ED: Beginning to appear set up ?? – read on)
If as Adair J. (ED: Incorrectly) diagnosed the issue of breach of Notice ought to have been provided within the foreclosure process this would de facto place IRobbins in the “defensive” role of respondent, when the issuance of her order to send the matter to trial (ED: Evidence of satisfaction of de minimus standard) presumes evidence sufficient to hear the complaint - inferring then that IRobbins indeed does have a case to be heard (as plaintiff) against BMO (however weak or strong), and that her Notice of Claim is also valid as an originating document to a file (ED: “commencement” document). Adair J.’s decision to invoke a res judicata decision gives the State actor Law Society and its contributing member Robert Ellis for State actor BMO a far greater access to justice than IRobbins. This did not occur for IRobbins or her husband Glen P. Robbins. Access to Canadian justice ought to be at least close to equal.
(ED: This is important because BC Civil Rules indicate that a person who applies to be added as a party through a petition proceeding can seek orders from the court to strike the petition and permit the respondent (to the petition) to file a notice of claim (described later in BCSC 149328)). IRobbins notice of claim against defendant BMO Bank a State actor was thus used in the making of a final decision of a BC Superior Court (originating from Canadian Constitution 1982) based (apparently) on the merits of the case. How can an apparently invalid document (the notice of claim) be permitted to uphold a judicial decision in any event?
Rightly or wrongly, a determination made by a BC Supreme Court Justice on the apparent merits (res judicata) of a case must affirm the credibility of all of the documents involved in the court process leading to a final determination - lest the outcome be tainted by the poisonous filing of the Notice of Claim and the lack of BMO’s Statement of Defence being filed prior to its application to dismiss. If the Notice of Claim (BCSC 106413) is not a valid legal document (ED: as Grauer J. determines) this would suggest Adair J. could have --dismissed the claim on that procedural defect basis alone, rather than on the merits of the matter as the res judicata decision would support and more to the point, where it exists contaminates the court process. Alas, that is not what happened and justice was denied to IRobbins on this account. It would also suggest that Grauer J. made a different decision relating to the Notice of Claim than Adair J. did.
Grauer J. is thus res judicata to Adair J. The legal defence filed by Ellis for himself personally invoking 15(4) (and 15(5)) should be connected to settlement provisions made by Ellis lawyer Daniel Webster QC- thus making Adair J. res judicata to that settlement, and Grauer J. the third involvement of the LPA.
IROBBINS paid the overdue amount immediately: IRobbins receives Lis Pendens document through personal service and immediately pays nominal amount owing (ED: In total about $2,000 of home value circa (2009) of $650,000 ) - however the bank refused to stop the foreclosure process despite being made of the lack of Notice oversight. (ED: And that begins bad faith for BMO as BMO had a duty to disclose these objections to the court). By paying up the mortgage arrears, IRobbins was (also) providing BMO an opportunity to mitigate damage caused to her. (ED: No Court has ever rejected the position of IRobbins that a cause of action has occurred).
IRobbins offers ¾ of a million dollars as additional collateral (nearly $1,500,000 to cover off $200,000). The State actor BMO Bank thus had another option far better than foreclosure. (ED: Ellis and BMO didn’t want options – they wanted revenge). The malice in BMO’s bad faith is clearly identified by now, but “NOW” occurs within BMO’s foreclosure process –.
IRobbins takes this course of action out of an abundance of caution to the fact that the filing of petition occurred at Vancouver Courthouse on 800 Smithe Street (44 kilometers) and not in New Westminster Courthouse (14 kilometers) as it should have been. (ED(1): Most courts where Punitive Damages follow bad faith prefer the foundation of determining general damages first). (ED(2): All of the filing miscarriages of justice in context will be seen as a greater causation of damage particularly as we see how the actions of the State Actors becomes more and more desperate from IRobbins v BMO through LSBC v Glen P. Robbins and culminating in Cambridge v IRobbins and now IRobbins et al and Glen P. Robbins heading to BC Cabinet and Supreme Court of Canada for orders).
This vitally important subject matter of lack of Notice turns the master key on the ‘commencement’ of miscarriage of justice against IRobbins and her family home on Honeysuckle Lane. Both the ‘core and boundary’ of the State Actor Law Society of BC’s Legal mandate is to protect the public from ‘nasty’ actual lawyers –, this “commencement” is in legal causation - response to that fact. IRobbins informed BMO of this causation factor (the lack of notice), itself notice (threat of civil “prosecution” as that language is transplanted from speaking about prosecuting a criminal to litigating any case). This is sufficient awareness for BMO to have looked to mitigate damage – and then elected the responsible option of making a more reasonable bargain with IRobbins, beyond having her private domicile considered empty etc. and proceding with foreclosure with sooo… much equity as covenant.
The word “commencement’ can mean the beginning of something or even a commencement process at College pertaining to graduates. That ‘Commencement’ ceremonies are State sponsored in most if not all cases by some type of statute – set of laws or regulations – one can better see how the beginning document filed to commence a claim (like a solicitor) – is as Grauer J. clearly described. The process of foreclosure (ED: to be drummed away at for as long as necessary) begins with a petition document. The form for a petition is different than for the other common form – the notice of claim. The Petition falls under separate BC Civil Rule than a Notice of Claim. The Petition is supposed to be subject specific to the process (in this case) foreclosure and other orders involved under the BC Civil Rules for that procedure.
The onus in the foreclosure process is on the petition filer to include this material evidence of dispute and complaint to the ear/eye of a judge at trial. The affidavit in support of the Petition is filed prior to the end date for filing and serving a Response to Petition. Accordingly, on the court docket the petition and affidavit, either the former or latter or preferably both would disclose that there are issues in dispute. State Actor BMO and State Actor Robert Ellis were responsible to disclose this to the court and they failed to do so. By subverting fair and due process the State actors Bank of Montreal and Law Society member Robert Ellis stepped on IRobbins and FM’s Legal Rights.
Did Law Society member Robert Ellis have the right to ignore foreclosure processes mandated to its members and breach IRobbins Legal Rights on the basis of the public interest? How bad is the breach when weighed against the unclear language in subsection 15(5)? So, the very first thing a “For Profit Lawyer ™” and For Profit lender must do is to give Notice to the borrower. BMO sought and obtained clear advantage in foreclosure by breach of venue rules, no notice, and failure to provide full facts in court registry filing and to the Court (itself) at ex parte hearing. Did Ellis’s bosses at BMO order him not to provide Notice to IRobbins? Did Ellis Roadburg’s (the law firm) bosses at BMO order the firm not to provide Notice on any all other cases with BMO? According to Robert Ellis of Ellis Roadburg, his explanation for continuing on in Robbins v BMO Bank was that his firm handled all of foreclosure business for BMO in the Lower Mainland.
(ED(1): With fraud known to be rampant in BC Real Estate, and this known fact widely disseminated in the public domain shouldn’t the police be investigating the records of BMO, Cambridge Mortgage and their attorneys Ron Bakonyi and Robert Ellis of Ellis Roadburg?) (ED(2): Keep in mind IRobbins sought the Discovery of all notes, emails etc as between BMO employees or officers or between those individuals and Robert Ellis).
State of Actor Law Society of BC Practice Requirements on Foreclosures in BC: From BC Law Society “Practice Checklists Manual: Foreclosure”: “2.3.2 Identify whether the property is vacant, occupied or abandoned.” (ED: BMO/Ellis *Roadburg didn’t bother to check). 2.3.5 Venue: There are very specific rules as to which registry to use in commencing a foreclosure (Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 C.253, s.21”
“The intent of these rules (Venue) is to ensure that the proceeding is commenced in the registry closest to where the property is situated.” ‘In the case of foreclosure Vancouver and New Westminster registries are deemed to be the same registry “with the borrowers consent”.” “4. “Demands for Payment” “4.1 Determine who should be sent a demand letter.” “4.2 “Determine the form of demand” (e.g., a demand for arrears only, accelerated and demand for the full balance.” “4.4 “Send demand letter(s) and notices if applicable, send copies to the client and ensure methods of delivery.”
“5. “Prepare for Foreclosure Proceedings” “5.1 After the demand period expires, ensure that you have instructions confirmed in writing, to proceed.” “5.2 “Prepare documents”; “5.2.2 (d) Copies of the demand letter (e) Proof that any notice required has been given (f) A statement of no knowledge of facts constituting a defence.” “5.3 Meet the client (BMO) to review, sign and swear documents”
Ellis lawyer/Insider for BMO Bank declared IRobbins family home vacant: Ellis informed his client BMO that the “Honeysuckle Hacienda ™”was vacant, that no Canadian or any other people lived there. Ellis failed to conduct proper due diligence on IRobbins property and did not provide proper oversight of foreclosure process. (ED: Or does Ellis’s law firm not provide Notice as a matter of business efficiency, wink and nod here, here and right here?) At the time proper notice ought to have been sent, IRobbins owed one month’s mortgage under $1,000. A demand letter with proper personal service could have sought arrears only…issue resolved. $1,000 overdue results in taking of property – Following the BMO foreclosure process (filed in the incorrect courthouse) GPR on IRobbins behalf, appeared at the Taxation for Bill of Costs without IRobbins present.
The Dore Loyola criteria established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Trinity Western applied to IRobbins v BMO shows cause how IRobbins was negatively affected on the basis of Basic and Legal Charter Rights. The purposeful deceptive and malicious actions to eviscerate IRobbins access to justice, or alternatively to effect preferential access to the court registry for the -State Actor LSBC- with direct support for that objective undertaken by State agent Robert Ellis on behalf of State actor BMO Bank in conjunction with the State actor (Government of British Columbia) Superior Court Registry, and State Actor Attorney General of British Columbia are not what meets expectations of any reasonable person in a free and democratic society.
BC Supreme Court Master and Special Referee preside of Bill of Costs of BMO: A Master and a Special Referee presided over this ‘taxation’ of the BMO Bill of Costs. At this taxation Robert Ellis claimed costs for notice required under the Law Society Practice Checklist Manual: Foreclosure Proceedings, but when asked by the two presiding officers of the court if he could prove notice of demand he answered: ‘No, he could not.’ The fact that a Special Referee and Master were both presiding over the BMO Bill of Costs made this taxation unique. Two decision makers presiding over a taxation of Bill of Costs from a simple undefended foreclosure. Why?
Contract conversion is original subject matter intended to occur prior to the foreclosure petition. Without “full, plain and true” disclosure, and in the circumstances, by virtue of a series of miscarriage(s) of justice: (1) filing in the wrong venue for partisan advantage; (2) no disclosure in petition affidavit of potential issues; (3) no notice is not determined on merits by adjudication of the full facts, and the full facts were not known until the end of foreclosure, and not discovered until the Taxation of the Bill of Costs. Adair J’s decision in the IRobbins v BMO matter to dismiss on basis of Res Judicata does not hold up.
Adair J’s decision in the IRobbins v BMO matter to dismiss on basis of Res Judicata does not hold up. This taxation of the BMO Bill of Costs renders evidence of the clear breach in Law Society’s own foreclosure procedures for its members, including No notice, a clear requirement of all LSBC members as established in that Checklist Manual for Foreclosures in British Columbia. That BMO Bank had the option to permit the modest arrears to be repaid by IRobbins (as was done) is of consequence to the overall cause of action (BCSC 106413) and punitive damages that should now attach to this, particularly amid the circumstances (Supreme Court of Canada) and through BMO’s participation from start to finish including its inextricable complicity with Cambridge Mortgage. (BCSC H130330). (ED: Gift really). That is what a decent corporate citizen would have done, particularly when IRobbins had hundreds of thousands of dollars in equity in her Honeysuckle home (circa 2008).
Bad faith changes the complexion of any litigation. (GPR says: “Bad faith begins with BMO ™”).
Under BC Supreme Court Rules it is the legal obligation of the petitioner to disclose any possible deficiencies to their case on the front end. This is the least foreclosure rules can provide to homeowners drawn into foreclosure - given there is no direct appeal to BC Court of Appeal of the lower court order nisi. (ED: Foreclosure order). (ED(1): FICA (FISA) warrants in U.S. National security matters demand in ex parte application for warrant must also make the case for the other side). (ED(2): One can readily see what the lawyers like in foreclosure…roll the ball downhill. It is legislation built for bullies). State actor BMO negligently breaches the rules and IRobbins Legal Rights ™ . (ED(3): They must have done something improper as Adair J. set the matter down for trial, (ED: Which is never done unless the matter is to require more than 2 hours to be heard).
However, the extent of the State actor BMO and Ellis’s breach of Law Society rules could not be objectively fully assessed in any meritorious way until a hearing of the Bill of Costs, where Ellis admits that he did not provide Notice, and that IRobbins Honeysuckle house Ellis/BMO declared legally vacant in order to assist him/them jointly and severally in obtaining the foreclosure was in fact filled with a family of IRobbins Canadians and pet(s) Tucker and Pepper (who were both traumatized as well). (ED: If Ontario’s Rule 20 were laid over the Adair J. decision it would appear that she made a determination based on the merits of the case). (ED: I can hear the bank vault opening – wait for it - - now).
Thus the fulsome nature of the missing Notice surfacing at Taxation of the Bill of Costs IRobbins believes should be deemed to be the “commencement” point of the cause of action for IRobbins against BMO, not the point in time of the Lis Pendens registration, contrary to IRobbins interests and thus unfair being deceptive business practice (on its face).
Foreclosure Kills Credit no matter the Equity: Once the Lis Pendens is filed the IRobbins (or anyone else in her position) loses the opportunity to ever getting a decent mortgage rate again, primarily because of high broker rates, legal fees). This constitutes further economic loss linked to the causation of lack of Notice. This economic loss is stitched to the entire process extending to the Cambridge Mortgage matter. (ED: GPR estimates ‘broke’ Law Society of BC (2010 Chief Justice Bauman luncheon) members earned $200 million a year from involvement with these unregulated subprime mortgages).
Following the actions of State actor BMO Bank, IRobbins must now confront the predations of unregulated lenders sanctioned by the State in British Columbia. But for BMO’s actions – it is more likely (ED: based on statistical probability) that IRobbins would not have suffered any economic loss. (ED: IRobbins had paid off her home mortgage a couple of times since 1992 after a long history with Hong Kong Bank) –and this was the first issue involving nonpayment in nearly 17 years. (ED: Keep in mind nearly $60 million in unpaid fines (FICOM) {the group that formerly regulated currently unregulated lenders} occurs each year in BC. GPR asserts: if the unpaid fines are this high estimates would put the fleecing of unsuspecting British Columbians at upwards of $600,000,000 per year or $6,000,000,000 over the 10 year report).
The action of providing legal notice is demanded by the Law Society to its members involved in for profit foreclosure and must occur prior to the filing of the Lis Pendens. GPR maintains that Adair J.’s decision with respect to BMO’s dismissal order on the basis of res judicata should be overturned in the event the original foreclosure process is not declared a nullity. (Res Judita Legal Definition: “A matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be pursued further by the same parties.”).
In “The Doctrine of Res Judicata” (Donald J. Lange, B.A., L.L.B., Ph.D) the author cites Rick v Brandsema, [2009] S.C.J. No 10 at par. 64 Abella J. for the Court (S.C.C.) her Ladyship citing for herself from decision of Osbourne J.A. in McGowan v McGowan (1995), 14 R.F.L. (4th) 325 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 19: “….it is well established that a consent judgment may be set aside on the same grounds as the agreement giving rise to the judgment.”
According to Lange: ‘This approach was explained by James G. McLeod as follows’: “This rule reflects the reality that a consent judgment is not a judicial determination on the merits of a case but only an agreement elevated to an order for consent. The basis for the order is the party’s agreement, not a judge’s determination of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.” In v. Mahalingan, [2008] S.C.J. No. 64 at par. 108 per Charron J. for the minority (at PAR. [108]): “The importance of the doctrine of res judicata to the administration of justice is unquestionable. It has been variably described as “lying at the heart of the administration of justice” (Toronto (City) v C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 s.c.r. 77, 2003 SCC. 63, at para. 15): “as a “fundamental principle of our system of justice” (R. v Van Rassel), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225, at p. 238; and as “a cornerstone of the justice system in Canada” (D.J. Lange, “The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada” (2nd ed. 2004), at p.4
IRobbins declares that matter of (No) Notice (Cause of Action, Notice of Claim) and Foreclosure (Petition – specific to one subject) are in fact 2 separate subject matters-Stare Decisis ought to apply. The doctrine of Res Judicata relates to ‘matters adjudicated and decided’, while Stare Decisis applies to case law linking 3rd parties to historical decisions. Since the original hearing in Cambridge Mortgage v IRobbins May 9, 2013 there have been 3 or more decisions made by the BC Supreme Court affirming Grauer J.’s decision to link subsection 15(5) to the role of the solicitor and filing of documents on behalf of parties to an action – with 3rd party signatures for those parties on court documents beginning (“commencing”) a proceeding. The language in subsection 15(5) is clearly mocked by Justice Grauer probably offending some institutional actors – its amended version is little better and the existing provisions in serious doubt.
Subsection 15(5) as a consequence of its linguistic and interpretative handicaps makes it unsettled law and not in the public interest. The order of Justice Grauer on 15(5) is an order involving different words then the current version of subsection 15(5). At the time Fenlon J. ‘accidentally on purpose’ misinterprets subsection 15(5) in Cambridge v IRobbins – she was dealing with the amended language and Grauer J.’s order against Glen P. Robbins could no longer be directly laid over that amended language beyond the concept of the solicitors work vis a vis “commencing” a claim in breach of subsection 15(5) professed in his Reasons for Judgment. Although Grauer J. lumped all three verb elements of provisions in subsection 15(5) into the linkage subsequent court decisions on the subject suggested there is less clarity for the words “prosecution” and “defence”.
Glen P. Robbins argues that since the legal connection between the words “prosecution” and “defence” – and since Glen P. Robbins only signed the Notice of Claim – how could he be guilty of illegally of prosecuting or defending a claim – when we do not know for certain how those words apply to the real world? The word “OR” is most often used in a conjunctive sense – representing alternatives – only in the largest semantic sense could the word defence be reasonably used alongside the word prosecute –but to do so would invite 95/100 reasonable people to assert a certain unreasonablesness to the semantic argument instead wishing reconciliation by attributing different meanings to the different elements. Notwithstanding the problem with linking through synergetic semantics any meaning alliance between prosecute and defence, it is also difficult to consider commence, a word more regularly synonymous with begin to be linked symmatically with prosecute or defence.
Justice Grauer’s linkage of 15(5) to the role of the solicitor (jurisprudence at 60 years to straighten out) did not explain what would come of the role of the solicitor or solicitor of record – if that was all the clients wanted from their solicitor - and then parties filed any other documents necessary to their prosecution or defence on their own? If the parties signed all further court documents in their own name then they would be operating under 15(1) and not 15(5). In that particular case 15(5) would not have been captured by the events in terms of totality of satisfaction of all elements, namely “commence”, “defend” and “prosecute”. Similarly even if we agree that Glen P. Robbins did breach the commence element of the subsection 15(5) – there is no evidence of a breach of either “prosecute” or “defend”. (ED: The Grauer J. order/judgment under BCSC S111171 is case law. It captures both stare decisis and judicial comity and his Reasons ought to have directed Fenlon J. in upcoming Mother case (IRobbins v Cambridge Mortgage).
----A Petition for Foreclosure or Notice of Claim (Statement of Claim) are commencement documents in the solicitors’ or the party’s quiver. The Response to Petition and Response to Civil Claim (Statement of Defence) are not commencement documents they are defending documents for the solicitor or party. A Rule 8 Application (Interlocutory) is a prosecution document to the solicitor or party, while a response to such an Application) would be a defending document. The matter of issuance of Notice prior to filing of Lis Pendens is a matter of required private law dealings between lender and borrower. The matter of Lis Pendens requires public notice.
All land title and court filings at court registry are public documents. The Law Society of BC fights like a rabid dog to ensure these documents are managed through law firms. What if dozens and dozens of BC law firms are filing fraudulent mortgage registration like Cambridge did? By knowingly not providing Notice of Demand to IRobbins BMO was depriving IRobbins equal and fair access to justice – it is a Charter infraction under Legal Rights – and permitted an unnecessary and unwarranted attack on IRobbins Privacy Rights.
IRobbins (Glen P. Robbins) also claims her/his subsection 15(1) right to practice law – was interfered with as Robert Ellis failed to properly engage the foreclosure procedure rules for all lawyers under the LPA – the statute capturing all paid lawyers – ignoring his own rules – and breaking BC Civil Rules, and removing IRobbins Legal Right to access the justice system and to obtain a fair hearing of her complaints through Judicial Review. It is not the registries fault Ellis and BMO failed to disclose relevant information to the court as required. Ellis’ bad faith is later witnessed when he tries to claim “Costs” and “Disbursements” for this no notice. It is likely the Government of British Columbia’s fault for not producing forms sufficient to capture necessary disclosure. Glen P. Robbins believes this is intentional to give the Law Society the edge as between the two State actors and their mutual business relationship($).
The actions of filing a petition of foreclosure (ED: The “commencement” document) are according to Grauer J. in landmark Glen P. Robbins case, the actions of a solicitor (“(A)s a solicitor is wont’ to do”). …and not the actions of a barrister. Must a solicitor always be a member of the Law Society in good standing? According to Grauer J. Glen P. Robbins can speak on behalf of someone with the Court’s permission (the barrister), but he cannot do the acts of the solicitor (the commencement, defend, prosecute of the solicitor). The difference to be found in subsection 15(5) – (ED: (remember) no one really understands what 15(5) means).
A paid for lawyer and a non lawyer –(according to subsection 15(1) the initial provisions of overarching Section 15 (“Authority to Practice Law”)) -are both permitted to practice law – with payment and benefit – the central distinguishing criteria of difference between those groups of persons. Grauer J. admits that a lawyer who is a member of the Bar and charging a fee can be both solicitor and barrister. Why should this be any different for Glen P. Robbins or any other person from his group or IRobbins group?
The lack of Notice was not included in the BMO Petition filing. This omission alone, in conjunction with legal inferences that can be drawn from the fact that Adair J. directed the matter to trial scheduling must on balance call into question the res judicata defence of BMO - later accepted by Adair J. A foreclosure procedure which does not include the cause of action of the respondent and cannot therefore be considered to be a conclusion on the entirety of the merits of the case. How can the court say it has heard the case – when foreclosure was obtained ex parte with insufficient disclosure of material information to the Court? Adair J. accepted hearing (apparently) a flawed application rising from another distinctly different type of filing but nonetheless also a flawed and insufficient case (the BMO Petition).
Adair J. accepted hearing (apparently) a flawed application rising from another distinctly different type of filing but nonetheless also a flawed and insufficient case (the BMO Petition). Indeed one would think the discovery of Robert Ellis’s disclosure (before 2 court authorities) that BMO did not provide notice and Ellis did not properly vet Honeysuckle Lane as his own rules demanded – would be inclined to have power retroactively – as evidence of non disclosure. Also keep in mind that Ellis was awarded Costs for the federal investigative private firm that stalked the residence on the basis that no one was in the “empty” property. The BC Civil Rules and case law permit a court to order the respondents to file a Notice of Claim when there is evidence that a foreclosure process is not on the up and up. If the evidence required (deficiency) by the petition filer is not included then the petition itself is defective.
The legal onus is on the petition filer and not the respondent no matter how one looks at it.
Two breaches occur involving two separate subject matters, the first the breach of the contract and Legal Professions own directives (no Notice) and then second the subject of the petition filing without disclosure of said breach. Why didn’t Adair J. refuse to properly consider the lack of Notice into evidence in making her determination?
Why declare Honeysuckle Vacant-was BMO double dipping in Stephen Harper’s $100 billion bank ‘slush fund’ circa 2008? At the same time as the filing of the Lis Pendens, BMO lawyer Ellis ordered a federal security company to keep watch on the property at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane (claiming the home empty, where she and her family were living, and at that time had been resident there for 17 years), appearing at the front door of 1355 Honeysuckle Lane and speaking to children answering the front door – to let them know they were checking around. In IRobbins lawsuit against BMO Bank she included lawyer and BMO and Law Society of BC “Insider” Robert Ellis as a defendant party. IRobbins privacy and fundamental rights are presumed breached by this State oversight.
Robert Ellis’s lawyer Daniel Webster QC included defence pleadings indicating that Glen P. Robbins (GPR) had breached Section 15(4)(5) of the legal profession act (LPA) in signing his own name to the lawsuit’s Notice of Claim when he was not a party to the action in the style of cause (ED: the listing of players in the document, plaintiffs, petitioners, defendants, respondent, and third parties). (ED(1): The two provisions involved 15(4) and 15(5) of the Legal Profession Act are entirely different breaches, yet GPR only committed one ‘crime’. You will note later on that Grauer J. lets GPR off with a promise not to do 15(4) (hereinafter the ‘promise injunction’ (proximate under Canadian law apparently to manslaughter) [sarcasm with emphasis]. (ED(2): using criminal double jeopardy as the equivalent, it would be like GPR emptying a full magazine of bullets into an individual who dies as a consequence, and then the police charging GPR with two (2) murders) {with only one corpse}).
Given that GPR had an interest in the Honeysuckle property, Adair J. could have struck the Notice of Claim and could have ordered him to amend the Notice of Claim and to add his own name or strike his name in the place for “No” (ED: Given particularly her alleged Transcript concern for access to justice for plaintiff IRobbins). She had simple options that were more efficient and effective than the course of action her decision making took. Webster QC’s statement of defence pleadings for Ellis, (ED: Featuring LPA subsection 15(5)), and also ordered both plaintiffs including IRobbins to add their signatures to the Notice of Claim (or GPR to include himself) in an amended Notice of Claim. (ED: These ‘what if’s’ would have better served justice and been more efficient. It requires some time and effort to amend a claim, including any offending elements, and to refile, particularly in a short period of time. The case might have extinguished itself through second sober thought of administrative effort).
Adair J. admits (ED: with utmost vigour on Court Transcript) on BC court transcript of BCSC 106413 hearings that she never read the Notice of Claim filed by IRobbins, and makes mischaracterization of the Notice of Claim’s quality without any (apparent) knowledge of its contents. This would appear to be outside the jurisdiction of judicial ‘reasoning’. (ED: Maybe more like planting evidence as is Grauer J. reported the negative comments, without including the relevant fact that were based on not reading the material). This judicial bias of Adair J. later infected GPR’s case with the Law Society of BC (S111171), displayed within Grauer J.’s reasoning (some 9 months later), ultimately turned into an “avalanche” of lawyer and judicial malfeasance all to cover up the other’s dishonesty and desire to place obstacles to justice. (GPR metaphoric irony & sarcasm with emphasis).
Adair J. sends IRobbins v BMO to trial scheduling . The Notice of Claim before Adair J. on the first attendance before her under BCSC 106413, and prior to her direction to send the matter to Trial Scheduling, presumes she had read it, and that the Notice of Claim had attained the de minimus standard required for her to direct the matter to trial scheduling. Seizing herself of the matter serves to reinforce this claim.
This also serves (along with final determination) that the apparent defective Notice of Claim – the source of all the hullaballoo – must be valid. If the “commencement document” (Notice of Claim) with Glen P. Robbins signature at placement on the form “Lawyer For Plaintiff” is not a valid filing than everything that follows in “defending” or “prosecuting” that document is subject to that miscarriage of justice – no decision on the merits should have been made (in good faith). Amendments to Legal Profession Act following GPR v Law Society of BC (before Grauer J. and BC Court of Appeal & Supreme Court of Canada) involving Royal Assent of Government of British Columbia and Lieutenant Governor.
Did Elected Officials pile on the Contempt Wagon?: Prior to amendments (ED: repairs) being made to provisions of 15(5) of the LPA by Royal Assent of the BC Government (May 2012) after strong repudiation of some of these provisions including particularly section 15(5) under Authority to Practice Law --- by Justice Grauer (S111171), subsection 15(5) indicated that no person could ‘commence, defend or prosecute a claim on behalf of another person’. “No person” means every person cannot do this. This means by most common application of Interpretation Act (BC) – the literal method of Interpretation that no person can file documents at court registry including “For Profit Lawyers ™”. (ED: Honestly – who knows?)
This argument follows nicely available evidence revealing poorly BCGEU managed court registry at Vancouver courthouse, 800 Smithe Street, which boasts its ignorance of administrative directive of the Chief Justice Bauman (2010) ‘that all document s filed by any person at any BC Court Registry be reviewed by registry staff to ensure proper form and sequence of filing’, rather than the “practice of smile and file” (ED: another activity inextricably linked to cause of action), and leaving the ‘clean up’ of any problems to the presiding decision maker (ED: Million dollar per year office per Justice), of whom there is an apparent shortage – make sense to you)? Prior to filing the lawsuit on IRobbins behalf GPR had carefully reviewed the LPA, and came to the conclusion that if he did not take money or a benefit from his wife he had authority to practice law on her behalf. Any reasonable person reading the legislation as it was then would arrive at the same conclusion.
Now keep this in mind. When Law Society of BC files its Petition under BCSC S111171 it seeks only relief for subsection 15(4) (referring to oneself as a lawyer). In his Response to Petition Glen P. Robbins agrees to the 15(4) provision. (ED: This blows the Costs award out of the water). No – my friends - The Law Society of BC is stuck, GPR has agreed to its demands without any reservation. The Law Society of BC then amends it petition adding in subsection 15(5) (ED: “commence, defend and prosecute”). Glen P. Robbins doesn’t respond to 15(5) because he believes 15(1) practice of law has more force than 15(5) and like in Law Society v. Bryfogle (2015) he also doesn’t understand what subsection 15(5) means at all.
*From Glen P. Robbins submissions in Google v Equustek at Page 46, Para 93 of GPR affidavit: “The Foreclosure decision could not be considered res judicata to the lack of notice as the notice does not occur under the foreclosure petition – and (sic) the notice relates to the State Bank Act, the jurisdiction of the federal government, and the petition and order nisi relate to BC laws”. (ED: FYI – as you continue to read through this – here is something to consider from the Hansard Transcript of amendments to the Legal Profession Act (BC) including the former Attorney General Shirley Bond (not a lawyer), AG critic Leonard Krog, and Bill Bennett, the minister who engineered non regulation for predatory lenders in an environment where $60,000,000 in (unpaid) fines were being issued to crooks every year in BC – and all 3 of these persons knew or ought to have known about the problems with language spoken to by Grauer J., but not addressed beyond platitudes by these persons in charge). (Circa May, 2012):
Hon. S. Bond: “I move that Bill 40, the Legal Profession Amendment Act, 2012, be read a second time. This legislation reflects a modernization of the Legal Profession Act, and in fact it responds directly to a request from the Law Society of British Columbia. The purpose of the bill is to modernize and improve the tools that the Law Society has to regulate lawyers in Society can protect the public and ensure that they are provided with high-quality legal services while at the same time ensuring that lawyers are treated in a manner that is fair and just.”British Columbia in the public interest. The objective of the Legal Profession Act is to ensure that the Law [L. Reid in the chair.]
“There are a number of key amendments that will be of benefit to the public. The amendments will expand the ability of the Law Society to suspend or disbar a lawyer convicted of a serious criminal offence. (ED: But who regulates the Law Society of BC?) They will also enable the Law Society to make rules authorizing the imposition of a suspension or condition of practice during an investigation, where necessary, to protect the public. “They will increase the maximum fine from $20,000 to $50,000 and permit orders for fines and costs arising from the Law Society disciplinary hearings to be filed and enforced as court orders. They will require lawyers who are subject to an investigation, disciplinary proceeding or practice review to obtain approval to resign from the Law Society. They will enable the Law Society to make rules that ensure the security of private electronic records to ensure that they are protected during an investigation.” “They will also ensure that anyone involved in a Law Society proceeding may be represented by counsel. They[ Page 11502 ] will clarify the process for compelling witnesses or records in a disciplinary hearing and allow the Law Society to establish a review board made up of lawyers and non-lawyers to replace the panel of benchers, who are elected lawyers, that currently review decisions of disciplinary or credentials hearing panels. They will also clarify the obligation of the Law Society to protect privileged and confidential information received in accordance with current interpretation of the law.”
L. Krog: “I must say it's always a pleasure to rise and speak in the House, particularly when there's a general sense of agreement in the chamber — not always common. But the truth is, hon. Speaker, in reality much of what goes on here is often by consensus and agreement. Certainly, what the minister, the Attorney General, has presented today, the amendments to the Legal Profession Act, are just exactly in that category.” [1440] “The bill, as the Attorney General has announced, makes a number of changes, all positive, all done in fairly lengthy consultation over a long period of time with the Law Society of British Columbia and with a fair bit of input. I think the fact that since its introduction I haven't received any criticism, comments or concerns from any members of the public to date tells me that, in fact, those people who are paying attention to what goes on in this chamber and have an interest in this legislation are, by their silence, signifying their consent and agreement with it. Some of the changes may appear somewhat subtle, but they are in fact important. One of the things that I would mention is the existing legislation, the existing Legal Profession Act, with respect to the object and duty of the society. In the existing section 3, it says: "It is the object and duty of the society "(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by (i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons, (ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members, and (iii) establishing standards for the education, professional responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for membership, and "(b) subject to paragraph (a), (i) to regulate the practice of law, and (ii) to uphold and protect the interests of its members." It is worth reading out the new and proposed section 3, which I think clarifies, quite appropriately for the Law Society…. This is at their request — at the request of the lawyers of British Columbia — and I want to emphasize that. Section 3, as proposed, will read: "It is the object and duty of the society to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by "(a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons, "(b) ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers, "(c) establishing standards and programs for the education, professional responsibility and competence of lawyers and of applicants for call and admission, "(d) regulating the practice of law, and "(e) supporting and assisting lawyers, articled students and lawyers of other jurisdictions who are permitted to practise law in British Columbia in fulfilling their duties in the practice of law."
(ED: none of this promoted action from ‘debate’ concerning changes to Legal Profession Act) occurs from BMO to Cambridge – including and involving the direct participation of a few BC Superior court justices). “I go back to the section where it starts: "It is the object and duty of the society to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice…." That's what this bill does. It emphasizes, very clearly, the responsibility that has been given to the Law Society by legislation and makes it absolutely clear, crystal-clear, to the public that there is not some conflicting duty to protect, to regulate the practice of law and to uphold and protect the interests of its members. There is not some conflict there. The paramount object and duty of the society, the clear object and duty of the society, is to "protect the public interest in the administration of justice." (ED: Hardee har har) Lawyers, like doctors, like engineers, are self-governing professions. It is an honour and a privilege to have the right to call yourself a lawyer in this province. It is an honour and a privilege to be able to uphold the high standards of professionalism associated with the profession. I appreciate that there are some British Columbians who have not been happy with the conduct of their particular counsel in a particular case, and that's the nature of the beast. It has ever been thus. You can't make everyone happy. But when you contrast the high standards of conduct in this province expected of lawyers — which are generally delivered, as indeed with most of the self-governing professions in this province; indeed all, probably — you have to express some gratitude that you live in the province of British Columbia, in Canada, as opposed to many other jurisdictions in the world. (ED: bring in the knee pads here). It is a source of great pride for me personally. The Attorney General, when she's feeling kind, refers to me as a member of the bar in a gentle way, and when she's trying to be somewhat sarcastic in question period, refers to me as a member of the bar with a somewhat different tone in her voice. But I'm always honoured to hear the words. It gives me no small thrill.”
“I say with a certain amount of pride…. A father can take that once in a while. Our second-born, our dear son Parker Krog — I think I'm entitled to use his name in the chamber — is going to be called to the bar at the end of this month and intends to carry on in this interesting profession, notwithstanding that his mother and his father, both lawyers, never encouraged him to take up the bar, appreciating that along with the honour and the privilege come a great deal of demand and pressure. We didn't feel it was appropriate to encourage him.” (ED: ready to puke – here, here & here).
“But I am flattered, no less, to say that in this cham-[ Page 11503 ]ber, because it is a noble profession. It is a profession that in…. Every society where lawyers have the ability to practise freely is the kind of society in which all of us would want to live. I have said it before. I can't remember which Shakespearean play it is. It's Henry III or IV. Maybe one of the other members in the chamber will assist me here — those more erudite than me. There's that oft-quoted line: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." Of course, what's never quoted is the full line, in which essentially Shakespeare is saying: "Yes, let's kill all the lawyers, because if we get rid of all the lawyers then we can really establish tyranny." That's really what lawyers do, and it is why it is such a privilege. I think it's important that this act, in section 3(a), says very clearly — and I think these are words that need to resonate with the public and British Columbians — that in pursuing the object to "uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice," it is by "(a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons." The rights and freedoms of all persons — that includes the freedom to discourse, the freedom to speak in this chamber in every corner regardless of how loud it might be and how much it might interfere with those who actually have the floor. It refers to the right to protest in public streets. It refers to the right to petition government. It refers to the right to protest and to criticize and to express, sometimes, on occasion, even the most abhorrent views.” “That is what the legislation does, in very clear language — remind us that lawyers have that special duty. It is that special expectation.
I have said it before. I can't remember which Shakespearean play it is. It's Henry III or IV. Maybe one of the other members in the chamber will assist me here — those more erudite than me. There's that oft-quoted line: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." Of course, what's never quoted is the full line, in which essentially Shakespeare is saying: "Yes, let's kill all the lawyers, because if we get rid of all the lawyers then we can really establish tyranny." That's really what lawyers do, and it is why it is such a privilege. I think it's important that this act, in section 3(a), says very clearly — and I think these are words that need to resonate with the public and British Columbians — that in pursuing the object to "uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice," it is by "(a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons." The rights and freedoms of all persons — that includes the freedom to discourse, the freedom to speak in this chamber in every corner regardless of how loud it might be and how much it might interfere with those who actually have the floor. It refers to the right to protest in public streets. It refers to the right to petition government. It refers to the right to protest and to criticize and to express, sometimes, on occasion, even the most abhorrent views.” “That is what the legislation does, in very clear language — remind us that lawyers have that special duty. It is that special expectation.
As I've indicated, it makes the public interest paramount. It makes that absolutely clear. As much as the Law Society, notwithstanding the existing legislation, worked on the premise that the great duty was to protect the public interest, nevertheless, the language itself, I think, presented some difficulty for some people with respect to the duty of the Law Society and its obligation. It also expands the Law Society's ability to suspend or disbar lawyers guilty of serious criminal offences — including those committed outside of Canada — without, necessarily, a full hearing. It adds investigatory powers and, when required by the public interest, allows benchers to make rules for suspensions during investigation for the medical examination of a lawyer or articled student. It gives the Law Society the ability to require persons to answer questions and produce records in the course of an investigation into a lawyer's conduct.”
“It increases the maximum fines for misconduct from $20,000 to $50,000. Keep in mind that a fine is one thing, but the ultimate sanction of the Law Society is the ability of the society, after a hearing, to withdraw from a member their ability to practise law. As I've said many times, it's an honour and a privilege to be in this chamber. It's an honour and a privilege to practise law. The power to withdraw that still exists. I wouldn't want anyone to get the impression that we're simply upping fines here and that that's the only sanction a lawyer is going to face. It also clarifies that lawyers have the right to legal counsel for disciplinary hearings. It makes decisions of Law Society hearing panels subject to review by a board which will exclude people who are not lawyers. It extends, importantly, the Law Society's reach into multiple areas: accounting practises, supervision of articling students, provisions respecting the breach of duty to law firms as well as to individual lawyers, and that runs throughout the bill. This is important. Lawyers quite often practise in partnerships. Now, I think the reality is, and I think the member for Kootenay East may be able to assist me in this, that the vast majority of lawyers in British Columbia are actually solo practitioners. But a number of lawyers actually practise in firms, generally smaller firms, three to four lawyers, some in them in much larger firms. Regulating the practise, if you will, of a lawyer only, as if they are somehow an entirely separate entity from their partners, frankly presents some significant difficulties for the Law Society. What this bill does is attempt to remedy that and ensures that the Law Society has the authority to deal with firms as well as individual lawyers. Now, the next one. This may be the place where I have [ Page 11504 ] a slight difficulty with the bill. When I say "slight difficulty," it's not that I'm going to vote against it. But it does give the Law Society's elected board of governors — not all the lawyers — the power to set the annual fees to be paid to fund the Law Society. Now, I suspect for some members of the bar, the prospect that they won't be able to vote on their annual fees may present some difficulty. Once you have had the authority to set your own level of taxation, if you will, it's a pretty appealing practice. I suspect there may be lawyers across the province of British Columbia who will take umbrage at the prospect that elected benchers of the Law Society will now get to set the annual fee without the individual lawyers being able to vote on that. But it's a practical approach. It's a practical approach. We in this chamber, the 85 of us, subject to the particular position the Speaker occupies in this chamber and only with respect to difficult votes…. The reality is that 84 British Columbians arguably get to make the decision on what taxation is paid by the other four-plus million British Columbians. We expect and acknowledge that that is part of a democratic process. It's a practical approach to things.” “The concept that every time you wanted to change taxation in this province you had to literally seek a vote of every British Columbian may have an appeal to those who don't like the concept of government and taxation, but it would present a practical difficulty that is almost difficult to describe or imagine. Indeed, we know in some jurisdictions in the United States, where taxation levels…. Particularly, I'm thinking of California. Property tax and Proposition 13, as I recall, have led to enormous difficulties for the state of California, which means that in some respects — there has been some suggestion, recently — California is coming close to bankruptcy. Without wishing to be too cheeky about this, I guess as an individual lawyer I'm prepared to believe…. I suppose I should state my conflict here, for purposes of the conflict commissioner. I'm prepared to concede that as a lawyer affected by this legislation, giving up the power to set annual fees from individual lawyers by vote to the Law Society's governors is, in fact, the appropriate thing to do.
But it's a practical approach. It's a practical approach. We in this chamber, the 85 of us, subject to the particular position the Speaker occupies in this chamber and only with respect to difficult votes…. The reality is that 84 British Columbians arguably get to make the decision on what taxation is paid by the other four-plus million British Columbians. We expect and acknowledge that that is part of a democratic process. It's a practical approach to things.” “The concept that every time you wanted to change taxation in this province you had to literally seek a vote of every British Columbian may have an appeal to those who don't like the concept of government and taxation, but it would present a practical difficulty that is almost difficult to describe or imagine. Indeed, we know in some jurisdictions in the United States, where taxation levels…. Particularly, I'm thinking of California. Property tax and Proposition 13, as I recall, have led to enormous difficulties for the state of California, which means that in some respects — there has been some suggestion, recently — California is coming close to bankruptcy. Without wishing to be too cheeky about this, I guess as an individual lawyer I'm prepared to believe…. I suppose I should state my conflict here, for purposes of the conflict commissioner. I'm prepared to concede that as a lawyer affected by this legislation, giving up the power to set annual fees from individual lawyers by vote to the Law Society's governors is, in fact, the appropriate thing to do.
end (2) Please continue @ Public Interest Alert: Court Filing details of B.C. & Canada Largest Real Estate-Mortgage Broker-MIC, Chartered Bank, Court Services - Money (Mortgage) Laundering: IRobbins vs Cambridge Mortgage-BMO Bank, BC & Canadian gov & Judiciary (3)

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