Robbins SCE Research
Home| British Columbia Polls| Canada Polls| US & the World Polls| Contact| Register| Search| Donate
BOOK IV Glen Robbins Sept. sub to SCC Re: LPA (BC), Royal Assent May 2012, unlawful conduct conspiracy, Bakonyi, Cambridge, Ellis, BMO, Fenlon J., Hinkson CJ, Gov BC, Right of Audience v LPA
  Dec 18, 2014

Commentary
316. At Page 7 paragraph 26 Grauer J., states: “It is also unclear why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words “in the person's own name”. Ultimately these words declared redundant by Grauer J., (and also include “in the name of the another person”) are later amended out by Royal Assent 6 months after his Reasons are announced October 3, 2011. It must therefore be presumed that the words “in the name of another person” form part and parcel that section of the provisions of section 15 (5) which Grauer J., declares “redundant”. These words appear “to be superfluous, to subsection 15 (1)”, and “detract from the clarity of the subsection”.
317. At Page 13 paragraph (48) under the heading “Conclusion” Grauer J., writes: “The Law Society is entitled to the injunction it seeks. Mr. Robbins is hereby permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, in his own name or in the name of another person, except as permitted by section 15 (1) of the Legal Professions Act.”
318. In his conclusion Grauer J., makes judgment that is inconsistent with his own reasoning. He does so by including that part of section 15 (5) which he previously referred to as superfluous and redundant “commence, prosecute or defend in any court in his own name..”
“It may remain possible at this juncture of reasoning by Glen Robbins that the language “commence, prosecute or defend in any court..in the name of another person...:” is relevant to Justice Grauer's reasoning, judgment and order but this isn't how the section section reads. The section is flawed because of the language which is “superfluous” and “redundant” ...”in his own name”.
320. Why did the BC Legislature elect to wipe out through amendment the entire second part of section 15 (5) in May 2012 by Royal Assent. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that provincial lawmakers were of the position that the language “or in the name of another person” was also not appropriate or otherwise not warranted in that section. “Or in the name of another person” is as equally undesirable as “in his own name” characterized by Grauer J., as “redundant” and “superfluous”. Obviously Grauer J. did what Halfyard failed to do – and assess the real contribution of the former subsection 15 (5) as not conforming to the generally accepted standards of the Interpretation Act.
321. If the language “or in the name of another person” is not acceptable or necessary why is it taken out of the provision? If the BC Legislature were following Grauer J.'s reasoning they would have amended section 15 (5) to read “commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, in the name of another person.” It is reasonable for a justice to take it upon himself to edit out portions of language of a subsection in order to accommodate an order when so doing conspicuously conflicts or otherwise is not reconciled with his general opinion of the confusion (the “inelegance”) of the legislative drafting. In order for Grauer J. to make the order adhere in any way to his Reasons he must take out the offending “redundant” language “in his own name” in order to accomplish it. Given this, and given that the Legal Profession Act encompasses the actions of all other persons who are not members of its organization – isn't the first question we need to ask: Is it fair that a person not trained in law be subjected to the confusing language of subsection 15 (5)? Isn't this point underscored when we consider the events of May 9, 2013 at the application before Justice Fenlon (now a BC Court of Appeal justice)?
322. Mr. Bakonyi is a member of the Law Society of BC and reveals that he really had no understanding about section 15 when asked about it by Justice Fenlon. Mr. Ellis is not much better informed, he prefers his own interpretation. Both members ought to know the subject matter down to the buttons. Of the two, Mr. Ellis is likely the most disingenuous. He is the most deceptive in his submissions. He has run for elected office many times with the Law Society of British Columbia. He was legal counsel from the very beginning under BCSC 106413 the core subject matter of S111171. Although it is hard to believe that neither legal counsel were (1) unaware of the legislative changes; or (2) did not understand that section 15 (5) had nothing to do with the legal concept of right of audience, what requires no interpretation is the fact that after Justice Fenlon was apparently deluded by the contra eloquence both of her 'friends' in the industry, they took it upon themselves to prepare an Order After Application (where no application ever existed) and no such Order was given declaring that: 'Glen Robbins is prohibited from speaking on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in this matter'.
323. Following Royal Assent of the amendments to section 15 (5) in May 2012 the remaining language simply says “Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court.” This amended version of the previous provisions ordered by Grauer J., lies with an exception, subsection 15 (1). 15 (1): “No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except(a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf, (b) as permitted by the Court Agent Act, (c) an articled student, to the extent permitted by the benchers, (d) an individual or articled student referred to in section 12 of the Legal Services Society Act, to the extent permitted under that Act,(e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section,(f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17 (1) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, and(g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.”
324. This exception under 15 (1) includes the provision of subsection (g) which stipulates “a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.” The conditions of being a practicing lawyers include charging a fee or benefit. At Page 9 paragraph (34) Grauer J., provides the following history: “By 1955, the distinction between the practice of a barrister and that of a solicitor was no longer maintained, and the legislation included a definition of the “practice of law” “That definition includes the same matters I quoted from the current definition, and ended similarly with the proviso that the practice of law DOES NOT (sic) include 'any such act if not done for or in the expectation of any fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from any other person.' 'This appears (in 1955) to have replaced the fee aspect of the former section 74.'
325. Justice Grauer provides the original 1895 Act which stipulates: “In case any person, unless himself the plaintiff or defendant in a proceeding, commences, prosecutes or defends in his own name or in that of any other person, any action or proceeding without being admitted or enrolled as a Solicitor as aforesaid, he shall be incapable of recovering any fee, reward or disbursement on account thereof, and such offence shall moreover, except in cases provided by the “Inferior Courts Practitioners Act,” be deemed guilty of a contempt of the Court in which such proceeding has been commenced, carried on or defended, and shall on the application of any person complaining thereof be punishable accordingly.”
325. Justice Grauer provides the original 1895 Act which stipulates: “In case any person, unless himself the plaintiff or defendant in a proceeding, commences, prosecutes or defends in his own name or in that of any other person, any action or proceeding without being admitted or enrolled as a Solicitor as aforesaid, he shall be incapable of recovering any fee, reward or disbursement on account thereof, and such offence shall moreover, except in cases provided by the “Inferior Courts Practitioners Act,” be deemed guilty of a contempt of the Court in which such proceeding has been commenced, carried on or defended, and shall on the application of any person complaining thereof be punishable accordingly.”
327. Grauer J., at Page 9 paragraph (35) refers to the 1895 Act and section 74 as a new section in the 1955 Act which Grauer J., characterizes in his Reasons as follows: “The balance of the former section 74, precursor to the current section 15 (5)...in section 75 as follows: “In case any person, unless himself a party to an action or proceeding, commences, prosecutes or defends in his own name or in that of any person any action or proceeding without being a member of the Society, he shall, except in cases provided for by the “Inferior Courts Practitioners Act,” be deemed guilty of a contempt of the Court in which the action or proceeding has been commenced, carried on, or defended, and shall, on the application of any person complaining thereof, be punished accordingly.”
328. The 1895 provisions under section 74 revised 60 years later “similar” to section 15 (5) as articulated by Grauer J., includes the language “in his own name or in that of any person any action or proceeding...” (This is important to remember when we consider that Michael Kleisinger of LSBC threatened Glen Robbins with contempt of the Grauer J. Order on two separate occasions in order to Glen Robbins from attending to speak at court), an action outside his authority or control as described on Page 2 and 3 inclusive of paragraphs (6) and (7) and commencing at Page 3 middle of paragraph (6) where Grauer J., writes: “Apart from misrepresenting himself as a lawyer....he (Glen Robbins) has not been practising law because he has not been charging a fee, and simply stands in the shoes of his family members. Accordingly, the Law Society should leave him alone. It is for the court to decide in its discretion whether it will grant him an audience.” At paragraph (7) “(sic) THAT THE COURT HAS SUCH DISCRETION, QUITE APART FROM ANYTHING IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT, IS NOT IN DOUBT.”
329. It is a fact that Justice Adair permitted Glen Robbins to speak to Costs under BCSC 106413 as referenced herein. By permitting him the opportunity to speak to the matter of Costs and GRANT A RIGHT OF AUDIENCE to Glen Robbins to speak on behalf of party's other than himself, Justice Adair is permitting Glen Robbins to defend proceedings following him commencing those proceedings by filing the Notice of Claim. He has done so in the names of other persons, namely Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.
330. Under the BC Court Rules Act Supreme Court Civil Rules Appendix B-Party and Party Costs and Interpretation and other the rules stipulate as follows: “In this Appendix, "process" means the drawing, filing or service of a document and any amendment to it or particulars of it, but does not include an application made with respect to the process or any part of the process Scale of costs 2 (1) If a court has made an order for costs, it may fix the scale, from Scale A to Scale C in subsection (2), under which the costs will be assessed, and may order that one or more steps in the proceeding be assessed under a different scale from that fixed for other steps. (2) In fixing the scale of costs, the court must have regard to the following principles:(a) Scale A is for matters of little or less than ordinary difficulty;(b) Scale B is for matters of ordinary difficulty;(c) Scale C is for matters of more than ordinary difficulty.(3) In fixing the appropriate scale under which costs will be assessed, the court may take into account the following:(a) whether a difficult issue of law, fact or construction is involved;(b) whether an issue is of importance to a class or body of persons, or is of general interest;(c) whether the result of the proceeding effectively determines the rights and obligations as between the parties beyond the relief that was actually granted or denied.”
331. The BC Court Rules clearly distinguish under the consideration of court “process” that Costs are related to “drawing, filing or service of a document and any amendment to it or particulars of it, but does
332. Excerpts from Proceedings in Chambers of May 9, 2013 “No exhibits entered”: Proceedings commenced at 12:00 Noon. The fact is that Cambridge is seeking an order for foreclosure on a mortgage under petition of H130330 which is not in fact a mortgage pursuant to section 6 of the Interest Act Canada, it is in fact a loan.
333. In fact the loan is not made between Ita Robbins and Frana Matich and Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation the petitioner under H130330. The loan is made between a second company owned by the same persons who Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation, Peet and Cowan Financial Services. The legitimacy of this loan is not clear.
334. It is a fact that the BC Civil Rules demand that loan agreements in dispute be put before the court by petition.
335. It is a fact that mortgages registered at BC Land Title and Survey are contracts. A mortgage is registered by Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation with BC Land Title Survey in New Westminster and signed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. Ita Robbins does not receive any independent legal advice and Frana Matich has filed sworn affidavits refuting the legal advice she received as not being legal advice at all. It is a fact that there is no agreement which supports the filing of the mortgage registration (and later judgment) October 4, 2014.
336. It is a fact that the loan agreement between Ita Robbins and Frana Matich features a criminal rate of interest of 98.7%. It is also a fact that Cambridge Mortgage files a mortgage registration featuring two different interest rates under the Interest Act Canada which document is accepted for filing.
337. It is a fact that respondent BMO and legal counsel Robert Ellis considered a bank insider under the Bank Act has standing to the extent that he seeks an order for $800 from a provincial court order which is 2/3rds of an order made by that court against Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins, and Frana Matich. This order includes Glen Robbins which would provide him standing in the application to the extent that the order is granted against him as well and no division is either sought by BMO or made by the Court.
338. It is a fact that the petition is brought by legal counsel Ronald Bakonyi on behalf of his client Cambridge Mortgage Corporation and not by BMO whose interest exceeds that of Glen Robbins by an amount of $800 to $400. It is a fact that BMO Bank has no authority or jurisdiction to make submissions on the matter of Glen Robbins standing as the order it seeks in its capacity as respondent includes Glen Robbins.
339. At page 1 of proceedings (pg 156) of 2 volume submissions to the Supreme Court of Canada time stamped received May 7, 2015 Glen Robbins appears on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich who have signed the response to petition themselves. Glen Robbins signature does not appear on the document anywhere. Glen Robbins appears on the basis to speak not to the petition per se but to the fact that no notice was served on Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.
340. Glen Robbins states to the court: “My name is Glen P. Robbins, for my wife Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, and I wanted to draw to the court's attention, before we prejudiced any further, that the documents filed by the petitioner are incorrect documents.”
341. Glen Robbins has given the court notice or attempted to give notice that the petition should be on the basis of a loan and not a mortgage.
342. At line 26 of page 1 (page 156) THE COURT: “Now Mr. Robbins, you say you are appearing as agent for Ms. Matich.” It is a fact that Justice Fenlon does not reference Glen Robbins wife Ita Robbins. It is a fact that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich are joint tenant owners and not tenant in common.
343. At line 29 (page 156) Glen Robbins says: “I'm not appearing as agent, I'm appearing for my wife and mother in law, which I have done pursuant to the order of Justice Grauer of October 3, 2011 which order is the subject, main subject matter of a Supreme Court of Canada appeal.” At line 34 (page 156) THE COURT responds: “All right”.
344. It is a fact that Glen Robbins has not been informed of the legislative changes to sections 15 (1) and 15 (4) of the Legal Profession Act.
345. At line 37 Madame Justice Fenlon for THE COURT states: “That's fine. You are here though speaking on behalf of Frana Matich, so I'll just ask you to have a seat for a moment so that I can get some sense of what is being applied for here.”
346. At line 41 Ron Bakonyi for Cambridge states: “I can walk you through that, My Lady.”
347. At line 42 THE COURT says: “--- just for Mr. Robbins benefit. I need to understand what the application is and then I will hear from you once I have that clearly on the table.”
348. At line 46 Glen Robbins asks: “Excuse me is this on transcript?” To which THE COURT answers: “Yes, it is”.
349. It is a fact that in two instances where reference is made to the petitioner respondent, Fenlon J., only makes reference to Frana Matich and makes no reference to Ita Robbins, the wife of Glen Robbins.
350. At page 2 (page 157) of submissions Mr. Bakonyi for Cambridge begins to speak on the matter of his petition application: “My Lady, this is usually a usual sort of application i foreclosure materials...” To this Glen Robbins responds at page 2 (157) line 13 “Excuse me, I do not have that document.”, to which THE COURT responds: “Just a moment. Now, is there an extra copy of the chambers record?” to which Bakonyi replies: “I don't have an extra copy of it”, to which THE COURT responds: “Just a moment though. It would be helpful if Mr. Robbins had a copy of the notice of hearing”. Madame Registrar, do you have another copy there?, to which THE CLERK responds: “No, ma'am, all I have is the notice of hearing” (which is what THE COURT was referring to).
351. At line 33 of page 2 (157) THE COURT says to all: “And I'm going to set some rules here on this application, Mr. Robbins, that apply to everyone, and I'm going to ask you to hold your fie, so to speak, and not interrupt Mr. Bakonyi and then I will permit you to speak and I will ask Mr. Bakonyi not to interrupt you, so those are the rules of engagement here.”
352. So by page 2 we established two clear facts from the mind of Justice Fenlon. The first is her acknowledgment and awareness of complaints regarding the respondents complaint that they were not provided with a notice of hearing document. She makes effort to find one for Glen Robbins. Her Honour then clearly indicates she is willing to permit Glen Robbins to speak.... “so there are rules of engagement here.”
353. As page 2 (page 157) Mr. Bakonyi elects to transgress back from the submissions pertaining to allegations of procedural deficiency and to move into a re litigating of Robbins standing: “Yes, My Lady. The first thing I'm here to – the reason we're in this courtroom today is because I'm, my position is that Mr. Robbins has no standing to be here today/and to speak on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich...” Mr. Bakonyi does not make a clear complaint about Glen Robbins capacity to speak at this point.
354. It is a fact that Glen Robbins has standing by virtue of the orders sought by BMO Bank for payment of costs from BC Provincial Court which total $1,200 with one third assessed to each of Glen Robbins (one third), Ita Robbins (one third) and Frana Matich (one third). An order in full amount is provided to BMO Bank which would include Glen Robbins' one third amount. At line 3 of page 3 (page 158) Mr. Bakonyi says: “In fact, Mr. Ellis has filed a response on behalf of the Bank of Montreal basically agreeing to the relief sought as long as there was a six month redemption period.”
355. It is a fact that Mr. Bakonyi has now inserted Mr. Ellis for BMO into a foreclosure process where he does not belong. BMO Bank of Montreal in fact has no standing in the foreclosure process on the basis that there ought not have been a petition for foreclosure filed in the first instance, but also because the costs amount obtained did not form any part of a collection process to which the court should have rightly committed itself.
356. Mr. Bakonyi at line 8 page 3 (page 158) continues on a confused effort to provide what he knows to be false submissions to THE COURT:“Okay. At tab 3 Mr. Robbins, it look like, has prepared – it's an unfiled response. I believe it was prepared by Mr.----- and I'm going to tell you why I believe that --- by Mr. Robbins on behalf of Ita and Frana --- Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. Its' 27 pages.”
357. It is a fact that a response to petition signed and filed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich defending in their own names the petition of the respondent. In reference to this at page 6 (page 145) of the Reasons of Justice Grauer at paragraph [23] Grauer J says: “Given that such acts as appearing as counsel, drawing documents for use in a judicial proceeding and negotiating a settlement do not constitute the practice of law if done for free...”
358. It is a fact that a response to petition was filed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich signed by them. Mr. Bakonyi is speaking to the fact that his response to petition is unfiled which would suggest a problem with service. It is a fact that Mr. Bakonyi is alluding to that which the court obviously considered as evidence of some type of an unfiled response that Mr. Bakonyi was alluding to, though one was filed with the court on April 17, 2013 2 days after the notice of hearing was obtained by Mr. Bakonyi on the basis that he had received a filed petition response and then attempting to connect that unfiled document to his believe that Mr. Robbins has prepared the document which according to Grauer J.'s Reasons is neither here nor there.
359. At line 27 page 3 of Transcript (page 158) Mr. Bakonyi states: “Now, Mr. Robbins raises whole host of problems by attempting to represent the two owners. Number 1, he is not a party to this action. If you look at tab 5, exhibit A, the mortgage is there.” It is a fact that the matter of whether or not Glen Robbins is permitted to speak on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich is not related to who the parties are on the mortgage. Glen Robbins is not purporting to being a party though he does have standing by virtue of the order including his name which BMO is a respondent and collecting on.
360. Beginning line 11 page 4 (page 159) Mr. Bakonyi speaks: “So normally there are times when people attempt to speak on behalf of others and sometimes it happens, but in this case it presents a whole host of problems because the first element is I'm objecting to it because Mr. Robbins has no standing because he's not a party.”
361. It is a fact that legal standing is not mutually exclusive to being a party in the action. In this action Bakonyi on behalf of Cambridge names the parties. He includes co counsel Robert Ellis as respondent in the order to collect as against Glen Robbins and others, but fails to include Glen Robbins as a respondent. Once again, Glen Robbins stake in the matter was one third of BMO's. Mr. Bakonyi made the election not include Glen Robbins.
362. It is a fact that Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich filed a petition in New Westminster courthouse under foreclosure on April 15, 2013 two days before filing the response to petition of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich under H130330 in Vancouver courthouse. This petition was filed in New Westminster on the basis that (a) New Westminster was within the prescribed distance from the subject property of 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, and Vancouver was not; and (b) the Petition should properly have dealt with what was a loan (an expired loan of no force and effect at that); and (c) should have included Glen Robbins as a party is it were to include BMO Bank of Montreal.
363. At line 23 page 4 (page 159) Mr. Bakonyi in addressing the court says: “...well, I'm going to start by just giving you a copy of that order that he has referred to dated October 3, 2011. It was an action between the Law Society and Mr. Robbins directly and if I can just hand you up a copy. He has a copy of it. He was aware of it and he mentioned it. That order is in an action in Vancouver court, Supreme Court, and it's an order filed January 11, 2012 and in paragraph 1, it was an action between the Law Society, who had many dealings with Mr. Robbins (ed-precisely 1 at this juncture) also, and the order says: “The respondent, Glen P. Robbins, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court in his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted under section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act.”
363. At line 23 page 4 (page 159) Mr. Bakonyi in addressing the court says: “...well, I'm going to start by just giving you a copy of that order that he has referred to dated October 3, 2011. It was an action between the Law Society and Mr. Robbins directly and if I can just hand you up a copy. He has a copy of it. He was aware of it and he mentioned it. That order is in an action in Vancouver court, Supreme Court, and it's an order filed January 11, 2012 and in paragraph 1, it was an action between the Law Society, who had many dealings with Mr. Robbins (ed-precisely 1 at this juncture) also, and the order says: “The respondent, Glen P. Robbins, be permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting, or defending a proceeding in any court in his own name or in the name of another person except as permitted under section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act.”
364. It is a fact that Ronald Bakonyi is attempting to link the order of Mister Justice Grauer and subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act before it went to the legislature for amended prior to the order being filed January 11, 2012 with an order or direction from Fenlon J., on May 9, 2013 that he should not have a right of audience.
365. Mr. Bakonyi reflects a rather rudimentary comprehension of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act he is 'pitching' to Fenlon J., evidence in fact at line 44 page 4 (page 159) where he adds to that reflected commencing at line 23 page 4 which says about section 15 (1): “Which deals with you have to be a lawyer to be able to practice law.”
366. Commencing at line 44 page 4 (page 159) Bakonyi continues: “So what Mr. Robbins had done since receipt of this petition and application is first of all this shows that he's clearly behind all of these matters and what he has done, in the envelope that he had sent me was a letter in which Mr. Robbins had noted himself as the sender and it was return address.”
367. It is a fact that Mr. Bakonyi in furtherance of his argument submissions on the matter of Glen Robbins 'standing' and right to audience and not the foreclosure related to the petition document is now saying that because Glen Robbins served the documents by registered mail in his permitted capacity as process server from the address he has resided at for over twenty years, that this supports a claim he is breach of the Grauer J. Order. It is a fact that no section of the Legal Profession Act B.C., relates or involves matters of service. It is a fact that there are no applications or other documentary evidence including affidavits questioning the service of document to Ronald Bakonyi.
368. At line 16 page 5 (page 160) THE COURT asks Bakonyi about the documents served to him by Glen Robbins: “So this in in furtherance of your submission that what he's doing is contrary to the order of Mr. Justice Grauer.”
369. Commencing line 2 page 8 (page 163) Bakonyi writes: “I will be filing responses and defences in all of these actions that I know about on behalf of Cambridge Mortgage, they (the Law Society of BC) have given me those instructions to defend those actions, and part of it will be obviously we're going to be seeking dismissal of those actions, abuse of process, the frivolous and contrary to the court order that's in front of you from October 3rd” (this is reference to the Grauer order).
370. It is a fact based on Transcript evidence of Mr. Bakonyi's submissions that he has spoke with the Law Society of B.C. , they have given him instructions to defend matters and part of the defence of those matters is that Glen Robbins is acting contrary to the Grauer J. Order.
371. From line 23 on page 7 (page 162) (47 lines to each transcript page) to line 16 on page 8 (page 163) Mr. Bakonyi talks about other matters unrelated to the petition to which THE COURT responds at page 8 line 17: “Now, that's not something I can take into account, its not in the materials.”
372. At line 20 of page 8 after the -long winded efforts- of Mr. Bakonyi to cast dispersion on Glen Robbins THE COURT asks him: “There is no vexatious litigant order?”
373. In response to THE COURT's question about a vexatious litigant order Ronald Bakonyi states at line 21 page 8 (page 163): “That's the – the Law Society is looking at that --” To this THE COURT responds at line 23 “All right” to which Mr. Bakonyi replies: “--at this point”, to which THE COURT responds at line 25 “But there's no current.” (vexatious litigant order).
374. At line 26 page 8 (page 163) Bakonyi seems to realize that he has been in overkill and embellishment and has disclosed that he and the Law Society of BC are looking at the Grauer J. Order of October 3, 2011 as their salvation against Glen Robbins. The members involved in this new movement are knowingly misrepresenting the Grauer J orders as somehow representative of a court order denying Glen Robbins an across the board right of audience in any court. Bakonyi says to THE COURT: “There is none, no. The only reasons it's in front of you that I have, and I just happened to come across that when I looked at his name on the internet. It's clear from all of these document that Mr. Robbins is the operating mind of this matter” (the petition signed and filed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich).
375. Clearly by line 26 of page 8 (page 163) Mr. Bakonyi has said enough for any right minded person to know he has lied to the court. He has sold a bill of goods that he has spoken to the Law Society of BC, received instructions, spoken to many other lawyers, and then attempts to give the impression he just came across the information in the Internet. Glen Robbins has displayed the bait and the member lawyers and society have eaten it up.
376. At line 47 page 8 (page 163) THE COURT says: “All right. So you are saying on behalf of your client that this is a standard foreclosure?”
377. At line 3 page 9 (page 164) Mr. Bakonyi responds “YES”
378. At line 4 page 9 (page 164) THE COURT asks Mr. Bakonyi: “And the preliminary issue is whether the court should be hearing from Mr. Robbins?”
379. At line 6 page 9 (page 164) Mr. Bakonyi answers the court: “Right”....
380. At line 25 page 9 (page 164) Mr. Ellis speaks on behalf of respondent BMO Bank: “My Lady, I only intend to address the issue of standing of Mr. Robbins.......”
381. At line 31 page 9 (page 164) Mr. Ellis tells the court “I'm all in favour of lay litigants having their day in court.”
382. At line 33 THE COURT: replies “Yes” to which Mr. Ellis responds: “However, there have to be limits to that audience.” At this point Mr. Ellis uses the language of “audience” linked to right of audience which is unrelated in any way, shape or form to subsection 15 (5).
383. At line 11 page 11 (page 166) following a long diatribe from Mr. Ellis unrelated to the petition matter THE COURT says: “All right. Just hang on. But the issue before me is whether Mr. Robbins is—should be permitted to speak on behalf of these two women.”
384. At line 29 page 11 (166) THE COURT: “And what do you say is the effect of the order of Mr. Justice Grauer?”
385. At line 31 page 11 (page 166) Mr. Ellis for BMO says: “I support my friend's position on this (Mr. Bakonyi) that Mr. Robbins is clearly the driving force behind all of the responses that are being filed and submitted to the court in this matter. He is clearly defending a proceeding in the name of another person and he is clearly NOT A MEMBER OF THE LAW SOCIETY.”
386. It is a fact that speaking at hearing involves only a right of audience and is unrelated to defending a proceeding (the confusing language of the amended subsection 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act.
387. At line 20 page 14 (page 169) THE COURT: - “Mr. Robbins, I'm going to interrupt you for just a moment” – and then at line 23 THE COURT: “--BECAUSE PART OF MY TASK IS TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS CASE GETS HEARD TODAY AND ALL THE OTHER CASES GET HEARD, SO I HAVE TO BRING YOU BACK TO THE ISSUE. THE ONLY ISSUE THAT I HAVE TO DEAL WITH TODAY, AND I REALIZE YOU HAVE A CASE---” What Madame Justice Fenlon has clearly failed to comprehend is that her entire job is to be independent and to ascertain the facts, and in doing so if matters of foreclosure, or in this case matter of loan agreements, is to send matters to Trial Scheduling if there is even a hint of issues requiring to be heard. Justice Fenlon's case load that day does not take priority over the administration of justice and the rights of the parties, in this case the respondents to have their day in court.
388. At one 45 page 14 (page 169) THE COURT: “.......WHAT ANSWER CAN YOU GIVE ME TO THIS ORDER OF MR. JUSTICE GRAUER WHICH VERY CLEARLY SAYS YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO SPEAK ON ANYONE'S BEHALF. There can be no doubt that subsection 15 (5) {the order of Grauer J.) does not say this at all. The Reasons of Grauer J. go to great lengths to specify how subsection 15 (5) applies to the acts of the solicitor in document preparation at the provincial court registrar and has nothing to do with speaking on anyone's behalf which is granted at the sole discretion of the presiding justice or judge. Note that Justice Fenlon referencing the incorrect interpretation of subsection 15 (5) on anyone's behalf and does so while said the matter of the Grauer J. order is before the Supreme Court of Canada and following amendments made to the subsection by the BC Government Legislature and Royal Assent.
389. Prior to her appointment by Stephen Harper to the judiciary Justice Fenlon was an associate at law firm Fasken Martineau the same law firm as her former boss senior partner Elizabeth Lyall opposing counsel against Glen Robbins under S111171 before Justice Grauer. Are we really expected to buy into the likelihood given the exhortations made by Glen Robbins that Fenlon J. was not aware of these Reasons for Judgment, was not aware of the case law included in those Reasons all of which pointed to many arguments none of which related to the appearance of a person before a justice in speaking on behalf of another (the right of audience)? No honest person of a standard to be earning $300,000 and more per year, trained in law, could accept this likelihood and no person in the right state of mind could accept that the Justice Fenlon if she was not aware of the very case involving her former boss at law firm Fasken Martineau before Grauer J. could not have taken the 23 minutes that the Vancouver Supreme Court library required to identify both the Grauer J order and the legislative changes which followed.
390. How was it that Law Society of BC members Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis alleged to be well trained in the stark demands of legal ethics and codes of conduct could after misrepresenting the Grauer J. order interpret Fenlon J's words “This Order of Mr. Justice Grauer which very clearly says you are not supposed to speak on anyone's behalf” to thereafter have the Grauer J. order pertaining to subsection 15 (5) (as it was prior to the legislative amendments) be reinterpreted to mean that the injunction from 15 (5) of October 3, 2011 to mean that Glen Robbins was prohibited from speaking for Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in this matter. The fraudulent order they drafted up is not even equivalent to the fraudulent interpretation made by Fenlon J. who knew better and who had a lunch recess to make clarification. After all, its only someone's family home for 22 years. How important is this even if Her Honour “knew they had a case”.
391. At line 38 page 15 (page 170) THE COURT: “LET ME BRING YOU BACK TO THE ISSUE. I AGREE THAT IT'S NORMALLY UP TO THE JUDGE HEARING THE MATTER TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PERMIT SOMEBODY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF OTHERS, AND AS I SAID TO YOU, THAT HAPPENS VERY OFTEN IN THIS COURTROOM...THE OTHER ISSUE IS THAT MR. JUSTICE GRAUER SAYS NO, MR. ROBBINS IS NOT TO BE SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF ANYONE ELSE.”
392. At line 9 page 16 (page 171) Glen Robbins responds to Madame Justice Fenlon saying “That isn't the order, that isn't the order” to which THE COURT responds: “Well, that's what this order says.”
393. At line 39 page 16 (page 171) THE COURT: “Well, the order is what's here and unless you have another order, this is the order that is in the court and its binding....”
394. At line 35 page 17 (page 172) Glen Robbins says to the court: “When I said for an adjournment because there's a defect in the filing and it's grotesque.”
395. At line 8 page 19 (page 174) THE COURT (to Mr. Bakonyi): “JUST IF I MAY FRAME THE QUESTION --- THAT THIS ORDER SOMEHOW DOES NOT APPLY TO SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PEOPLE IN PROCEEDINGS AND PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS?, to which Mr. Bakonyi responds: “I have no notice of any appeal on that order." All I have is that order which I found on the Internet. THE LAW SOCIETY CONFIRMED IT'S AN ORDER AND---”, to which THE COURT replies: “If I may, what is the section 15-1 of the Legal Profession Act?”, to which Mr. Bakonyi responds: “it's basically that no person other than a practicing lawyer is permitted to engage in the practice of law. So I think what it's saying is that he (Glen Robbins) is not entitled to – this is what's going on here in one sense. In the other, he's not speaking – he's driving ---he's the driving force behind this opposition, not the owners. EVEN IF THEY SIGN THEIR NAMES TO SOMETHING, THEY ARE NOT THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THIS, IT'S MR. ROBBINS WHO IS ALSO APPARENTLY, YOU KNOW, WELL VERSED IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HAS A LOT OF OTHER ISSUES HE'S DEALING WITH IN THAT REGARD, AND I HAVE THAT SECTION IF YOU WANT IT, I GUESS THAT' THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION.”
396. At line 35 page 19 (page 174) Glen Robbins says: “Your Honour, it's terribly important we read the order of Justice Grauer.”
397. At line 41 page 19 (page 174) THE COURT: “ALL RIGHT, SIR, I'VE READ THE ORDER, I HAVE READ IT”, to which Glen Robbins replies: “THE JUDGMENT”, to which THE COURT quickly responds: “NO, JUST A MOMENT, please.”
398. At line 16 page 20 (page 175) Glen Robbins says: “So I've never had anybody refuse me since Grauer, respectfully.”
399. At line 20 page 20 (page 175) the transcript states: PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:46 P.M.; PROCEEDING RECONVENED AT 2:04 P.M.
400. At line 43 page 20 (page 175) Glen Robbins addresses Madame Justice Fenlon: “The advice I've gotten was to ask, because we need to hear on the merits, and so far we haven't because of the standing situation and the choice you've elected, was to ask for a continuance, extension in order to file and order to procure two powers of attorney and register them at Land Titles, and on that basis, specifically dealing with this property, we would be able to hear the case on its merits.....then we would be in a position here to come back before My Lady and at least be able to make our cases and not be handcuffed by sort of the moving goal posts of the judicial system about what meets a standard, what doesn't meet a standard from one room to another, or one place to another.”
401. At line 22 page 21 (page 176) Madame Justice Fenlon speaks: “All right. I have already made my ruling on your ability to speak to this application today and I'm not prepared to change that for the reasons I have given” (the Grauer J. Order).
402. At line 35 page 21 (page 176) Mr. Bakonyi says: “Before he leaves, (Glen Robbins is leaving the courtroom) if we could just ask for an order – I want to enter that order that you made before lunch as a separate order.” to which THE COURT responds: “YES”, to which Mr. Bakonyi replies at to Madame Justice Fenlon at line 40 page 21 (page 176) “But I would like to ask for dispensing of his (Glen Robbins) approval as to the form of that order. I will provide a copy of the order to the property once it is filed”, to which THE COURT responds: “YES, I'LL DO THAT”
403. At line 46 page 21 (page 176) THE COURT (Madame Justice Fenlon) states: “So, Madame Registrar, there is an order dispensing with Mr. Robbins' signature on that order that's already been made.”
404. It is a fact that Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis filed an ORDER MADE AFTER APPLICATION H130330 stamped May 31, 2013 and not served within the time for so doing and after the expiration of 30 days stipulating that this order was made Thursday, the 9th day of May, 2013 that “(1) Glen Robbins has no standing and is prohibited from making submissions in this matter on behalf of the Respondents, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.”
405. It is a fact that this Order was not obtained after any Application. The only application made was a petition for foreclosure and order nisi. It is a fact that this Order document is a fraudulent order drafted and signed by two members of the Law Society of British Columbia with the authority of the courts. It is a fact that the notice of hearing document filed by a member of the Law Society of BC under this matter April 15, 2013 was also a fraudulent filing and the writ of possession was also a fraudulent document filing.
406. It is a fact that in order for an Order to be made involving Glen Robbins he would need to be a party to the action. It is a fact that the notice of hearing was not served and that Glen Robbins (nor Ita Robbins and Frana Matich) did not have a fair opportunity to be heard.
407. It is fact that Ita Robbins and Frana Matich filed an appeal of the order nisi by regular appeal and ticked the box declaring the appeal was constitutional in nature.
408. It is a fact that at line 47 page 8 (page 163) THE COURT says to Mr. Bakonyi on behalf of the petitioner: “All right. So you are saying on behalf of your client that this is a standard application for an order for foreclosure”, to which Mr. Bakonyi at line 3 page 9 (page 164) responds “Yes”.
409. It is a fact that beginning line 6 page 9 (page 164) that Mr. Bakonyi directs THE COURT'S attention to the mortgage document and says says: “Right. And just the final point that I'll make, because I'll sit down and let them speak, is that if you look at that mortgage, both of the parties had different lawyers, independent legal advice when they signed the mortgage as well. There was a Michael Rathbone for one of the parties, Ita Robbins, and Jeff Kuhl represented Frana Matich, so they both had lawyers when they signed the mortgage”, to which THE COURT replies: “All Right”.
410. It is a fact that the document declared to be a mortgage document which is in fact not a mortgage at all has on its face clearly in front of anyone actually looking at it a statement from Michael Rathbone of Burnaby BC law firm that he is signing the document “as to signature only” for Ita Robbins. It is a fact that this is not independent legal advice. It is a fact that Frana Matich swore an affidavit sworn April 24, 2015 (page 203-205) declaring that at her meeting she did not receive independent legal advice. (Ed: Glen Robbins telephones Michael Rathbone and informs him of his concerns about the agreement with Peet and Cowan Financial Services including the overcharges generally, but also the BMO payments without legal authority and the threat of Peet and Cowan Financial Agent Darcy Doyle that the company will not lend money unless BMO gets its money, whilst BMO has an application at the BC Supreme Court at the same time seeking conduct of sale of the property. None of the applicants have any idea about Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation and have paid consideration only to Peet and Cowan Financial Services at its corporate bank account with Royal Bank of Canada).
411. Commencing part way through line 45, page 9 (page 164) Mr. Ellis says in reference to Glen Robbins “All of his (sic) actions, except for this last one that he has just filed, have been dismissed as a result of applications for summary dismissal, and they were all dismissed with costs.” In fact this statement by Robert Ellis is sufficiently untrue to be characterized as (another) lie intended to deceive the court. There were a number of cases outstanding which had not been heard, had been settled including monetary settlement (Capital One). It is a fact that Mr. Ellis was involved with a one day trial at provincial court directly following the Grauer J., order where Mr. Robbins represented Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. This matter is referenced at Page 4 and paragraph [12] of the October 3, 2015 Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer. In this case an order was made for the amount of judgment but no costs were awarded to either party including BMO. It is also a fact that under Robbins, Matich et al v BMO Bank of Montreal (page 154 of April 30, 2105 submissions) Mr. Ellis attended to two hearing dates and was not awarded any costs.
412. Commencing at line 2 page 10 (page 165) Mr. Ellis tells THE COURT: “One of the issues that has come up, and I've appeared in court with Mr. Robbins on many occasions, (ed: an interesting admission given that virtually all of these cases involved Ita Robbins and Frana Matich) and one of the issues that has come up is whether or not he in fact does have the consent of his wife and his mother in law, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to appear on their behalf. In the first action (BCSC 106413) against the bank Madam Justice Adair was presented with the same type of standing application or argument that is being made today and she expressed great concern that Mr. Robbins may not have the requisite authority or consent of his wife and his mother-in-law to appear or that he may be taking positions which they are not aware and she adjourned the application specifically for the purpose of requiring those two ladies to appear in court before her so that they could satisfy the court that he did have the requisite authority.”
413. With respect to the submissions made above by Mr. Ellis the facts relating to the matter of BCSC 106413 are recited as follows in the Reasons of Grauer J. (had her Honour taken the 5 minutes or so to read her brother Justice's Reasons during the 2 hour lunch recess the court's are treated to). It is a fact that page page 2 paragraph [6] Grauer J states in his Reasons: “Mr. Robbins maintains, in essence, that he is simply assisting his mother in law, who speaks little English, and his wife, who is ill, neither of whom can afford legal counsel, to defend themselves against the predations of the Bank of Montreal and other moneylenders......he (sic) has not been practicing law because he has not been charging a fee, and simply stands in the shoes of his family members.” At page 11 paragraph [42] Grauer J., states: “But we are not finished yet. Mr. Robbins points out that he holds from his wife and his mother in law Powers of Attorney by which he as appointed to be their attorney and to do on their behalf anything that they could lawfully do by an attorney, “specifically any and all matters relating to B.C. Supreme Court Action N. S-106413”

Home| British Columbia Polls| Canada Polls| US and the World Polls| Contact| Register| Search| Site Map
Copyright Robbins SCE Research Inc. ©2017