Robbins SCE Research
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G. Robbins BOOK III SCC Re: LPA (BC), Royal Assent 2012, Const right of audience,
  Dec 19, 2014

Commentary
218. Legal Profession Act (B.C) (1) In this Act:"applicant" means a person who has applied for (a) enrollment as an articled student, (b) call and admission, or (c) reinstatement;"articled student" means a person enrolled in the society's admission program;"bencher" means a person elected or appointed under Part 1 to serve as a member of the governing body of the society;"chair" means a person appointed to preside at meetings of a committee or panel;"conduct unbecoming a lawyer" includes a matter, conduct or thing that is considered, in the judgment of the benchers, a panel or a review board, (a) to be contrary to the best interest of the public or of the legal profession, or (b) to harm the standing of the legal profession;"disbar" means to declare that a lawyer or former lawyer is unsuitable to practise law and to terminate the lawyer's membership in the society;"executive committee" means the committee established under section10;"executive director" means the executive director or acting executive director of the society;"foundation" means the Law Foundation of British Columbia continued under section 58 (1);"law corporation" means a corporation that holds a valid permit under Part 9;"law firm" means a legal entity or combination of legal entities carrying on the practice of law;"lawyer" means a member of the society, and(a) in Part 2, Division 1, includes a member of the governing body of the legal profession in another province or territory of Canada who is authorized to practise law in that province or territory,(b) in Parts 4 to 6 and 10 includes a former member of the society, and (c) in Part 10 includes an articled student;"member" means a member of the society;"officer" means the executive director, deputy executive director or other person appointed as an officer of the society by the benchers;"panel" means a panel appointed in accordance with section 41;"practice of law" includes (a) appearing as counsel or advocate, (b) drawing, revising or settling (i) a petition, memorandum, notice of articles or articles under the Business Corporations Act, or an application, statement, affidavit, minute, resolution, bylaw or other document relating to the incorporation, registration, organization, reorganization, dissolution or winding up of a corporate body,(ii) a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, (iii) a will, deed of settlement, trust deed, power of attorney or a document relating to a probate or a grant of administration or the estate of a deceased person, (iv) a document relating in any way to a proceeding under a statute of Canada or British Columbia, or(v) an instrument relating to real or personal estate that is intended, permitted or required to be registered, recorded or filed in a registry or other public office,(c) doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages,(d) agreeing to place at the disposal of another person the services of a lawyer, (e) giving legal advice, (f) making an offer to do anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e), and (g) making a representation by a person that he or she is qualified or entitled to do anything referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e),but does not include: (h) any of those acts if performed by a person who is not a lawyer and not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed,(i) the drawing, revising or settling of an instrument by a public officer in the course of the officer's duty, (j) the lawful practice of a notary public,(k) the usual business carried on by an insurance adjuster who is licensed under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Financial Institutions Act, or (l) agreeing to do something referred to in paragraph (d), if the agreement is made under a prepaid legal services plan or other liability insurance program;"practising lawyer" means a member in good standing who holds or is entitled to hold a practising certificate;"president" means the chief elected official of the society;"resolution" means a motion passed by a majority of those voting at a meeting;"respondent" means a person whose conduct or competence is the subject of a hearing or an appeal under this Act;"review board" means a review board appointed in accordance with section 47;"rules" means rules enacted by the benchers under this Act;"society" means the Law Society of British Columbia continued under section2;"suspension" means temporary disqualification from the practice of law;"written" or "in writing" includes written messages communicated electronically.”
219. “Application 1.1 This Act does not apply to a person who is both a lawyer and a part time judicial justice, as that term is defined in section 1 of the Provincial Court Act, in the person's capacity as a part time judicial justice under that Act.”
220. Part 1—Organization Division 1—“Law Society Incorporation 2 (1) The Law Society of British Columbia is continued. (2) For the purposes of this Act, the society has all the powers and capacity of a natural person. Object and duty of society 3 It is the object and duty of the society to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by (a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,(b) ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers,(c) establishing standards and programs for the education, professional responsibility and competence of lawyers and of applicants for call and admission, (d) regulating the practice of law, and(e) supporting and assisting lawyers, articled students and lawyers of other jurisdictions who are permitted to practise law in British Columbia in fulfilling their duties in the practice of law. Benchers 4 (1) The following are benchers:(a) the Attorney General;(b) the persons appointed under section 5;(c) the lawyers elected under section 7; (d) the president, first vice-president and second vice-president.(2) The benchers govern and administer the affairs of the society and may take any action they consider necessary for the promotion, protection, interest or welfare of the society. (3) The benchers may take any action consistent with this Act by resolution. (4) Subsections (2) and (3) are not limited by any specific power or responsibility given to the benchers by this Act. (5) The benchers may(a) use the fees, assessments and other funds of the society, including funds previously collected or designated for a special purpose before this Act came into force, for the purposes of the society,(b) raise funds by the issue of debentures, with or without a trust deed, for the purposes of the society,(c) provide for a pension scheme for its officers and employees out of the funds of the society, and(d) approve forms to be used for the purposes of this Act.”
221. “Appointed benchers 5 (1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may appoint up to 6 persons to be benchers. (2) Members and former members of the society are not eligible to be appointed under this section.(3) A bencher appointed under this section has all the rights and duties of an elected bencher, unless otherwise stated in this Act.(4) If a bencher appointed under this section fails to complete a term of office, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may appoint a replacement to hold office for the balance of the term of the bencher who left office. (5) A bencher appointed under this section is not eligible to hold the position of president, first vice-president or second vice-president.”
222. Authority to practise law “15 (1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except(a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf,(b) as permitted by the Court Agent Act,(c) an articled student, to the extent permitted by the benchers,(d) an individual or articled student referred to in section 12 of the Legal Services Society Act, to the extent permitted under that Act, (e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section,(f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17 (1) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, and(g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.(2) A person who is employed by a practising lawyer, a law firm, a law corporation or the government and who acts under the supervision of a practising lawyer does not contravene subsection (1).(3) A person must not do any act described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the definition of "practice of law" in section 1 (1), even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, if (a) the person is a member or former member of the society who is suspended or has been disbarred, or who, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, has resigned from membership in the society or otherwise ceased to be a member as a result of disciplinary proceedings, or(b) the person is suspended or prohibited for disciplinary reasons from practising law in another jurisdiction.(4) A person must not falsely represent himself, herself or any other person as being(a) a lawyer,(b) an articled student, a student-at-law or a law clerk, or(c) a person referred to in subsection (1) (e) or (f). (5) Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court. (6) The benchers may make rules prohibiting lawyers from facilitating or participating in the practice of law by persons who are not authorized to practise law.”
223. (Logic-Argument) Section 15 (3) is part of the amended provisions of section 15. It previously permitted the practice of law if the activity was not performed for the expectation of a fee, gain or benefit. It was this poorly written language that Glen Robbins first pounced on in BCSC 106413 by signing his name in the place on the new form for notice of claim where it stipulated “lawyer for plaintiff”. The new form like the legislation was poorly considered in drafting. This is certainly not the fault of Glen Robbins or anyone else confused by the confused drafting. The fact that justices danced around this obvious confusion until the Grauer J. decision is somewhat disturbing in and of itself. Consider this: Prior to the May 2012 amendments a person could practice law if they weren't paid and didn't receive a benefit. How could a person possibly understand what was being said in section 15 (5) 'commence, defend or prosecute a claim in any court in his own name or the name of another person'. An action under section 15 (1) is your own name which would also presume an individual party (the confusing language referenced by Grauer J. Practicing law without expectation of a fee or benefit would presume one could do what lawyers did so long as they did it for free. Well, what else is there that might be done if it isn't an action in one's own name? It would be an action for someone else which would be in their name. The old exception to 15 (1) on the practice of law exemption would thus cancel out as an equivalent contradiction the old section 15 (5). Glen Robbins was guilty of nothing. The Law Society of BC was guilty of purposefully retaining ambiguous language in its regulations under the Authority to Practice Law to hide in the bushes and wait to attack a self litigant in this case someone representing his own family 'tribe'.
224. (Logic-Argument) It is a fact that a person who is not a member in good standing of the Law Society of British Columbia and who does acts included in the practice of law in section 1 (1) when those acts are done when not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward does all of those acts legally (pre May 2012 amendments). It is also a fact that a person who works for a lawyer or law firm who is not a member in good standing with the Law Society of British Columbia may perform acts described as practising law for a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, as may certain officers and insurance adjusters etc., who are also not members in good standing with the Law Society of BC, and it is also a fact that a person who WAS a member in good standing of the Law Society of British Columbia and who is suspended may not perform any of the acts in section 1 (1) of the Legal Professions act “even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee.” Some of these other persons might be insurance adjusters or other professionals on behalf of their company as mentioned by Halfyard J. Currently, paralegals have become the subject of alternatives to lawyers when under the supervision of a lawyer. What happens if Glen Robbins or Ita Robbins is supervised by a lawyer like Ross Davidson? Are they not equal to the paralegal who like them is not a member in good standing with the Law Society of British Columbia?
225. (Logic – Argument) How do we reconcile the action of a lawyer like Ross Davidson who first makes settlement agreement with lawyer Ronald Bakonyi to declare the regular appeal of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich on the matter of the order nisi as a limited appeal order., files an Enduring Power of Attorney donated by land owner Ita Robbins to Glen Robbins with Land Title Registry pursuant to the Land Title Act, prepares another Enduring Power of Attorney from Glen Robbins to Ita Robbins to create an equitable arrangement as advised by other legal counsel?
226. Twelve moves ahead Glen Robbins had prepared the appeal document within the 30 day period on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich on the basis of being a constitutional issue. Look at where we are today? Appealing the fact that Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis not only (apparently) deluded a justice about the true circumstances of the Reasons for Judgment of Mister Justice Grauer of October 3, 2011, but also completely misrepresenting the meaning of section 15 (5) which itself had been completely amended a year before. Are we really to believe that both of these lawyers did not know what they were doing. Can we really believe that Justice Fenlon hearing the petition on May 9, 2013, an associate justice from law firm Fasken Martineau (Vancouver) whose former employer senior partner Elizabeth Lyall has been counsel for the Law Society of BC before Justice Grauer, was not aware that section 15 (5) had nothing to do with a right of audience. No rationale or reasonable person would believe this. It would take a stretch of the imagination that only the likes of Timothy Leary could promote to believe anything to the contrary. The hearing which started at Noon – two hours later than expected had to be 'rigged'. The transcript evidence is the give away.
227. Anyway, how is it possible that neither of the two lawyers or the sitting justice could not know that the language involved in the order implicated in the oral submissions had been amended? Ronald Bakonyi makes clear reference to having contact with the Law Society of BC then later in Transcript catches himself and says his only knowledge about the Grauer J. matter is that which is on the Internet. Well, who put the Grauer order on the Internet? Why the Law Society of British Columbia.
228. How is it possible that Glen Robbins attends to court in small claims matters such as PCBC 11987 versus Capital One Bank? Justice Grauer was incorrect in his fact finding. It is a fact that Capital One settled its matter over Interest rates for over $6,000? How is it possible that Glen Robbins attends to three hearings in the matter of Kellie Robbins under PCBC 12342 versus BMO Bank commenced October 4, 2011? Where was the Law Society's complaint then? Where was Robert Ellis's complaint then? What about the matter of Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins, and Frana Matich versus BMO Bank heard on two occasions immediately following the Grauer J. Reasons? Where was Robert Ellis' complaint then? Where were his cost submissions? How is it that these legitimate hearings and a half dozen others settled or ceased for time or other became the Law Society's basis along with BCSC 106413 and other matters already heard and concluded by the courts for a section 18 application under S111171 a case not closed until July 2015 over a year later? This can only occur when corruption is on the table.
229. Corruption Evidence)How is possible that Ronald Bakonyi for lender Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation a company that has no signed contract with Ita Robbins or Frana Matich to this date, and Robert Ellis of BMO Bank of Montreal are able to file an Order Made After Application from Justice Fenlon in a British Columbia Superior Court Registry when no such application was ever filed in the court and no order was given?
230. These events can only occur such as they are in a conspiracy.
231. “Part 3—Protection of the Public Complaints from the public 26 (1) A person who believes that a lawyer, former lawyer or articled student has practised law incompetently or been guilty of professional misconduct, conduct unbecoming a lawyer or a breach of this Act or the rules may make a complaint to the society. (2) The benchers may make rules authorizing an investigation into the conduct of a law firm or the conduct or competence of a lawyer, former lawyer or articled student, whether or not a complaint has been received under subsection (1).(3) For the purposes of subsection (4), the benchers may designate an employee of the society or appoint a practising lawyer or a person whose qualifications are satisfactory to the benchers.(4) For the purposes of an investigation authorized by rules made under subsection (2), an employee designated or a person appointed under subsection (3) may make an order requiring a person to do either or both of the following:(a) attend, in person or by electronic means, before the designated employee or appointed person to answer questions on oath or affirmation, or in any other manner;(b) produce for the designated employee or appointed person a record or thing in the person's possession or control.(5) The society may apply to the Supreme Court for an order(a) directing a person to comply with an order made under subsection (4), or (b) directing an officer or governing member of a person to cause the person to comply with an order made under subsection (4).(6) The failure or refusal of a person subject to an order under subsection (4) to (a) attend before the designated employee or appointed person,(b) take an oath or make an affirmation,(c) answer questions, or (d) produce records or things in the person's possession or control makes the person, on application to the Supreme Court by the society, liable to be committed for contempt as if in breach of an order or judgment of the Supreme Court.”Practice standards 27 (1) The benchers may (a) set standards of practice for lawyers,(b) establish and maintain a program to assist lawyers in handling or avoiding personal, emotional, medical or substance abuse problems, and(c) establish and maintain a program to assist lawyers on issues arising from the practice of law. (2) The benchers may make rules to do any of the following:(a) establish a practice standards committee and delegate any or all authority and responsibility under this section, other than rule-making authority, to that committee;(b) permit an investigation into a lawyer's competence to practise law if(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the lawyer is practising law in an incompetent manner, or(ii) the lawyer consents;(c) require a lawyer whose competence to practise law is under investigation to answer questions and provide access to information, files or records in the lawyer's possession or control;(d) provide for a report to the benchers of the findings of an investigation into the competence of a lawyer to practise law;(d.1) permit the practice standards committee established under paragraph (a) to make orders imposing conditions and limitations on lawyers' practices, and to require lawyers whose competence to practise law has been investigated to comply with those orders;(e) permit the benchers to order that a lawyer, a former lawyer, an articled student or a law firm pay to the society the costs of an investigation or remedial program under this Part and set and extend the time for payment;(f) permit the discipline committee established under section 36 (a) to consider(i) the findings of an investigation into a lawyer's competence to practise law,(ii) any remedial program undertaken or recommended,(iii) any order that imposes conditions or limitations on the practice of a lawyer, and(iv) any failure to comply with an order that imposes conditions or limitations on the practice of a lawyer.(3) The amount of costs ordered to be paid by a person under the rules made under subsection (2) (e) may be recovered as a debt owing to the society and, when collected, the amount is the property of the society.(3.1) For the purpose of recovering a debt under subsection (3), the executive director may(a) issue a certificate stating that the amount of costs is due, the amount remaining unpaid, including interest, and the name of the person required to pay it, and(b) file the certificate with the Supreme Court.(3.2) A certificate filed under subsection (3.1) with the Supreme Court is of the same effect, and proceedings may be taken on it, as if it were a judgment of the Supreme Court for the recovery of a debt in the amount stated against the person named in it.(4) Rules made under subsection (2) (d.1)(a) may include rules respecting(i) the making of orders by the practice standards committee, and(ii) the conditions and limitations that may be imposed on the practice of a lawyer, and(b) must not permit the imposition of conditions or limitations on the practice of a lawyer before the lawyer has been notified of the reasons for the proposed order and given a reasonable opportunity to make representations respecting those reasons.”
232. 36 -The benchers may make rules to do any of the following: (a) establish a discipline committee and delegate any or all authority and responsibility under this Part, other than rule-making authority, to that committee;(b) authorize an investigation of the books, records and accounts of a lawyer if there is reason to believe that the lawyer may have committed any misconduct, conduct unbecoming a lawyer or a breach of this Act or the rules;(c) authorize an examination of the books, records and accounts of a lawyer or law firm;(d) require a lawyer or law firm to cooperate with an investigation or examination under paragraph (b) or (c), including producing records and other evidence and providing explanations on request;(e) require a lawyer or articled student to appear before the benchers, a committee or other body to discuss the conduct or competence of the lawyer or articled student;(e.1) require a representative of a law firm to appear before the benchers, a committee or other body to discuss the conduct of the law firm;(f) authorize the ordering of a hearing into the conduct or competence of a lawyer or an articled student, or the conduct of a law firm, by issuing a citation;(g) authorize the rescission of a citation;(h) permit the benchers to summarily suspend or disbar a lawyer convicted of an offence that was proceeded with by way of indictment or convicted in another jurisdiction of an offence that, in the opinion of the benchers, is equivalent to an offence that may be proceeded with by way of indictment;(i) establish a process for the protection of the privacy and the severing, destruction or return of personal, business or other records that are unrelated to an investigation or examination and that, in error or incidentally, form part of (i) the books, records or accounts of a lawyer, an articled student or a law firm authorized to be investigated or examined under a rule made under paragraph (b) or section 26, or (ii) files or other records that are seized in accordance with an order of the Supreme Court under section 37.”
233. News Release from Law Society of B.C. VANCOUVER - Pursuant to its statutory duty to govern BC's legal profession in the public interest, the Law Society of BC has disciplined the following lawyers (the lawyer's year of call to the BC Bar appears in parentheses). Hearing reports are posted on the Law Society's website. John Motiuk (1967, undertook not to practise law, Nov. 25, 1999, became a non-practising member Jan. 1, 2001), of Delta, BC, admitted professional misconduct for: paying money to a party in a foreclosure claim contrary to a court order, settling a foreclosure claim without notifying another party in the claim, charging fees in estate matters when he was not entitled to do so, failing to advise the beneficiaries in estate matters to obtain independent legal advice, rendering an account in an estate matter that did not comply with Law Society rules, failing to follow client instructions, attempting to have a client withdraw a complaint, and failing to remit employee salary deductions to the proper authorities. Mr. Motiuk consented to a Law Society hearing panel order that he be required to satisfy a board of examiners appointed by the Law Society that he is competent to practise law should he ever apply to return to the practise of law.”
234. BILL 40 — 2012 LEGAL PROFESSION AMENDMENT ACT, 2012, HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, enacts as follows: 1 Section 1 (1) of the Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, is amended(a) in the definition of "conduct unbecoming a lawyer" by striking out "of the benchers or a panel," and substituting "of the benchers, a panel or a review board,",(b) by repealing the definition of "conduct unbecoming a lawyer" and substituting the following:"conduct unbecoming the profession" includes a matter, conduct or thing that is considered, in the judgment of the benchers, a panel or a review board,(a) to be contrary to the best interest of the public or of the legal profession, or(b) to harm the standing of the legal profession; ,(c) by adding the following definition:"law firm" means a legal entity or combination of legal entities carrying on the practice of law; ,(d) by repealing paragraph (h) of the definition of "practice of law" and substituting the following:(h) any of those acts if performed by a person who is not a lawyer and not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, , and(e) by adding the following definition:"review board" means a review board appointed in accordance with section 47;
235. Object and duty of society 3 It is the object and duty of the society to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by(a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,(b) ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers,(c) establishing standards and programs for the education, professional responsibility and competence of lawyers and of applicants for call and admission,(d) regulating the practice of law, and (e) supporting and assisting lawyers, articled students and lawyers of other jurisdictions who are permitted to practise law in British Columbia in fulfilling their duties in the practice of law.
236. Section 15 is amended (a) in subsection (1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (e), by adding ",and" at the end of paragraph (f) and by adding the following paragraph: (g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules. , and(b) in subsection (5) by striking out ", in the person's own name or in the name of another person".
237. Section 26 is amended (a) by repealing subsection (1) and substituting the following: (1) A person who believes that(a) a lawyer, former lawyer or articled student has practised law incompetently or been guilty of professional misconduct, conduct unbecoming the profession or a breach of this Act or the rules, or(b) a law firm has been guilty of professional misconduct, conduct unbecoming the profession or a breach of this Act or the rules may make a complaint to the society.
238. Section 30 is amended (a) by repealing subsection (1) and substituting the following: (1) In this section, "trust protection insurance" means insurance for lawyers to compensate persons who suffer pecuniary loss as a result of dishonest appropriation of money or other property entrusted to and received by a lawyer in his or her capacity as a barrister and solicitor.(1.1) The benchers must make rules requiring lawyers to maintain professional liability and trust protection insurance. , (b) by adding the following subsection:(2.1) The benchers (a) must establish, administer, maintain and operate a trust protection insurance program and may use for that purpose fees set under this section,(b) may establish conditions and qualifications for a claim against a lawyer under the trust protection insurance program, including time limitations for making a claim, and (c) may place limitations on the amounts that may be paid out of the insurance fund established under subsection (6) in respect of a claim against a lawyer under the trust protection insurance program, (c) by repealing subsection (4) (b) and (c) and substituting the following: (b) establish classes of membership for insurance purposes and exempt a class of lawyers from the requirement to maintain professional liability or trust protection insurance or from payment of all or part of the insurance fee; (c) designate classes of transactions for which a lawyer must pay a fee to fund the professional liability or trust protection insurance program. ,(d) in subsection (5) by striking out "professional liability insurance" and substituting "professional liability or trust protection insurance", (e) in subsection (6) by striking out "comprised of the insurance fees and other income of the professional liability insurance program" and substituting "comprising fees set under this section and other income of the professional liability and trust protection insurance programs",(f) in subsection (6) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (a), by adding ",and" at the end of paragraph (b) and by adding the following paragraph:(c) is not subject to a trust in favour of a person who has sustained a loss,(g) by repealing subsection (8) and substituting the following:(8) A lawyer must immediately surrender to the executive director his or her practising certificate and any proof of professional liability or trust protection insurance issued by the society, if (a) the society has, on behalf of the lawyer,(i) paid a deductible amount under the professional liability insurance program in respect of a claim or potential claim under that program, or (ii) made an indemnity payment under the trust protection insurance program in respect of a claim under that program, and (b) the lawyer has not reimbursed the society at the date that the insurance fee or an installment of that fee is due, (h) in subsection (9) (b) by striking out "a deductible amount paid" and substituting "a deductible amount paid under the professional liability insurance program or an indemnity payment made under the trust protection insurance program", and (i) by adding the following subsection:(11) A payment made from the insurance fund established under subsection (6) in respect of a claim against a lawyer under the trust protection insurance program(a) may be recovered from the lawyer or former lawyer on whose account it was paid, or from the estate of that person, as a debt owing to the society, and(b) if collected, is the property of the society and must be accounted for as part of the fund.
239. Section 15 (5) as it was in 2010 stipulated that except for section 15 (1) no person may “commence, defend or prosecute an action in any court in his own name or the name of another person.”
240. On May 12, 2012 by Royal Assent section 15 (5) as amended to exclude the words.., “in his own name or the name of another person.” Section 15 is also amended to change the language related to the practice of law initially providing the exception to no person except a member in good standing with the Law Society... so long as there is no expectation of a fee, gain or benefit to to permitting the practice no matter unless that person is a member in good standing with the Law Society. Now the new section 15 (5) makes more sense as it more clearly particularizes the “commencement, defending or prosecution of a claim in any court” – period. This relates to the court registry and documents filed there. It does not relate or pertain to the court insofar as the independent justice or judge's court is concerned. The court registry is a provincial matter, the independent court of the justice or judge (federal supreme court of Canada) is a Constitutional or federally conceived court. The defending and prosecuting of claims relates to the documents filed and not the the right of audience.
241. On February 24, 2010 and application was made by BMO whose defence lawyer was Daniel Webster Q.C. , and who had included pleadings in the response to civil claim using the language from section 15 (5) as it was in 2010, with no reference to the fact that Glen Robbins had declared himself to be a lawyer.
242. Justice Adair was made well aware by numerous legal counsel of the concerns with Glen Robbins declaring himself to be a lawyer in the notice of claim. Despite this, she made no orders with respect to this action, but did provide BMO with an order that the notice of claim was res judicata the original foreclosure and order nisi. Orders are also made for costs against Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in their capacity as plaintiffs, even though neither attended to court owing to symptoms of onset cancer striking Frana one day prior to hearing. Ita took charge of looking after her mother.
243. On the same day that Justice Adair made her order for BMO, the Law Society of British Columbia filed and served a petition (BCSC S111171) naming Glen Robbins in an action accusing him of being in breach of section 15 (4) and 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act, again, as it was in February 2011.
244. It is well known to persons involved with BCSC 106413 and BCSC S111171 and to the provincial court of appeal and Supreme Court of Canada that Glen Robbins filed a response to petition consenting to all orders the Law Society had requested. The Law Society then filed an amended petition and again Glen Robbins consented to all orders it sought, a fact well known to all parties.
245. It is a fact that Glen Robbins has been on a WorkSafe BC pension of $310.00 per month since August 16, 2010 with no additional income.
246. The orders given to BMO by Adair J., on February 24, 2011 for dismissal and costs are not appealed by either party(s). All defendants other than BMO (6) settle with Ita Robbins and Frana Matich who sign their names to settlement agreements. These agreements recognize the deficiency of the notice of claim and no party pays any money or other benefit to the other party and no costs are demanded. BMO is the only exception.
247. BMO obtains its order following Rule 8 application for dismissal despite not filing and serving a statement of defence.
248. I am neither a party or self litigant in BCSC 106413. The claim and file are closed without any changes made to the notice of claim.
249. That in order for Glen Robbins to have breached any part of the Legal Professions Act under the section relating to the “Authority to Practice Law” under the Legal Professions Act, the notice of claim would have to be struck by Adair J., and was not.
250. It is a fact that based on the orders of Adair J., including costs Glen Robbins was entitled to commence and prosecute a notice of claim BCSC 106413. It is a fact restated herein by quotation that Grauer J. declared Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to also be guilty of breaches of the Legal Profession Act specifically section 15 (1) and 15 (5). Is this why Adair J., 'conveniently' overstepped her jurisdiction (as well as her own order) to permit Glen Robbins to make submissions in relation to costs? Was it to ensure the courts apparent friendship with the money lending industry and investments with the Vancouver Foundation where chief justices sit as vice chairs by declaring an order for costs, and then letting the Law Society of BC exact their pound of flesh thereafter. Oh to be a fly on the walls in discussions between the Law Society and members (justices too).
251. Despite agreeing to allow Glen Robbins to declare himself to be a lawyer and commencing and prosecuting a claim on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich Adair J., made no orders with respect to 15 (4) or 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act, Adair J., (the acts later reasoned by Grauer J., under BCSC S11171) to be acts of a solicitor, Adair J., did not permit me to speak on behalf of the Ita Robbins or Frana Matich in court hearing, but did permit me to make submissions with regard to costs on their behalf.
252. The exclusive subject matter of the Law Society's petition against Glen Robbins (BCSC S111171) is BCSC 106413. Costs are awarded against Ita Robbins and Frana Matich with no costs against Glen Robbins.
253. Section 15 (4) stipulates that “A person must not falsely represent himself, herself or any other person as being (a) a lawyer, (b) an articled student, a student-at-law or a law clerk, or (c) a person referred to in subsection (1) (e) (f).”
254. Under Part 2, Division 1 of the BC Legal Professions Act, “lawyer” means “a member of the society, and (a) in Part 2, Division 1, includes a member of the governing body of the legal profession in another province or territory of Canada who is authorized to practise law in that province or territory, (b) in Parts 4 to 6 and 10 includes a former member of the society, and (c) in Part 10 includes an articled student.”
255. The exception to 15 (1) stipulates that “No person, other than a practicing lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law (a) except a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf.”
256. A practicing lawyer as set out in 15 (1) {the exception} is defined in the Legal Professions Act “does not include (h) any of the acts if performed by a person who is not a lawyer and not for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.”
257. The following excerpts are provided as facts from BC Supreme Court case law Citation: The Law Society of B.C. v. Robbins 2011 BCSC 1310, Place and Date of Hearing Vancouver, B.C. September 8, 2011; Place and Date of Judgment Vancouver, B.C. October 3, 2011:
258. From Page 2, paragraph (4): “The Law Society then brought this petition seeking, first, an order permanently prohibiting and enjoining Mr. Robbins from representing himself as a lawyer until such time as he becomes a member in good standing of the Law Society, and second, an order permanently prohibiting in any court, in his name or in the name of another person, except as permitted by section 15 (1) of the Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (the Act).”
259. From Page 3, paragraph (6): commencing at line 2 Justice Grauer under heading of “Discussion” writes: “Apart from his misrepresenting himself as a lawyer, which he now regrets, he has not been practicing law because he has not been charging a fee, and simply stands in the shoes of his family members. Accordingly, the Law Society should leave him alone. It is for the court to decide in its discretion whether it will grant him an audience.”
260. From Page 3, paragraph (7): “That the court has such discretion, quite apart from anything in the Legal Profession Act, is not in doubt. But the Law Society argues that it has a mandate under section 3 of the Act to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice, and that is is obliged by that mandate to intervene in this case. The Act, it asserts, prohibits Mr. Robbins from acting for his wife and mother-in-law in the manner he did, and intervention is justified by the fact that his actions have interfered with the proper administration of justice.....”
261. The administration of justice was completed under BCSC 106413 on the basis that all parties consented to orders of settlement prior to February 24, 2011 except BMO Bank though offered the same consent order by the plaintiffs demanded a hearing on the merits. An order was made by Justice Adair on the apparent merits (under application for appeal herein) including submissions for costs. The order was that the BMO litigation was res judicata foreclosure (though the basis of the action no notice preceded the filing of petition). The administration of justice was satisfied. It is a fact that Groberman in “Bryfogle” denied the res judicata argument however Bryfogle's case was different in that there were multiple subject matters giving merit to the pursuit of the Law Society orders therein. It is a fact that BCSC 106413 was a sole subject matter.
262. It is a fact that section 3 of the Act Grauer J., is referring to: “Object and duty of society: 3 “It is the object and duty of the society to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by(a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,(b) ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers,(c) establishing standards and programs for the education, professional responsibility and competence of lawyers and of applicants for call and admission,(d) regulating the practice of law, and(e) supporting and assisting lawyers, articled students and lawyers of other jurisdictions who are permitted to practise law in British Columbia in fulfilling their duties in the practice of law.”
263. It is clearly a fact that the Law Society of BC failed to satisfy any aspect of section 3 and is a further fact that they went to great lengths to maliciously breach this section as against Glen Robbins as well as Ita Robbins and Frana Matich in an effort to benefit their membership involved in unconscionable and illegal loans and mortgages.
264. Subsection (a) of section 3 stipulates “the object and duty of the society is uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by (a) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,” a category of person to which Glen Robbins belongs. Subsection (b) “ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers”. It is a fact that this objective and duty did not occur. Subsection (d) “regulating the practice of law” does not apply to Glen Robbins as it is a fact that one cannot practice law unless one is in expectation of a benefit.
265. It is a fact that the Legal Profession Act is poorly drafted in relation to many of the sections of the Act and that a history of judicial questions arose over this faulty legislative drafting which has affected many persons not members of the Law Society of BC which no reasonable person would see as accidental. The amended section 15 (5) remains unclear. It is a fact that it remains so as a type of utility set off to the matter of the practice of law and the exceptions thereto in order to provide the Law Society with leverage over non members.
266. It is a fact that members in good standing pay for the Law Society to operate and self litigants do not. It is a fact that the Law Society of BC charged Mr. Bryfogle $2,000 in costs despite numerous judgments he breached the practice of law sections of the Act, yet Glen Robbins was charged significantly more. It is a fact that all of Glen Robbins interactions with the superior court since 1996 involve banks and lenders.
267. It is a fact that Grauer J., provided no orders to the Law Society of British Columbia for numerous onerous orders sought beyond section 15 (4) and 15 (5) and it is a further fact that when the Law Society of BC lead with this evidence his Honour waved the back of his hand at them and refused to hear these submissions.
268. At Page 4 paragraph (14) Justice Grauer writes: “Mr. Robbins signed this Notice of Civil Claim as “Lawyer for Plaintiffs:. It was filed in the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court as Action No. S-106413. It is this action that is primarily responsible for the Law Society's intervention.”
269. At Page 4 paragraph (15) Justice Grauer writes: “An application for dismissal by the Bank of Montreal on behalf of itself and its chairman, Mr. Galloway came on for hearing before Madame Justice Adair on January 19, 2011. At that time, as I understand it, Adair J. refused Mr. Robbins right of audience, finding that his pleadings and application response were rambling, incoherent, and almost incomprehensible. In the circumstances, Adair J. Adjourned the hearing so that the plaintiffs could attend in person or retain counsel.”
270. It is a fact that the pleadings were not rambling, incoherent and almost incomprehensible, it is a fact that the pleadings are as clear as day. It is a fact by inference that Justice Grauer did not read the Notice of Claim and could not make a reasoned assessment of whether the pleadings were thus. This fact impacts on the overall reasoning of the judgment and the orders provided.
271. It is a fact that Glen Robbins was refused a right of audience before Justice Adair on the basis that she elected to consider a right of audience on condition that the plaintiff's attended the courtroom. It is a fact that Justice Adair did not make any declaration on the merit or lack thereof the pleadings in the notice of claim until after she had adjourned the original hearing date (January 2011), had seized herself of the matter, and had directed that the matter go to trial scheduling for hearing. A direction from a justice of the courts for matters to trial infers that there is at least a hint of valid of argument. Justice Adair must have made a decision that the notice of claim had sufficient grounds to be sent to trial otherwise it is a fact that she was under no obligation to make such declaration.
272. It is a fact that refusing a right of audience on the basis of “rambling, incoherent, and almost incomprehensible pleadings” and adjourning a hearing “so that the plaintiffs could attend in person or retain counsel” are not mutually exclusive concepts in fact they are irreconcilable in that the former relates to the acts of a solicitor in filing of documents and falls under the arguments relating to section 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act, while the latter concept relates entirely to the judicial discretion of a right of audience.
273. At Page 4-5 paragraph (16) Justice Grauer writes: “The matter came back before Adair J. On February 24, 2011, but again Mr. Robbins appeared instead of the plaintiffs. Madam Justice Adair was unwilling to grant a further adjournment in the absence of any affidavits from the plaintiffs or other reliable evidence to support the request, and so the application proceeded. Mr. Robbins was not permitted to make submissions on the merits of the application. The application was granted, and the action dismissed as against BMO Bank of Montreal and David A. Galloway.” 274. At page 5 paragraph (17) Justice Grauer writes: “Mr. Robbins was permitted to make submissions in relation to costs.”
275. It is a fact that a person who is not given a right of audience to speak to the merits of an application (application response) is not thereafter entitled to speak to the matter of costs, as the matter of costs is related to the merits of the case which is contradictory to the right of audience denied in the first instance.
276. It is a fact that by awarding costs against Ita Robbins and Frana Matich after hearing submissions from Glen Robbins who had been refused a right of audience, Justice Adair was infringing on the rights of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to have arguments heard under their notice of claim.
277. It is a fact that Justice Adair did not possess the discretion or jurisdiction to refuse a right of audience to Glen Robbins on the matter of merits of the application under BCSC 106413 and then authorize a right of audience on the matter of costs and it is a further fact that by so doing she was contradicting her own order in order to get payment to BMO Bank of Montreal, an act which is not in the interests of the administration of justice.
278. It is a fact that by granting Glen Robbins a right of audience to speak to the matter of costs it must be inferred that Justice Adair was permitting Glen Robbins the opportunity to practice law on the basis that he was not in the expectation of a 'fee, gain or benefit'.
279. At page 5 paragraph (19) Justice Grauer writes: “Although Mr. Robbins also represented his wife and mother-in-law in other proceedings connected with the foreclosure of their property, including a petition brought by MIC Investments, Action No. S-106413 is the only one he commenced on their behalf.”
280. It is a fact that under the Law Society of British Columbia's application of January 2014 under S111171 (SCC docket 35302) that the Law Society including both the MIC matter and S-106413 in its evidence package seeking vexatious proceedings orders.
281. Under the heading Part 2 “Legislation” Justice Grauer writes at Page 5 paragraph (20) “The Law Society brings this application pursuant to sections 15 and 85 of the Act, relying in particular on subsections 15 (1) and (5). It maintains that Mr. Robbins is guilty of commencing, prosecuting or defending proceedings in the name of another person, contrary to those subsections. Section 85 (5) permits the Law Society to apply for an injunction to restrain a person from contravening the Act, while section 85 (6) authorizes the granting of such an injunction where there is reasons to believe that there has been or will be a contravention of the Act.”
282. It is a fact that Justice Grauer reasons that Law Society is bringing its application in “particular” reliance of subsections 15 (1) the authority to practice law and subsection (5) the long controversial commence, defend prosecute....section. It is a fact that Justice Grauer does not rely particularly on subsection 15 (4) (falsely declaring oneself to be a lawyer) and lets Glen Robbins go on the basis of promise. It is a fact that there is no evidence that Glen Robbins ever advertised himself to be a lawyer. It is a fact therefore that the petition of the Law Society deals primarily and particularly with subsection 15 (5).
283. 15 (1) of the Legal Professions Act stipulates: “No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf, (b) as permitted by the Court Agent Act, (c) an articled student, to the extent permitted by the benchers, (d) an individual or articled student referred to in section 12 of the Legal Services Society Act, to the extent permitted under that Act,(e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, (f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17 (1) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, and (g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules. (2) A person who is employed by a practising lawyer, a law firm, a law corporation or the government and who acts under the supervision of a practising lawyer does not contravene subsection (1). (3) A person must not do any act described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the definition of "practice of law" in section 1 (1), even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed, if (a) the person is a member or former member of the society who is suspended or has been disbarred, or who, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, has resigned from membership in the society or otherwise ceased to be a member as a result of disciplinary proceedings, or (b) the person is suspended or prohibited for disciplinary reasons from practising law in another jurisdiction,(4) A person must not falsely represent himself, herself or any other person as being(a) a lawyer,(b) an articled student, a student-at-law or a law clerk, or(c) a person referred to in subsection (1) (e) or (f).”
284. In his Reasons at Page 6 paragraph [22] Grauer J., writes: “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law”. The definition is non exhaustive. It includes such matters as “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling....a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and “doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages.” It DOES NOT INCLUDE, however, “any of those acts if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.” SO BY DEFINITION, THE “PRACTICE OF LAW” DOES NOT INCLUDE, FOR INSTANCE, APPEARING AS COUNSEL OR ADVOCATE IF ONE DOES NOT CHARGE A FEE FOR DOING SO.”
285. It is a fact that Royal Assent of the BC Legislature May 2012 amended both 15 (1) and 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act. These amendments were sent to legislative processing approximately two months after the issuance of Grauer J.'s Reasons of October 3, 2011. It is a fact that Royal Assent amended section 15 (1) from “any of those acts if not performed for in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect from the person for whom the acts are performed.” TO: “(3) A person must not do any act described in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the definition of “practice of law” in section 1 (1), even though the act is not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.”
286. It is a fact that under BCSC 106413 Glen Robbins was legally practicing law representing his wife Ita Robbins a joint tenant with her mother Frana Matich on the subject property of foreclosure.
287. Section 15 sub (5) (NOW) stipulates: “Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court.”
288. Again, it is a fact according to 'fact finding' Justice Grauer from Page 5 paragraph (20) that “The Law Society of British Columbia relies particularly on subsections 15 (1) and 15 (5)” [with no reference to subsection 15 (4)]. (Once again) section 15 (1) “No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf, (b) as permitted by the Court Agent Act, (c) an articled student, to the extent permitted by the benchers, (d) an individual or articled student referred to in section 12 of the Legal Services Society Act, to the extent permitted under that Act,(e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, (f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17 (1) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, and (g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules. (Once again), section 15 (5) (5) “Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court.”
289. It is a fact that at Page 13 paragraph [48] Justice Grauer writes: “Mr. Robbins is hereby permanently prohibited and enjoined from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding in any court, in his own name or in the name of another person, except as permitted by the Legal Profession Act.”. It is the underlined portion of the original text of subsection 15 (5) that is removed by amendment of Royal Assent. It is a fact that following Royal Assent of amendments to section 15 (5) on May 2012 Glen Robbins is no long under any prohibition of the court. It is a fact that for decades subsection 15 (5) was unclear. It is a fact that in virtually all cases where the Law Society of BC obtained orders against other parties the problems of language associated with subsection 15 (5) were declared.
290. On Page 6 paragraph [21] Grauer J., writes: “Just how these provisions apply to a person like Mr. Robbins, a non-lawyer who is acting for free as the representative of litigants to whom he is related in matter in which he has an interest, is not entirely clear. PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THIS COURT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT, AND THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS YET TO RESOLVE THE INCONSISTENCY. THE PROBLEM ARISES FROM WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE RATHER CLUMSY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING. GIVEN THAT THE LEGISLATION IN QUESTION IS THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT THIS OBSERVATION IS NOT WITHOUT IRONY.”
291. On Page 7 at paragraph [25] Grauer J writes: “It is not immediately obvious why subsection 15 (1)(a) permits a person who is an “individual party” (whatever that means) to a proceeding who is acting without counsel on his or her own behalf to engage in the practice of law, when by definition, the practice of law would appear not to include such activity. One must assume, I suppose, that since the definition is non exhaustive, the practice of law may be taken to include other activities not covered by the definition, even when no fee is charged.”
292. This reasoning of Justice Grauer on page 7 at paragraph [25] reflects his doubt about the legitimacy of the soundness of the provision. He is not able to conclusively Interpret it. How can we apply the Interpretative Act (federal or provincial) to language described by a fact finder as requiring supposition? Indeed, we have established that at point in time of Royal Assent May 2012 this subsection was changed, one assumes on the basis of the Reasons for Judgment of Grauer J.
293. At Page 7 paragraph [26] Justice Grauer writes: “It is also unclear why subsection 15 (5) includes the redundant words “in the persons' own name.” Given the provisions of subsection 15 (1), and the definition of the “practice of law”, those words would appear to be superfluous, and detract from the clarity of the subsection.”
294. It is a fact that in his Reasons for Judgment October 3, 2011 Grauer J., expresses his reasoning that both subsections applying to Glen Robbins, that is, 15 (1) and 15 (5) are unclear and their relationship to each other is “superfluous”. Another word for superfluous is redundant or repetitive. In his orders Justice Grauer declares Glen Robbins guilty of breaching section 15 (5) as it was then, yet that subsection is redundant to elements of subsection 15 (1) and Glen Robbins is not in breach of that section, and both of these redundant subsections are later amended by Royal Assent 2012.
295. The amendments given Royal Assent on May 12, 2012 to the Legal Professions Act B.C. include removing the word lawyer and replacing it with the word “professional”.
296. It is a fact at the time of the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Grauer issued October 3, 2011 that section 15 (4) of the Legal Professions Act is not included in his final order.
297. However, it is a fact that at Page 2 paragraph (5) Justice Grauer writes: “At the hearing before me, Mr. Robbins did not seriously contest the Law Society's entitlement to the first order it sought, and abandoned the insupportable positions he had earlier taken in an attempt to justify describing himself as “solicitor”, “counsel” and “legal representative”.
298. It is a fact that the original language of 15 (4) did not include any reference to the words “solicitor”, “counsel” and “legal representative” and it is also a fact that the Law Society of B.C. , amended Section 15 (4) removing the word “lawyer” and replacing it with the word “professional”.
299. It is a fact that in the most recent history of decades of judicial findings on these sections of the Legal Profession Act all non lawyers who have been charged under subsection 15 (4) have advertised or otherwise solicited for work representing themselves as a lawyer and thereafter charged third parties for that work. On other words the false representation of declaring oneself a lawyer has been inextricably linked to the unequivocal practice of law.
300. It is a fact that the word “professional” aligns itself with the practice of law where compensation and benefit may be taken in return for “professional” services.
301. It is a fact that Glen Robbins made reference to himself as a “lawyer” which the actions of the Law Society of B.C made in relation to amendments given Royal Assent on May 12, 2012 removed the word, by inference of fact actually making the use of the word “lawyer” by an person to be supportable in law.
302. Let's break down as fact section 15 by subsection “No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf,@ 15 (1). It is a fact that Glen Robbins is not a “professional” lawyer “permitted to engage in the practice of law”. It is a fact according to Grauer J., that BCSC 106413 is the reason for the hearing under BCSC S111171 with the Law Society of B.C. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is NOT “an individual party to the (sic) proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf.”
303. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is not a party to BCSC 106413. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is not a “professional” permitted to “practice law”. It is also a fact that it is in fact supportable for Glen Robbins to refer to himself as a “lawyer”. Glen Robbins is an unprofessional lawyer by combination of two facts. First, he signs his name under BCSC 106413. Unlike other cases before Justices Groberman, Halfyard, Cullen and others Glen Robbins does not write in under his own hand a declaration that he a lawyer. The government employee drafting the notice of claim (a new document replacing the writ of summons and statement of claim) only offers that designation within the form of the notice of claim.
304. At Page 2, paragraph (5) and line 4 Justice Grauer writes in context of 15 (4) in referring to Glen Robbins “He promised that he would not so describe himself again. I pronounced the order in the terms requested. In fact Grauer J., does not make make any “Conclusion” with regard to 15 (4).
305. It is a fact that Glen Robbins signed his name to BCSC 106413 as “Lawyer for Plaintiffs” Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. It is a fact that orders are made unrelated to this action on the part of Glen Robbins by Madame Justice Adair on February 24, 2011. It is a fact that Glen Robbins believed that he was permitted to act as a lawyer for his wife and mother in law so long as he did not receive a fee, benefit or gain from either of them. It is a fact that Glen Robbins may have received benefits from his wife through marriage including love, support and joy. It is a fact that the Priest who married them indicated that: “Marriage creates “one body” a new reality, enabling the union by ordering it toward a common life that promotes the good of the couple, the family, and the community. Marriage is the first estate preceding both Church and civil government. “We leave our parents and cleave to our spouses.”
306. It is a fact that Justice Adair makes an independent decision within her authority to do so not to permit Glen Robbins to have right of audience with her to speak to the matters of the Application of BMO set for hearing that day without the presence of either or both of the plaintiffs Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.
307. It is a fact however that Justice Adair does permit Glen Robbins with an opportunity to speak on behalf of the plaintiffs in terms of monetary Costs award, which she later awarded to Glen Robbins.
308. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is permitted to speak on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich to Costs associated with the Application for Dismissal. It is a fact that under BCSC 106413 that Justice Adair does not impose any prohibition on Glen Robbins with regard to Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.
309. It is a fact that Justice Adair would have permitted Glen Robbins to speak on behalf of Frana Matich or Ita Robbins had either of them been in the courtroom and not on the basis of power of attorney.
310. It is a fact that on February 24, 2011 Glen Robbins is free to speak on behalf of any other person in any BC courthouse with the permission of the presiding justice who has the right to reject a right of audience of a non practicing lawyer like Glen Robbins or a professional lawyer who has membership with the Law Society of B.C.
311. From Page 5 Part 2. “Legislation” at paragraph 20 Justice Grauer writes commencing at line 3: “It (the Law Society) maintains that Mr. Robbins is guilty of commencing, prosecuting or defending proceedings in the name of another person.”
312. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is not guilty of “commencing, prosecuting or defending proceedings in the name of another person...”. as the legislation existed when it was before Justice Grauer, but not following the Royal Assent of May 12, 2012 when the language ..in the name of another person was amended. The question remaining retrospectively of the amendment to the legislation is whether or not Glen Robbins is guilty of being in breach of section 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act “Except as permitted in subsection (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court.” 15(1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf,(b) as permitted by the Court Agent Act,(c) an articled student, to the extent permitted by the benchers, (d) an individual or articled student referred to in section 12 of the Legal Services Society Act, to the extent permitted under that Act,(e) a lawyer of another jurisdiction permitted to practise law in British Columbia under section 16 (2) (a), to the extent permitted under that section,(f) a practitioner of foreign law holding a permit under section 17 (1) (a), to the extent permitted under that section, and(g) a lawyer who is not a practising lawyer, to the extent permitted under the rules.
313. So...Section 15 (1) stipulates that “No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law...” We must find out what the practice of law means according to the only case precedent we have on the subject. At Page 6 paragraph (22) Justice Grauer says this about the practice of law. “Section 1 of the Act defines the “practice of law.” The definition is “non exhaustive” according to Grauer J. The term non exhaustive is defined as being incomplete. According to Grauer J., the Legal Professions Act definition of practice of law is incomplete. Grauer J., goes on to defend this assessment. It includes (but is not limited to: “appearing as counsel or advocate”, “drawing, revising or settling....a document for use in a proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial”, and “doing an act or negotiating in any way for the settlement of, or settling, a claim or demand for damages.” Because the list is non exhaustive, it is necessary to consider what actions are not included. Grauer J., provides us with those actions which are excluded “(sic) any of those acts if not performed for or in the expectation of a fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from the person for whom the acts are performed.”
314. Grauer J., concludes “So by definition, “the practice of law” does not include, for instance, appearing as counsel or advocate if one does not charge a fee for doing so.”
315. At Page 6 paragraph (23) Grauer J., reasons in furtherance of the practice of law in relation to the actions of Glen Robbins. He writes that: “Given that such acts as appearing as counsel, drawing documents for use in a judicial proceeding and negotiating a settlement do not constitute the practice of law if done for free, one might reasonably assume, as does Mr. Robbins, that the Law Society would have no interest in such conduct. It is concerned, after all, only with the practice of law, authorized or not.”

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