Robbins SCE Research
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Glen P. Robbins - BOOK I September 2015 submissions to Supreme Court of Canada-Re: Legal Professions Act, no Notice of Amend Royal Assent May 2012, unlawful conduct conspiracy, Bakonyi, Cambridge, Ellis, BMO, Fenlon J. Hinkson CJ, Gov of BC
BOOK I - On Right of Audience and Inherent Jurisdiction  Dec 21, 2014

Commentary
1. BC Supreme Court Rules: Part 1 – Interpretation, Rule 1-1 “accessible address” “means an address that describes a unique and identifiable location in British Columbia that is accessible to the public during normal business hours for the delivery of documents.”
2. “action” “means a proceeding started by a notice of civil claim.”
3. The matter of BC 106413 which preceded and is later the sole basis for the Law Society of BC proceeding with BCSC S111171 was filed in Vancouver Courts on the basis that one of the plaintiffs in the claim, Frana Matich lived withing the 30 kilometer distance to that courthouse and similar distance to New Westminster courthouse, while Ita Robbins address at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam, BC was not within that distance.
4. In their capacity as self litigants under BCSC 106413 Ita Robbins and Frana Matich had lawful choice as to where they might file or have filed their notice of claim.
5. The matter of S111171 filed by the Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC) with Glen Robbins whose residence as respondent was commenced at Vancouver courthouse is more than the authorized distance provided by BC Court Rules.
6. The matter of H130330 filed by Cambridge Mortgage Investment Corporation (CMIC) was outside the distance for commencement of action as against the respondents Ita Robbins and Frana Matich as the address for service was 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, Coquitlam.
7. “address for service”, “in relation to a party to a proceeding, means an address that is, under Rule 4, the party's address for service in the proceeding.”
8. “Part 4—Service, Rule 4-1—Address for Service-Party must have address for service (1) Each party of record to a proceeding must, (a) if the party is represented by a lawyer in the proceeding, have, as the party's address for service, an accessible address that is the office address of that lawyer, or (b) if the party is not represented by a lawyer in the proceeding,(i) have, as the party's address for service, an accessible address within 30 kilometers of the registry, or (ii) if the party does not have an accessible address within 30 kilometers of the registry, have, as the party's addresses for service, both (A) an accessible address, and (B) a postal address in British Columbia, a fax number or an e-mail address. Additional addresses for service. (2)A party may have, in addition to the address or addresses for service the party is required to have under subrule (1), one or more of the following as addresses for service: (a) a postal address; (b) a fax number;(c) an e-mail address. Change of address for service. (3)A party of record may change his or her address or addresses for service by filing and serving on the other parties of record a notice of address for service in Form 9 that shows, for the party,(a) the address or addresses for service required under subrule (1), and (b) any additional addresses for service referred to in subrule (2) that the party wishes to include.”
9. It is a fact that at no time in either BCSC 106413, BCSC S111171 or BCSC H130330 did the LSBC or CMIC make application to the court for change of service of address or for any any other orders relating to various types of additional service methods.
10. All Federal Court of Canada, Federal Court of Appeal Judges, Supreme Court of Canada Judges and other staff operating under the Public Service Act Canada including the Registrar and District Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada are required under law to live within a certain distance of the city of Ottawa.
11. “Chief Justice” means the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.” 12. “document” “has an extended meaning and includes a photograph, film, recording of sound, any record of a permanent or semi-permanent character and any information recorded or stored by means of any device.” 13. “file” “means file in the registry” 14. “order” “includes a judgment or decree” 15. “party of record” “in relation to a proceeding, means a person who has filed a pleading, petition or response to petition in the proceeding, and includes, (a) in a proceeding referred to in Part 18, a person who has filed a notice of intent under that Part.” 16. “Part 18-Other Court Proceedings, Rule 18-1 – “Inquiries, Assessments, and Accounts (1) At any stage of a proceeding, the court may direct that an inquiry, assessment or accounting be held by a master, registrar or special referee.” 17. “party's lawyer” “in relation to a party to a proceeding means the lawyer representing the party in that proceeding.” 18. “petition proceeding” “means a proceeding started by a petition”. 19. “pleading” “means a notice of claim, a response to civil claim, a reply, a counterclaim, a response to counterclaim, a third party notice or a response to third party notice.” 20. “registrar” “includes a district registrar and a deputy registrar.” 21. “registrar's hearing” “means an inquiry, an assessment, an accounting, a review of a bill, an examination of an agreement or an assessment of a bill of costs.” 22. “registry” “in relation to a proceeding, means the office of the Court in which the proceeding is being conducted.” 23. “requisite proceeding” “means a proceeding stated by a requisition”. 24. “responding pleading” “means a response to civil claim, a response to counterclaim, a respondent third party notice, a reply or any other document filed in response to an originating pleading.” 25. “style of proceeding” “means, in relation to a document that is or is to be filed in a proceeding, that portion of the document that (a) sets out the registry number attributed to the proceeding and the court and registry in which the proceeding is being or is to be conducted, and (b) identifies the parties to the proceeding or, if there is no person named as the defendant, the subject matter of the proceeding.” 26. “writ of execution” “includes a writ of seizure and sale, a writ of sequestration, a writ of possession and a writ of delivery and any subsequent writ that issues to give effect to these writs and also includes a warrant or other process of execution issued out of any court in British Columbia that has jurisdiction to grant and issue that process.”
27. “Rule 1-3- Object of the Rules” “(1) The object of these Supreme Court Rules is to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of a proceeding on its merits, so far as is practicable, conducting the proceeding in ways that are proportionate to (a) the amount involved in the proceeding (b) the importance of the issues in dispute, and (c) the complexity of the proceeding.” 28. “Part 2 – How to Make a Claim” “Rule 2-1 Choosing the Correct Form of Proceeding commencing proceedings by notice of civil claim (1) Unless a enactment of the Supreme Court of Rules otherwise provides, every proceeding must be started by the filing of a notice of civil claim under Part 3.” “commencing proceedings by petition or requisition (2) To start a proceeding in the following circumstances, a person must file a petition or, if Rule 17-1 applies, a requisition.” “(a) the person starting the petition is the only person who is interested in the relief claimed, or there is no other person against relief is sought; (b) the proceeding is brought in respect of an application that is authorized by an enactment, to be made to the court.” (c) the sole or principle question at issue is alleged to be one of construction of an enactment, will, deed, oral or written contract or other document. (d) the relief sought relates to land and is for (i) a declaration of a beneficial interest in or a charge on land and of the character and extent of the interest or charge, (ii) a declaration that settles...interest and charges (iii) an order that cancels a certificate of title or making the title subject to an interest or charge, or (iv) an order for partition or sale (h) the relief, advice or direction sought relates to the determination of a claim of solicitor and client privilege.” 29. Procedures applicable to particular proceedings” (3) without limiting subrules (1) to (2.1), the following provisions apply to the following applications and proceedings (e) Rule 18-2 applies to a state case (k) Rule 21-7 applies to a proceeding for foreclosure of the equitable right to redeem mortgaged property, for redemption or for cancellation of an agreement for sale.”
30. Rule 21-7—Foreclosure and Cancellation, “Starting the proceeding, (1)A proceeding for foreclosure of the equitable right to redeem mortgaged property or for redemption must be started by petition. Parties (2)In a proceeding referred to in subrule (1), all persons whose interest in or claim to the mortgaged property is sought to be extinguished and all persons against whom any relief is sought must be made respondents and, unless the court otherwise orders, it is not necessary to join any other person as a respondent. Joinder of claim or party. (3)A petitioner under this rule may join in the proceeding any claim arising out of the mortgage or out of any bond or collateral security or obligation given for the mortgage debt and may join as a party any person who is liable to pay the mortgage debt. Person filing interest after certificate of pending litigation.(4)If a petitioner under this rule registers a certificate of pending litigation in respect of the proceeding against the mortgaged property, a person who subsequently registers or files in a land title office an interest, right or claim in or to the mortgaged property (a) need not be served with the petition,,(b) is bound by an order made in the proceeding, and (c) may file a response to petition in the proceeding. Powers of the court (5)The court may do one or more of the following in a proceeding under subrule (1):(a) make a final order of foreclosure; (b) order that a respondent must, within a redemption period that the court may fix, pay to the petitioner what is due under the mortgage and for costs, and that, in default of payment, the respondent is to be foreclosed of his or her equity of redemption; (c) determine summarily, or order that an account be taken of and that a registrar certify, the amount that is due to the petitioner or to any person on the date of the hearing of the petition or on the date of the accounting, as the case may be; (d) determine summarily, or order that an account be taken of and that the registrar certify, in relation to the amount determined under paragraph (c), (i) the daily amount of interest from the date of the hearing of the petition or from the date of the accounting, as the case may be, to the expiration of the period of redemption, or (ii) if the daily amount of interest referred to in subparagraph (i) may fluctuate over the period referred to in that subparagraph, the method for calculating such interest;(e) pronounce judgment for any amount determined to be due or for any amount that has been certified to be due on an accounting; (f) determine summarily, or order an inquiry to determine, any issues raised between respondents, including priorities;(g) determine summarily, or order an inquiry to determine, whether a person should be served with the petition; (h) order at what times, on what terms and in what order of priority respondents may redeem the mortgaged property and that in default they are to be foreclosed of any interest, right or claim in or to the mortgaged property; (i) order a sale of the mortgaged property; (j) grant further or corollary relief; (k) make an order under Rule 22-1 (7). Final order (6)In default of payment in accordance with an order made under subrule (5), a final order of foreclosure may be granted against a respondent on application by the petitioner. Order for sale (7)A party of record may apply at any time for an order that the mortgaged property be sold or be put up for sale. Inquiry to settle terms of sale (8)The court may order an inquiry to settle the terms of a sale. Order confirming sale (9)Even though the time for redemption has not expired, the person having conduct of a sale may apply to the court for an order confirming the sale, directing the disposition of the proceeds and vesting title in the purchaser. Notice to assess costs. (10)A respondent wishing to redeem may, on paying to the petitioner the amount due under the mortgage, serve notice on the petitioner to assess costs, and if, within 14 days after service of the notice, the petitioner has not filed a bill of costs for assessment, the petitioner is not entitled to costs. Agreement for sale (11)This rule applies to a proceeding by a vendor on an agreement for sale of land in which a claim is made for specific performance of an agreement for sale and for its cancellation on failure to perform.”
31. “In a represented capacity” mean: “(1) For or on behalf of a corporation, partnership, trust or other entity, as an authorized officer, agent, partner, trustee or other representative; (2) As a public office, personal representative, guardian or other representative, in the capacity recited in the instrument; (3) As an attorney-in-fact for the principal; (4) In any other capacity as an authorized representative of another.” 32. “Attorney in Fact” “A person who is authorized to perform business-related transactions on behalf of someone else (the principal). In order to become someone's attorney-in-fact a person must have the principle sign a power of attorney document.
33. Rule 4-2—Ordinary Service, Documents normally to be served by ordinary service (1)Subject to Rule 4-3 (1) and unless the court otherwise orders, documents to be served by a party under these Supreme Court Civil Rules may be served by ordinary service. How to serve documents by ordinary service (2)Unless the court otherwise orders, ordinary service of a document is to be effected in any of the following ways on a person who has provided an address for service in the proceeding: (a) by leaving the document at the person's address for service; (b) by mailing the document by ordinary mail to the person's address for service; (c) subject to subrule (5) of this rule, if a fax number is provided as one of the person's addresses for service, by faxing the document to that fax number together with a fax cover sheet;(d) if an e-mail address is provided as one of the person's addresses for service, by e-mailing the document to that e-mail address. When service by delivery is deemed to be completed (3)A document served by leaving it at a person's address for service is deemed to be served on the person as follows: (a) if the document is left at the address for service at or before 4 pm. on a day that is not a Saturday or holiday, the document is deemed to be served on the day of service; (b) if the document is left at the address for service on a Saturday or holiday or after 4 pm. on any other day, the document is deemed to be served on the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday. When service by mail is deemed to be completed (4)A document sent for service by ordinary mail under this rule is deemed to be served one week later on the same day of the week as the day of mailing or, if that deemed day of service is a Saturday or holiday, on the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday. When documents may be served by fax (5)A document may be served by fax as follows:(a) if the document, including the fax cover sheet, is less than 30 pages, the document may be served by fax at any time; (b) if the document, including the fax cover sheet, is 30 pages or more, the document may be served by fax if it is transmitted (i) between 5 pm. and the following 8 am., or(ii) at another time if the person receiving the document agreed to that time before service. When service by fax or e-mail is deemed to be completed (6)A document transmitted for service by fax or e-mail under this rule is deemed to be served as follows: (a) if the document is transmitted before 4 pm. on a day that is not a Saturday or holiday, the document is deemed to be served on the day of transmission; (b) if the document is transmitted on a Saturday or holiday or after 4 pm. on any other day, the document is deemed to be served on the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday. If no address for service given (7)If, despite these Supreme Court Civil Rules, a party of record on whom a document is to be served has no address for service, and if these Supreme Court Civil Rules do not specify that the document must be served by personal service on the party, (a) the document may be served by mailing a copy of the document by ordinary mail to (i) the party's lawyer, or(ii) if the party has no lawyer representing the party in the proceeding, to the party's last known address, and (b) subrule (4) applies. Rule 4-3—Personal Service, When documents must be served by personal service (1)Unless the court otherwise orders or these Supreme Court Civil Rules otherwise provide, the following documents must be served by personal service in accordance with subrule (2): (a) a notice of civil claim;(b) a petition; (c) a counterclaim if that counterclaim is being served on a person who is not a party of record;(d) a third party notice if that third party notice is being served on a person who is not a party of record;(e) a subpoena to a witness who is not a party of record;(f) a subpoena to a debtor under Rule 13-3;(f.1) a subpoena under Rule 25-12; (g) a citation referred to in Rule 25-11;(h) a notice of intention to withdraw under Rule 22-6 if that notice is being served on the person who was being represented by the lawyer who filed the notice;(i) a notice of application under Rule 22-8 for an order for contempt;(j) any document not mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this subrule that is to be served on a person who is not a party of record to the proceeding or who has not provided an address for service in the proceeding under Rule 8-1 (11);(k) any other document that under these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to be served by personal service. How to serve documents by personal service (2)Unless the court otherwise orders, personal service of a document is to be effected as follows: (a) on an individual, by leaving a copy of the document with him or her;(b) on a corporation, (i) by leaving a copy of the document with the president, chair, mayor or other chief officer of the corporation,(ii) by leaving a copy of the document with the city clerk or municipal clerk,(iii) by leaving a copy of the document with the manager, cashier, superintendent, treasurer, secretary, clerk or agent of the corporation or of any branch or agency of the corporation in British Columbia, or(iv) in the manner provided by the Business Corporations Act or any enactment relating to the service of court documents,and, for the purpose of this paragraph, if the chief place of business of the corporation is outside British Columbia, every person who, within British Columbia, transacts or carries on any of the business of, or any business for, that corporation is deemed to be an agent of the corporation;(c) on an unincorporated association, other than a trade union, by leaving a copy of the document with any officer of the association;(d) on a trade union, by leaving a copy of the document with any officer of the trade union or with a business agent;(e) on an infant, in the manner provided by the Infants Act;(f) on a mentally incompetent person, by leaving a copy of the document(i) with the person's committee or, if there is no committee, with the person with whom the mentally incompetent person resides or in whose care he or she is or with the person appointed by the court to be served in the mentally incompetent person's place, and (ii) with the Public Guardian and Trustee, and in no case is it necessary to show the original document; (g) on a principal referred to in subrule (3), in accordance with subrules (3) to (5);(h) on the Attorney General, in accordance with subrule (6).Agent may be served (3)If an agent residing or carrying on business in British Columbia enters into a contract, in British Columbia, on behalf of a principal who resides outside British Columbia, and a proceeding is brought that relates to or arises out of that contract, a pleading or other document in that proceeding may be served on the agent with leave of the court. Court may grant leave (4)The court may make an order granting leave under subrule (3) before the agent's authority or the agent's business relations with the principal have been determined. Notice to principal (5)Promptly after a pleading or other document is served on an agent under subrule (3), the party serving the pleading or other document must send, by registered mail to the principal at the principal's address outside British Columbia,(a) a copy of the entered order giving leave for that service, and (b) a copy of the filed pleading or other document. Service on Attorney General (6)A document to be served on the Attorney General must be served at the Ministry of Justice in the City of Victoria, and is sufficiently served if it is left during office hours with any lawyer on the staff of the Attorney General at Victoria or mailed by registered mail to the Deputy Attorney General at Victoria. When personal service is deemed to be completed (7)A document served by personal service is deemed to be served as follows: (a) if the document is served at or before 4 pm. on a day that is not a Saturday or holiday, the document is deemed to be served on the day of service; (b) if the document is served on a Saturday or holiday or after 4 pm. on any other day, the document is deemed to be served on the next day that is not a Saturday or holiday. Date of deemed service (8)If an originating pleading or petition has not been served on a person, but the person files a responding pleading or response to petition or attends at the trial or at the hearing of the petition, the originating pleading or petition is deemed to have been served on that person on the date the person files or attends. Rule 4-4—Alternative Methods of Service Alternative service methods (1)If it is impracticable to serve a document by personal service or if the person to be served by personal service, (a) cannot be found after a diligent search, or (b) is evading service of the documents,the court may, on application without notice, make an order for substituted service granting permission to use an alternative method of service. If an alternative service method is permitted (2)If a document is to be served by an alternative method permitted under subrule (1), a copy of the entered substituted service order that granted permission to use that alternative method must be served with the document unless (a) the court otherwise orders, or (b) the alternative method of service permitted under subrule (1) is service by advertisement. Service by advertisement (3)If, under subrule (1), the court permits a document to be served by advertisement, the advertisement must be in Form 10.”
34. Rule 6-2—Change of Parties, Change of Party Status, or Interest Party ceasing to exist (1) If a party dies or becomes bankrupt, or a corporate party is wound up or otherwise ceases to exist, but the claim survives, the proceeding may continue in spite of the death or bankruptcy or the corporate party having been wound up or ceasing to exist. Effect of death (2)Whether or not the claim survives, a proceeding may continue in spite of either party dying between the verdict or finding on the issues of fact and the entry of judgment, but judgment may be entered despite the death. Assignment or conveyance of interest (3) If, by assignment, conveyance or death, an estate, interest or title devolves or is transferred, a proceeding relating to that estate, interest or title may be continued by or against the person on whom that estate, interest or title has devolved or to whom that estate, interest or title has been transferred. Change or transmission of interest or liability (4)If, after the start of a proceeding, (a) a change or transmission of interest or liability of a party takes place or a person interested comes into existence, and(b) it becomes necessary or desirable that (i) a person not already a party should be made a party, or (ii) a person already a party should be made a party in another capacity, the court may order that the proceeding be continued between the continuing parties and the new party. Prosecution of proceeding if plaintiff or petitioner dies (5)If a plaintiff or petitioner has died and the proceeding may be continued, a defendant or respondent may apply to the court for an order that the person entitled to proceed do proceed within the time that the court orders and that, in default, the proceeding be dismissed for want of prosecution. Costs on dismissal (6)If a proceeding is dismissed under subrule (5), an order for payment of costs may be made and enforced against the assets of the deceased's estate. Change of Parties Adding, removing or substituting parties by order (7) At any stage of a proceeding, the court, on application by any person, may, subject to subrules (9) and (10), (a) order that a person cease to be party if that person is not, or has ceased to be, a proper or necessary party,(b) order that a person be added or substituted as a party if(i) that person ought to have been joined as a party, or (ii) that person's participation in the proceeding is necessary to ensure that all matters in the proceeding may be effectually adjudicated on, and (c) order that a person be added as a party if there may exist, between the person and any party to the proceeding, a question or issue relating to or connected with (i) any relief claimed in the proceeding, or (ii) the subject matter of the proceeding that, in the opinion of the court, it would be just and convenient to determine as between the person and that party. Procedure if party added, removed or substituted by order (8)Unless the court otherwise orders, if an order is made under subrule (7) adding, removing or substituting a party,(a) the originating pleading or petition must be amended in accordance with these Supreme Court Civil Rules, a reference to the order must be endorsed on that amended pleading or petition and Rule 6-1 (4) to (7) applies, (b) no further steps may be taken against a person added or substituted as a party under this subrule until a copy of the filed amended originating pleading or filed amended petition and a copy of the entered order adding or substituting the party are served on the person, and (c) if a person is made a party under the order, (i) the person may apply to the court to vary or discharge the order within 21 days after the date on which the order is served on the person under paragraph (b) of this subrule, and(ii) unless the court orders, in an application under subparagraph (i) of this paragraph or otherwise, that the person not be added as a party, these Supreme Court Civil Rules apply in relation to that added party as if the amended originating pleading or petition were a new originating pleading or petition. If case plan order in effect (9)If an order is made under subrule (4) or (7) in an action in which a case plan order has been made, (a) if a person is removed as a party, the case plan order remains in effect, and(b) if a person is added or substituted as a party and that person becomes a party of record, no step may be taken by or against the added or substituted party until the case plan order is amended to apply to the added or substituted party. General- Consent required (10)A person must not be added or substituted as a plaintiff or petitioner without the person's consent. Effect of order (11)Unless the court otherwise orders, if a person becomes a party in substitution for a former party, all things done in the proceeding before the person became a party have the same effect in relation to that person as they had in relation to the former party, but the substituted party must file a notice of address for service in Form 9.”
35. Part 8—Applications, Rule 8-1—How to Bring and Respond to Applications Definitions (1)In this rule: "application respondent" means a person who files an application response under subrule (9);"business day" means a day on which the court registries are open for business. How applications must be brought (2)To apply for an order from the court other than at trial or at the hearing of a petition, a party must do the following: (a) in the case of an application for an order by consent, apply in accordance with (i) this rule, or (ii) Rule 8-3;(b) in the case of an application of which notice need not be given, apply in accordance with (i) this rule, or (ii) Rule 8-4; (c) in the case of an urgent application, apply in accordance with Rule 8-5; (d) in the case of an application referred to in Rule 8-6 that may be made by written submissions, apply in accordance with the directions of the case planning conference judge referred to in Rule 8-6; (e) in the case of an application for which a procedure is provided for by these Supreme Court Civil Rules, apply in accordance with that procedure; (f) in the case of any other application, apply in accordance with this rule. Notice of application (3) A party wishing to apply under this rule must file (a) a notice of application, and (b) the original of every affidavit, and of every other document, that (i) is to be referred to by the applicant at the hearing, and (ii) has not already been filed in the proceeding. Contents of notice of application (4)A notice of application must be in Form 32 and must (a) set out the orders sought or attach a draft of the order sought, (b) briefly summarize the factual basis for the application, (c) set out the rule, enactment or other jurisdictional authority relied on for the orders sought and any other legal arguments on which the orders sought should be granted, (d) list the affidavits and other documents on which the applicant intends to rely at the hearing of the application, (e) set out the applicant's estimate of the time the application will take for hearing, (f) subject to subrules (5) and (6), set out the date and time of the hearing of the application, (g) set out the place for the hearing of the application in accordance with Rule 8-2, and (h) provide the data collection information required in the appendix to the form,and the notice of application, other than any draft order attached to it under paragraph (a), must not exceed 10 pages in length. Date and time of hearing (5)Subject to subrule (6), the hearing of an application must be set for 9:45 am. on a date on which the court hears applications or at such other time or date as has been fixed by the court or a registrar. Date and time if hearing time more than 2 hours (6)If the applicant's estimate referred to in subrule (4) (e) is more than 2 hours, the date and time of hearing must be fixed by a registrar. Service of application materials (7)The applicant must serve the following, in accordance with subrule (8), on each of the parties of record and on every other person, other than a party, who may be affected by the orders sought: (a) a copy of the filed notice of application; (b) a copy of each of the filed affidavits and documents, referred to in the notice of application under subrule (4) (d), that has not already been served on that person; (c) if the application is brought under Rule 9-7, any notice that the applicant is required to give under Rule 9-7 (9).Time for service (8)The documents referred to in subrule (7) of this rule must be served, (a) subject to paragraph (b) of this subrule, at least 8 business days before the date set for the hearing of the application, or (b) in the case of an application under Rule 9-7, at least 12 business days before the date set for the hearing of the application. Application response (9)A person who is served with documents referred to in subrule (7) of this rule and who wishes to respond to the notice of application (in this subrule called the "responding person") must do the following within 5 business days after service or, in the case of an application under Rule 9-7, within 8 business days after service: (a) file an application response; (b) file the original of every affidavit, and of every other document, that(i) is to be referred to by the responding person at the hearing, and (ii) has not already been filed in the proceeding; (c) serve on the applicant 2 copies of the following, and on every other party of record one copy of the following: (i) a copy of the filed application response; (ii) a copy of each of the filed affidavits and documents, referred to in the application response under subrule (10) (b) (ii), that has not already been served on that person; (iii) if the application is brought under Rule 9-7, any notice that the application respondent is required to give under Rule 9-7 (9). Contents of application response (10)An application response must be in Form 33, must not exceed 10 pages in length and must (a) indicate, for each order sought on the application, whether the application respondent consents to, opposes or takes no position on the order, and (b) if the application respondent wishes to oppose any of the relief sought in the application, (i) briefly summarize the factual and legal bases on which the orders sought should not be granted, (ii) list the affidavits and other documents to which the application respondent intends to refer at the hearing of the application, and (iii) set out the application respondent's estimate of the time the application will take for hearing. Address for service (11)An application respondent who has not yet provided an address for service in the proceeding must include an address for service in any application response filed under subrule (9), and Rule 4-1 applies. Repealed Applicant may respond (13)An applicant who wishes to respond to any document served under subrule (9) must file and serve on each application respondent any responding affidavits no later than 4 pm. on the business day that is one full business day before the date set for the hearing. No additional affidavits (14)Unless all parties of record consent or the court otherwise orders, a party must not serve any affidavits additional to those served under subrules (7), (9) and (13). Application record (15) Subject to subrule (18), the applicant must provide to the registry where the hearing is to take place, no later than 4 pm. on the business day that is one full business day before the date set for the hearing, an application record as follows: (a) the application record must be in a ring binder or in some other form of secure binding; (b) the application record must contain, in consecutively numbered pages, or separated by tabs, the following documents in the following order: (i) a title page bearing the style of proceeding and the names of the lawyers, if any, for the applicant and the application respondents;(ii) an index; (iii) a copy of the filed notice of application;(iv) a copy of each filed application response; (v) a copy of every filed affidavit and pleading, and of every other document other than a written argument, that is to be relied on at the hearing; (vi) if the application is brought under Rule 9-7, a copy of each filed pleading; (c) the application record may contain (i) a draft of the proposed order, (ii) subject to subrule (16), a written argument,(iii) a list of authorities and (iv) a draft bill of costs;(d) the application record must not contain(i) affidavits of service, (ii) copies of authorities, including case law, legislation, legal articles or excerpts from text books, or (iii) any other documents unless they are included with the consent of all the parties of record. Written argument (16)Unless an application is estimated to take more than 2 hours, no party to the application may file or submit to the court a written argument in relation to the application other than that included in the party's notice of application or application response. Service of application record index (17)The applicant must serve a copy of the application record index on each application respondent no later than 4 pm. on the business day that is one full business day before the date set for the hearing. If application respondent's application is to be heard at the hearing (18)If an application respondent intends to set an application for hearing at the same time as the applicant's application, those parties must, so far as is possible, prepare and provide to the registry where the hearing is to take place a joint application record and agree to a date for the hearing of both applications. Application record to be returned (19)Unless the court otherwise orders, the applicant must retrieve the application record(a) at the conclusion of the hearing, or(b) if the hearing of the application is adjourned to a date later than the following business day, after the hearing is adjourned. Application record to be returned to the registry (20)If the application record has been retrieved by the applicant under subrule (19) (b), the applicant must return the application record to the registry between 9:00 am. and 4 pm. on the business day that is one full business day before the new date set for the hearing of the application. Provision of amended application record (21)If any additional affidavits are filed and served under subrule (14) and are not included in the application record, the applicant must provide to the registry an amended application record containing those affidavits. Resetting adjourned applications (21.1)To reset an application that has been adjourned without a date being set for it to be heard ("adjourned generally"), the applicant must (a) file a requisition in Form 17 setting out the date and time of the hearing, and (b) serve a copy of the filed requisition on the application respondents at least 2 business days before the date set for the hearing. Application respondent may apply for directions (22) If, after an application has been adjourned generally, the applicant does not reset the application for hearing within a reasonable time after an application respondent has requested the applicant to do so, an application respondent may apply, by requisition in Form 17 on 2 business days' notice, for directions.”
36. Rule 9-7—Summary Trial Definition (1)In this rule, "summary trial application" means an application referred to in subrule (2).Application (2) A party may apply to the court for judgment under this rule, either on an issue or generally, in any of the following: (a) an action in which a response to civil claim has been filed; (b) a proceeding that has been transferred to the trial list under Rule 22-1 (7) (d); (c) a third party proceeding in which a response to third party notice has been filed; (d) an action by way of counterclaim in which a response to counterclaim has been filed. When application must be heard (3)A summary trial application must be heard at least 42 days before the scheduled trial date. Setting application for hearing (4)Unless the court otherwise orders, a summary trial application must be set for hearing in accordance with Rule 8-1. Evidence on application (5)Unless the court otherwise orders, on a summary trial application, the applicant and each other party of record may tender evidence by any or all of the following:(a) affidavit;(b) an answer, or part of an answer, to interrogatories;(c) any part of the evidence taken on an examination for discovery;(d) an admission under Rule 7-7;(e) a report setting out the opinion of an expert, if (i) the report conforms with Rule 11-6 (1), or (ii) the court orders that the report is admissible even though it does not conform with Rule 11-6 (1).Application of Rule 12-5 (6) Rule 12-5 (46), (49), (50), (51), (56) to (58) applies to subrule (5) of this rule. Application of Rule 11-6 (7)Rule 11-6 (2) applies to a summary trial application. Filings with application (8)A party who applies for judgment under subrule (2) (a) must serve, with the notice of application and the other documents referred to in Rule 8-1 (3), every expert report, not already filed, on which the party will rely in support of the application, and (b) must not serve any further affidavits, expert reports or notices except (i) to tender evidence that would, at a trial, be admitted as rebuttal evidence, (ii) to respond to a notice of application filed and served by another party of record, or (iii) with leave of the court. Notice of evidence to be used on application (9) If a party intends, on a summary trial application, to rely on (a) evidence taken on an examination for discovery, (b) answers to interrogatories, or (c) admissions,the party must give notice of that fact in accordance with subrule (10). Giving notice (10) Notice under subrule (9) must be given(a) by an applicant, in accordance with Rule 8-1 (7) and (8), and(b) by a party who is not an applicant, in accordance with Rule 8-1 (9).Adjournment or dismissal (11) On an application heard before or at the same time as the hearing of a summary trial application, the court may (a) adjourn the summary trial application, or(b) dismiss the summary trial application on the ground that (i) the issues raised by the summary trial application are not suitable for disposition under this rule, or (ii) the summary trial application will not assist the efficient resolution of the proceeding. Preliminary orders (12)On or before the hearing of a summary trial application, the court may order that (a) a party file and serve, within a fixed time, any of the following on which the party intends to rely in support of the application: (i) an affidavit; (ii) a notice referred to in subrule (9), (b) the person who swore or affirmed an affidavit, or an expert whose report is relied on, attend for cross-examination, either before the court or before another person as the court directs, (c) cross-examinations on affidavits be completed within a fixed time, (d) no further evidence be tendered on the application after a fixed time, or (e) a party file and serve a brief, with such contents as the court may order, within a fixed time. Ancillary or preliminary orders may be made at or before application (13)An order under subrule (11) or (12) may be made by a judge or by a master, and may be made before or at the same time as a summary trial application. Judge not seized of application (14)A judge who makes an order under subrule (11) or (12) in relation to a summary trial application is not seized of the summary trial application unless the judge otherwise orders. Judgment (15)On the hearing of a summary trial application, the court may (a) grant judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, unless (i) the court is unable, on the whole of the evidence before the court on the application, to find the facts necessary to decide the issues of fact or law, or (ii) the court is of the opinion that it would be unjust to decide the issues on the application, (b) impose terms respecting enforcement of the judgment, including a stay of execution, and (c) award costs. No further application without leave (16)If the court does not grant judgment under subrule (15), the applicant may not apply again under subrule (2) without leave of the court. Orders (17)If the court is unable to grant judgment under subrule (15) and considers that the proceeding ought to be expedited, the court may order the trial of a proceeding generally or on an issue and may (a) order that the parties attend a case planning conference, (b) make any order that may be made under Rule 5-3 (1), or (c) make any other order the court considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules. Right to vary or set aside order (18) A court may, before or at trial, vary or set aside an order made under subrules (12) and (17) of this rule. Order if jury notice filed (19)A party may apply to the court for judgment under subrule (2) even though a party may have filed a notice under Rule 12-6 (3) requiring that the trial of the action be heard with a jury.”
37. Professor M.H. Ogilvie of Carleton University on the development of the bar in Historical Introduction to Legal Studies (Carswell: Toronto: 1982): Ogilvie asserts that “the bar developed as a result of a determined effort by Edward I, who (sic) ordered that pleaders and attorneys be trained by justices. This, together with the common lodgings of practitioners and judges, led to the development of the Inns of the Court (pg 103).” “A division between barristers, who advocated on behalf of the individual, and solicitors was apparent by the beginning of the sixteenth century (pg. 337).” “Barristers had the right of audience to appear before the Supreme Court of Judicature.”
38. “In 1729, due to an Act of Parliament, judges were granted authority to admit to practice only those who were found acceptable to them (p. 341). “However, it was the Inns of the Court that were primarily responsible for disciplinary counsel (p. 341).”
39. From “Mitchell's Case, 2 Atk. 173, 26 E.R. 508”... “Nonetheless, the Courts asserted the right of audience to determine who might as a barrister before them. In 1741, it was determined that the Statute of Westminster gave the courts authority that “attornies and serjeant counters” who have been guilty of male-practices, and have unbecoming in their profession, may be silenced, and not allowed to be heard anymore....”. (Ed: Thus despite the Inns responsibility for discipline – the courts had power to 'silence' those before them)
40. “Importantly the court held that there was a difference between how a solicitor and barrister should be treated. The solicitor could be struck from the rolls. The court did not determine that the accused who was a lawyer should be removed from acting as a barrister. It did, however, decide that the court would not hear him or allow him to appear as a barrister before it. The result was that the accused was denied a right of audience. He could not appear as an advocate due to his unethical conduct. The court was, in effect, asserting the right to control its own processes and determine who could appear before it.” (Ed: Thus it was the solicitor – the person we know and understand to be the document drafter – filer-who could be struck from the rolls of the Inns of the Court – providing us with insight as to the historical connection between the solicitor – document filing – and the Inns ultimate power over the solicitors conduct – theoretically, at this historical juncture a solicitor could be struck from the rolls of the Inns of the Court – yet be permitted to speak on another persons behalf).
41. “The right of audience has been recognized in both academic writings and in case law. In “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” at page 23, Professor Jacob states that: “....the right of audience before the superior courts...(sic) derives from the inherent jurisdiction of the judges to regulate the proceedings and practice of their own courts. The superior courts of common law conferred the privilege of acting as advocates in proceedings before them to barristers only and did not allow attorneys to appear before them as advocates (1970) (Curr. legal Probs. 23).” “The judges, sitting as visitors to the Inns of the Court, stated that they never gave up the right to determine who may appear before them nor could they ever do so.” (1970). (Curr legal Probs. @ 955). (Ed: Here we witness the type of thing Grauer J. hinted at in his Reasons – the attorney could not speak before the Judge – on the advocate could do so).
42. “The right of the Inns of Court to discipline a member, although recognized, was always subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court to determine who may appear before it. An analogy can be drawn between this situation and that of a law society and a court in modern day Canada.” “These were not isolated examples. In Cox v Coleridge (1822) 1B. And C. 37 quoted in O'Toole v Scott, {1965} A.C. 939 @ 952 it was determined that magistrates had a discretion to determine who would be allowed to appear before them to represent an accused person. The right to be represented by counsel did not necessarily mean the right to be represented by a particular counsel. This was viewed as a power to be exercised only when necessary to the proper administration of justice and as part of the inherent right of a magistrate to regulate proceeding....in the court.” (Ed: Cox v Coleridge gives us the first hint that the right of the Judges in their courts (in Canada the constitutional Justice or Judge) with the hint that they had more power of oversight over even the Inns – the Law Society).
43. “In O'Toole v. Scott, the Privy Council went so far as to say that this discretion could be exercised “to secure or promote convenience and expedite and efficiency in the administration of justice.” “This does not however, determine how a court in Canada may use the right of audience to enforce ethical standards.” (Ed: O'Toole v Scott reveals that the Privy Council's position need not necessarily be adopted in Canada).
44. “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court”: “It is beyond dispute that the provincial superior courts in Canada possess inherent jurisdiction. The nature and extent of that jurisdiction has been the subject of much debate. Jacob noted at p. 25: the (sic) superior courts of common law have exercised the power which has come to be called “inherent jurisdiction” from the earliest times, and that the exercise of such power developed along two paths, namely, by way of punishment for contempt of court and of its process, and by way of regulating the practice of the court and preventing the abuse of its process.” (Ed: At this juncture we see how the history of English law through “Inherent Jurisdiction” of the Court permeates Canada's court processes. Inherent jurisdiction is the overriding royal jelly of the courts powers- we can also see how this historical understanding impacts on this case insofar as the procedure of document filing, service of document etc., the methodology of practice of law vis-a-vis the provincial court registry, is tied to the court's jurisdiction in terms of contempt of court).
45. “In British Columbia Government Employees Union v Attorney General of British Columbia, Chief Justice Dickson, speaking for the Court, quoted Jacob, stating: “For the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribution. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfill itself as a court of law. The juridicial basis of the jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.” (At page 307 C.C.C.) (Ed: Could the power of inherent jurisdiction been described any better?)
46. “Similarly, a court could insist that is ability to control who appears before it must be an inherent power or part of its core jurisdiction and that while provincial law societies have a great role to pay in the determination of who may act, they cannot displace the right of a court to make a final determination of the issue.” (Ed: when reading the Transcript of May 9, 2013 it is necessary to realize how this inherent power was abused and thereafter abused further. Essentially, two law society members Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis conspired either between them or in conjunction with the justice of that day (Fenlon J.) to allow those who 'act' and the law society to have the ability to control those who appear through a contempt of the court. (Ed: What is necessary is to determined how deep this contempt and abuse was and what the overarching motivation was for taking such reckless steps).
47. “The court have not delegated to law societies the powers of administrative regulation and discipline. In Canada, these have come about by statute. There is no conflict between a law society exercising a statutory power in determining who may be called to the provincial bar and a court determining that a person called to the provincial bar and a court determining that a person called to the bar may not appear before it.”......”the powers of inferior courts have been interpreted to mean the right to control their own process. This is narrower than inherent jurisdiction as it must be founded in an enabling statute or be allied closely with powers granted by statute (R v Doyle (1977) 29 C.C.C. (2d) 177 (S.C.C.). (Ed: Notwithstanding the breach in procedure which infects both H130330 (a petition for mortgage when there is no bona fide mortgage – the filing of any petition in the incorrect courthouse – filing a Notice of Hearing under false pretense – not indicating 'triable issues' in the affidavit as required – the court failing to direct the matter to Trial Scheduling despite acknowledging the respondents 'have a case' with the knowledge that any hint of a case must go to trial scheduling & under S111171 – the Rule 8 application – the rushed hearing of the matter – the taking of evidence of matters already heard – the lack of disclosure of the amended legislation -(ambush), and the preponderance of small claims cases which are not matters of inherent jurisdiction permitted in a case which technically had not been resolved at the Supreme Court of Canada 35302)
48. “In Doyle (supra), the Supreme Court specifically overruled the Court of Appeal for Ontario's decision in R v Keating, (1973) 11 C.C.C. (2d) 133 which held that the provincial court had an “inherent jurisdiction”.... to control its own process and proceedings in any manner not contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Code or any other statute....”holding instead that the powers of a magistrate on a preliminary inquiry were “entirely statutory”. (Ed: Further evidence of the concern of use of small claims cases (most of which were closed or settled as evidence of vexatious procedure (litigant) – suspicious as to intent given the matters relating to the amendment of subsection 15 (1) and 15 (5) by Royal Assent 2012).
49. In R. v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd, et al Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, stated that “the core jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts comprises those powers which are essential to the administration of justice and the maintenance of the rule of law...the superior court must not be put in a position of relying on either the provincial attorney general or an inferior court acting at its own instance to enforce its orders.” (Ed: well, doesn't this case just say it all in terms of the LSBC – Hinkson CJ fiasco under S111171 – Chief Justice – really?).
50. “THE ETHICAL STANDARDS OF COUNSEL”. “Both by statute and custom, lawyers have high ethical duties. The Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Law Society of Upper Canada contain many provisions to ensure that counsel act honourably. It is appropriate to reproduce several extracts here: RULE 1 “conduct unbecoming a barrister or solicitor mean conduct in a lawyers personal or private capacity that tends to bring discredit upon the legal profession including, for example: (a) committing a criminal act that reflects on the lawyers honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; (b) taking improper advantage of the youth, inexperience, lack of education, unsophistication, ill health, or unbusinesslike habits of another, or (c) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty.” (Ed: In context of the overwhelming submissions of what the applicants view as conduct conspiracy it is likely safe to make the contra assertion that there is no evidence of professional conduct in any of the cases cited in the application).
51. “Professional misconduct” means conduct in a lawyer's professional capacity that tends to bring discredit upon the legal profession including: (a) violating or attempting to violate one of the Rules of Professional Conduct (d) misappropriating or otherwise dealing with a client or third party's money or property.; (e) engaging in conduct....prejudicial to the administration of justice. (g) knowingly assisting a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.” (Ed: It is apparent through discussion of the history of relationship between the Law Society of BC and the independent courts and constitutionally appointed judiciary that there is an overriding assumption that there is no professional misconduct among the appointed judiciary. This comment must be highlighted by the SCC Chief Justice's comments to the Calgary Bar Association stipulation that: 'just because a justice is appointed does not mean that they are not accountable.' The applicants say jointly and severally – I suppose we will see).
52. In the original case of the 3 main cases of focus referenced in this application BCSC 106413 is commenced by way of notice of claim. It is settled among all but one of the parties, the defendant BMO Bank of Montreal without any costs to any party. BMO rejects the offer of the plaintiffs to a similar settlement insisting that a decision be made on the merits of the claim after Trial hearing. BMO eventually obtains a consent dismissal order by way of Rule 8 Application following the filing (but not the service of) the response to civil claim. The Justice in this matter (Adair J.) refuses to acknowledge that no affidavit of service has filed. Adair J. Also refuses to permit Glen Robbins to make submissions without either Frana Matich or Ita Robbins appearing in court with him despite Powers of Attorney being filed in the court registry under affidavit (BCSC 106413). (Ed: this touches on the procedural abuses that are widespread in this matter but also generally in the BC Civil Justice system – namely, service of documents is not required in practice as they are manifestly required in the Federal Court of Canada and Supreme Court of Canada. Under Federal Court of Canada docket T-445-15 Glen Robbins v HMQ, Glen Robbins the applicant in context particularly of matters relating to the Law Society of British Columbia, professes abuse of service documents by West Coast process server. This is affirmed by Frana Matich in affidavit to the court under 35772. In particular the document service of matters relating to S111171 (35302 SCC) specifically the application before Hinkson CJ made by the Law Society of BC personal service of the original application is claimed by the Law Society when in fact it was found in the bushes of the applicants home at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane in Coquitlam, British Columbia – by who else? West Coast process servers. Glen Robbins owned a process serving company with partner (Continental Process Servers in the mid and late 1980's. The documented history of the service irregularities by Ronald Bankonyi (and indeed Robert Ellis of BMO Bank of Montreal which precipitated this) is without question from Notice of Hearing not being served to on service of application material orders by Justice Kloegman of April 7, 2014 to non service of stay application of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich for September 18, 2014, to non service of documents for conduct of sale by – who else? Fenlon J., to non service of documents to every hearing and for every hearing thereafter).
53. BCSC 106413 is concluded by orders of the court on February 24, 2011 and is not appealed by either party. (Ed: Justice Adair does permit a right of audience to Glen Robbins on the matter of the application of BMO Bank of Montreal but does permit a right of audience of costs which are linked to the notice of claim and the application to dismiss. If a right of audience if provided by the courts inherent jurisdiction for costs than arguments should have been permitted. The costs award intimidated the plaintiffs from appealing which the applicants believe was intentional on the part of the court and conduct unbecoming a justice. Later, under petition of S111171 Law Society of BC v Glen P. Robbins Justice Grauer mistakenly grants costs to the Law Society on the basis that Glen Robbins made no effort to comply with orders, when in fact the court file revealed clearly that Glen Robbins agreed with every demand of the Law Society even ones unrelated to anything he did and even when he was not and remains not guilty of the allegations made against him – the BC Court of Appeal affirms that Justice Grauer has discretion as to costs. The question which must asked then is – if Justice Adair found it necessary to grant a right of audience to Glen Robbins to make a determination as to costs, when she would not grant the same right to argue the merits of the BMO application including the abuse of procedure in not being able to prove service of the response to civil claim – how was it that Justice Grauer had discretion to make order for costs when the documents on the file clearly revealed this to be unfair?)
54. BCSC S111171 is initiated by way of petition by LSBC on February 24, 2011. The file is closed by the Supreme Court of Canada (docket 35302) July 8, 2015. The subject matter of SCC docket 35302 is related exclusively to BCSC S111171 the sole subject matter events precipitated from BCSC 106413, the BMO Bank of Montreal matter. An application is then made by the Law Society of BC pursuant to Rule 8 of the BC Supreme Court Rules in its capacity as the petitioner (applicant) under BCSC S111171 in January 2014 involving other subject matter (vexatious proceedings) unrelated to the original subject matter. (Ed: Yet the original petition deals with subsections of the Legal Profession Act {15 (1) and 15 (5)}, and the subsequent Application under Rule 8 (presumed to follow the original petition because it is the same file) deals with section 18 of the BC Supreme Court Rules – vexatious proceedings. What would we need to debate this – this is clearly an abuse of process from the dark ages - and likely would not have been tolerated back then).
55. The vexatious proceeding matter brought by Law Society of B.C. January 2014 and heard March 20, 2014 be direction of order of Chief Justice Hinkson (with decision April 10, 2014) should have been brought by way petition. How can the Law Society have one subject matter involving sections 15 (1) and 15 (5) of the Legal Professions Act brought by way of petition February 24, 2011 before the Supreme Court of Canada, and then add another subject matter after the fact when the first matter in not formally concluded by appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada?
56. Ed: The applicants believe the reason is simple. The Law Society of British Columbia has a long and close relationship with Christopher Hinkson C.J.. His Honour was new to this position as Supreme Court Justice and the Law Society of British Columbia had just received an affidavit of evidence from Ita Robbins on January 6, 2014 indicating that she had directed Glen Robbins to commence all actions in her name on her behalf with Powers of Attorney she had donated to him prior to BCSC 106413 and under Enduring Power of Attorney she had instructed Law Society member Ross Davidson to file on Land Title and Survey in New Westminster, British Columbia on her behalf in relation to her property located at 1355 Honeysuckle Lane, British Columbia).
57. On April 10, 2014 an order is given under S111171 in a rushed trial organized and demanded by newly minted Chief Justice Christopher Hinkson whose history as a lawyer and member of the Bar reflects a long history of association with the Law Society of British Columbia.. Hinkson C.J. refuses to respond to hear Glen Robbins application response and application and makes decision for vexatious proceedings (the so called vexatious litigant label) order against Glen Robbins despite the application of the Law Society being of different subject matter, different grounds and the original petition still before the Law Society of BC. Three days prior to Hinkson C.J.'s decision, Justice Kloegman had sought a trial hearing of applications of Glen Robbins, an appeal of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, and application of Ronald Bakonyi as well as application response from Glen Robbins all related to H130330. (Ed: The Chief Justice refuses to hear the response to application and application of Glen Robbins because he says that he was included as a respondent personally. This is not the case, his office was included as a respondent as was the office of the Chief Justice for British Columbia. The office is not the person nor is the person is the office. Glen Robbins includes the office of both Chief Justices as respondents because both offices have been made well aware of the abuses they were experiencing to date, with abuses and breach of professional conduct of Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis reported to the Law Society of BC in August of 2103. The Law Society waits months (and until the original decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in September 2013 and the requisite periods for Reconsideration) and then refuses to investigate the conduct complaints. The BC Ombudsperson also refuses to investigate as well as Chief Justice for British Columbia Robert Bauman who is promoted to this office when Hinkson CJ takes over his at or about November 2013. Through this period of time Glen and Ita Robbins have retained legal counsel (Ross Davidson) and signed Enduring Powers of Attorney to one another, with the donation to Glen from Ita being registered in Land Titles Office. It is clear that the process of seeking an investigation into complaints of the Law Society of BC was not even responded to beyond the BC Ombudsperson with the Chief Justices not even responding other than Bauman CJ indicating that he was 'aware' of the circumstances).
58. Justice Kloegman is on the record directing matters to Trial Scheduling and did so in front of Glen Robbins and Frana Matich. Instead the matters were heard ex parte by a succession of justices on April 23rd and April 24th, 2014 including orders for vacant possession. In each of these orders judgment reasons verified that the justices providing these orders to Mr. Bakonyi by way of chambers application indicated that they would not hear from Glen Robbins because of the orders of Justice Grauer or Hinkson CJ conveniently made April 10, 2014. (Ed: Kloegmann J., resigned soon after thsi hearing but it was her intent to put the matter over to Trial Scheduling, she had the court clerk telephone down to Trial Scheduling it was her intent to have this matter heard under Trial Scheduling. Her Honour was in a hurry she had been taken off another case to accommodate Bakonyi's application which he had to know was our of order of other matters already filed and dated before the court including a) Glen Robbins January 2, 2014 application to be added as party under H130330; b) appeal of Master Tokarek's order for conduct of sale (following the May 9, 2013 courtroom issue), and the hearing of the vacant possession application of Ronald Bakonyi which he tried to have heard on April 7, 2014. It was Bakonyi who sought at the end of his failed application for an order that his hearing must follow the Glen Robbins application and the Ita Robbins and Frana Matich appeal. Kloegmann J., also directs Bakonyi who has not filed a response to Glen Robbins' January 2, 2014 application or his response to the appeal filed by Ita Robbins and Frana Matich (December 6, 2013) and to serve these on the parties by April 18, 2014. Bakonyi does not file and serve these documents until April 29, 2014. Glen Robbins appeals the order made against him by Davies J., and Ita Robbins and Frana Matich appeal the order of Smith J. on their appeal of the Masters order of December 6, 2013).
59. The additional question is how is it that Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich are not provided with a Trial hearing of the December 6, 2013 appeal of Masters order for sale of the property at Honeysuckle, the January 2, 2014 application of Glen Robbins to be added as a party and for a refiling of the petition or demand for commencement of new matter by way of notice of claim (as a trial hearing from Fenlon J , May 9, 2013 would have achieved), yet the Law Society of British Columbia is granted one immediately by ex parte order of Hinkson CJ without proper service or providing Glen Robbins with a hearing accorded to Glen Robbins or any opportunity provided to him for pre trial motions of other matters available to other Canadians? (Ed: once can readily see how the Law Society of BC had riden 'shotgun' for its members in these cases. The petition of February 24, 2011 the same dated as Adair J. makes her order when the Law Society of BC could have included itself as a respondent in that matter in the first place, they were in the courtroom in the initial hearing and were negotiating with Glen Robbins at the time. The evidence of Transcript hearing May 9, 2013 of Ronald Bakonyi clearly referencing a communication of some type with the Law Society and then catching himself saying he found the Grauer J information on the Internet. The Law Society of BC's Michael Kleisinburg writing to Glen Robbins after being couriered the Enduring Powers of Attorney and threatening him with contempt of the Grauer order if he attends to BC Court of Appeal to seek a right of audience there on behalf of his wife. At this juncture here the Law Society of BC has promulgated a clear and unequivocal breach of trust- then, once Ita Robbins swears affidavit declaring that all actions before any BC Court were commencing on her behalf at her direction which included BCSC 106413 and other provincial court matters used by the Law Society in evidence under the section 18 rule 8 application – an obvious manipulation of the courts and further abuse of the courts with the overriding purposeful ignoring of anything resembling a concern for the rights of Glen Robbins, It Robbins or Frana Matich).
60. Hinkson C.J has a very long career as legal counsel in relation to matters before the Law Society involving its members. The events described reveal a clear bias on his part. Glen Robbins asserts that he is in collusion with the Law Society and the Government of British Columbia and BC Attorney General, the former whose Cabinet appoints Benchers and the latter which itself is a Bencher.
61. (Ed: The Law Society of BC was also involved with the Attorney General of BC in 1999 in certifying John Motiuk unable to practice law. Motiuk is Glen Robbins legal counsel in a BCHRT matter and has applied for joinder of 5 complainants against Glen Robbins who is not told his lawyer cannot represent him until the spring of 2000. Christopher Hinkson an attorney at the time is John Motiuk's lawyer.
62. It is a fact that Glen Robbins is not fond of unusual coincidences).
63. Whatever complaints raised by LSBC at trial March 21, 2014 before Hinkson CJ ought to have been raised during the course of proceedings under BCSC 106413 as the BMO matter was introduced as evidence under this application. The basis of dismissal for BMO notwithstanding conspicuous procedural deficiencies is legal principle res judicata. Res judicata ought to have applied to the respondent Glen Robbins under BCSC S111171 notwithstanding the fact that Glen Robbins also consented to all orders sought by LSBC in both a response to petition and amended response to petition. (The applicant does not see the same circumstances on res judicata in this matter as considered by Groberman J., in Law Society versus Bryfogle).
64. Should the Chief Justice of the BC Supreme Court be using the Supreme Court Act (B.C.) and his inherent jurisdiction of the superior court to adjudicate and assess case matters from the Inferior Courts?
65. In the Federal Court of Canada, Federal Court of Appeal Canada and Supreme Court of Canada proof of service in necessary prior to documents being accepted for filing to ensure 'the street' does not compromise the integrity of court processes.
66. The matter involving Glen Robbins, the Law Society of British Columbia, the Ministry of Justice BC (Attorney General) and other related parties involves the Legal Professions Act, matters before the BC Superior Courts and changes to legislation affected by those matters which ultimately impact on Glen Robbins including his Charter Rights. These events ultimately impact on Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, their property rights (Charter Rights).
67. These matters also include quasi criminal matters and rights to a fair hearing. The criminal matters include contracts that include illegal rates of interest in contravention of the Criminal Code of Canada and complaints made to the RCMP with the respect to these. They include expired contracts, provincial government agencies including BC Land Titles and Survey accepting documents of registration of mortgage that are not mortgages but loan agreements of dubious nature, and constitutional breaches of the Interest Act (federal jurisdiction). They include purposeful ignoring of the B.C. Financial Commissions Act, the illegal authorization of self governance and regulation of mortgage brokers as lenders operating in breach of section 6 of the Interest Act Canada with the consent and support of the Government of British Columbia and the Chief Justices and other justices of the BC Superior Courts in flagrant disregard to the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter Rights of Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich.
68. These matters reflect a protracted imbalance between federal and provincial authorities. The issues relating to the aforementioned relate initially to the notice of claim BCSC 106413 which links to a petition of the Law Society of British Columbia (“Law Society”) February 24, 2011 (S111171), which then spill over to matters relating to the myriad and many problems in the administration of justice directly linked to H130330, which the applicants believe in sum total paint a better than circumstantial case of widespread mortgage fraud, judicial interference, and serial incompetence and malpractice of lawyers, and questionable professional relationships between a number of BC Superior Court justices and these lawyers.
69. Previous history of abuse involving the Law Society of British Columbia, the Attorney General of BC and coincidentally Hinkson CJ: The evidence includes as fact additional information in support involving an BC Human Rights Tribunal matter where Glen Robbins is denied an opportunity for a fair hearing as a result of his attorney John Motiuk failing to make submissions for joinder application at about the spring of 1999. Counsel for complainants in a case against Glen Robbins seek an adjournment of this hearing and the Attorney General of British Columbia and Law Society of British Columbia issue a certificate prohibiting the practice of law against Mr. Motiuk during this adjournment period. Glen Robbins is never informed about his by his attorney until nearly one year later. In the interim the crucial joinder application his lawyer makes is dismissed, Mr. Robbins is unable to make a proper defence and the disastrous result is his being named as a pedophile on Google for nearly 3 years. There is a serial pattern of abuse involving the BC Attorney Generals Office and the Law Society of British Columbia which at the turn of the century orchestrated efforts not only to deny Glen Robbins an opportunity to prove his accusers in quasi criminal proceedings were lying, but further to make the case that lawyers for his accusers had cooperated with the Law Society of BC and Bencher member the Attorney General of BC is orchestrating circumstances where he would be denied legal counsel.
70. Mr. Motiuk's legal counsel ironically is non other than Christopher Hinkson, then a lawyer who represents many lawyers in trouble with the Law Society and is involved in many cases involving the Law Society. Hinkson CJ is made Chief Justice at or about November 2013 barely one month following the original decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (Glen Robbins v Law Society) in docket file no. 35302 and following the decision of the Law Society of British Columbia (delayed) decision to refuse to hear the complaint of Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich filed against Ronald Bakonyi legal counsel for petitioner Cambridge Mortgage Investment, and Robert Ellis counsel for ('nominal') respondent BMO Bank of Montreal pertaining to events under S111171.
71. The matter of no legal representation and no notice of his lawyer being disbarred not only caused the loss of Glen Robbins multi million dollar publishing enterprise, but resulted in his name being associated with the label pedophile on Google for a period of three years. To date, Glen Robbins is unable to work with females in any manner other than brief social encounters or family matters.
72. Section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the section of the Canadian Constitution that protects a person's legal right in criminal and penal matters. This includes both criminal as well as regulatory offences, as it provides rights for those accused by the state for public offences. There are nine enumerated rights protected in section 11, 1. Right to be informed of the offence; 2. Right to be tried within a reasonable time; 3. Right not to be compelled to be a witness; 4. Right to be presumed innocent; 6. Right to trial by jury; 7. Right not to be found guilty unless acts constitute an offence; 8. Right not to be tried again; 9 Right to a lesser punishment.
73. That at a point in the history of this matter “Law Society” compliance officer Michael Kleisinger (“Kleisinger”) accuses Glen Robbins in writing twice of being in civil contempt of orders of Justice Grauer made September 8, 2011 and October 3, 2011. These allegations are made in October 2013 and the 1st week of January 2014. Enduring Powers of Attorney filed at BC Land Titles office by Surrey lawyer Ross Davidson October 6, 2013 and provided to “Kleisinger” immediately thereafter. These Enduring Powers of Attorney involve Glen Robbins making the donation to Ita Robbins and Ita Robbins making equivalent donation to Glen Robbins. Glen Robbins donation differs in terms of the subject of land as only Ita Robbins has an interest in real property. In the first week of October 2013 Glen Robbins was Ita Robbins attorney and ought to have been permitted to take any action he pleased in terms of court filings at any registry in the province as well as to have spoken on her behalf (right of audience) with the permission of the providing justice. The fraudulent threats by “Kleisinger” involve criminal implications and are made without foundation, legal justification or authority. Later in early January 2014 Ita Robbins swears an affidavit before a Commissioner for the taking of oaths in British Columbia indicating that she directed Glen Robbins in all cases involving herself to commence, defend or prosecute claims on her behalf. Neither Glen Robbins nor Ita Robbins are aware at this point that this legislation has been amended by Royal Assent as at May 2012.
74. “Kleisinger” immediately following being couriered this affidavit of Ita Robbins files an application under Rule 8 and BCSC file no. S111171 that Glen Robbins be declared to have participated in vexatious proceedings. Kleisinger has obstructed with justice for many months threatening Glen Robbins with civil contempt in relation to the Grauer J orders in order to freeze him out of the courts on behalf of his wife Ita Robbins and her mother Frana Matich, who are also intimidated and stay away from the court in appealing matters under H130330.
75. The evidence adduced from the Grauer J Reasons and later from the Transcript of the May 9, 2013 hearing before Justice Fenlon (the appeal of the order that Glen Robbins is prohibited from speaking on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich, and the order nisi which followed but for the first prohibition order) in connection with Kleisingers actions on behalf of the Law Society of BC, as well as the actions of Hinkson CJ under S111171 on the basis of these actions ordering trial for hearing application, and later using S111171 in March 2015 to deny Glen Robbins and Ita Robbins and Frana Matich an application for hearing of their notice of claim, running interference for an application of Ronald Bakonyi is clear and irrefutable evidence of obstruction of justice, breach of trust and criminal conspiracy under the Criminal Code (alternatively unlawful conduct conspiracy). It is a fact that Michael Kleisinger thought it fit to bring a gaggle of his female paralegals to watch the Trial before Hinkson CJ (Ed: on the members dime – all giggling and swooning over their 'legal hero').
76. It is a fact that at the May 9, 2013 foreclosure hearing involving Cambridge and BMO where Justice Fenlon declares that Glen Robbins is prohibited from speaking on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich BEFORE making order nisi (foreclosure) Justice Fenlon asks Cambridge counsel if there is a vexatious litigant order against Glen Robbins to which Bakonyi answers “No” but suggests by inference that the Law Society of BC is considering one. The actual rule 8 application occurs nine months following this inferred statement by Bakonyi without any letter or notice from Glen Robbins.
77. It is a fact that between May 9, 2013 and January 2014 no mention in writing or other is made by the Law Society of BC to Glen Robbins (or Ita Robbins and Frana Matich) that they have engaged in a vexatious proceeding).
78. In R v Delaronde (1997), the Supreme Court of Canada found that “section 11 (a) is meant not only to guarantee a fair trial but also to serve as an economic right.....those who suffer economically because of delayed information of charges have had their rights under section 11 (a) infringed with remedy under section 24 of the Charter. Section 24 under “Enforcement” stipulates (24.(1)) “Anyone whose right or freedoms as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a Court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
79. In Savdip v Her Majesty the Queen involves a criminal case where the appellant claimed undue delays in going to trial. The decision in this case ultimately rested with the determination of what which party contributed the most weight to the reason for delays.
80. Scowby v Glendinning SCC Case number 17739 1985: February 19, 1986: October 9 “Constitution Law” “Division of Powers” “Judicial Powers” “Allegation of arbitrary arrest and detention” “Adjudication of tort reserved to S. 96 Courts” “Whether or not provincial human rights commissioner had jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate on complaint” Per Breetz, Estey, McIntyre, Chouinard, Lamer, and Le Dain JJ. “The Constitution Act, 1867 assigned Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure in the widest sense. The requirements in s. 7, that a detention be judicially determined immediately and that notice be given of the charge, appear to be derived from the law of habeous corpus and were therefore, when sought to be applied to create the offence of arbitrary arrest went beyond regulating the civil consequence of unlawful arrest when it purported to define the boundaries of an unauthorized arrest. The problem with avoiding the criminal characterization of this legislation was rendered insoluble once it became necessary to sever section 35. That section was fed and sustained by section 7 which could not be severed because it was the main pillar of the statutory structure. Neither could any phrase or clause of section 7 be severed because if taken in isolation it is as much criminal law as the section when read as an entity. No question of federal paramountcy arose because there was no parallel provincial power capable of supporting the section. Given the controlling force of the criminal law power it was not necessary to deal with effect of s. 96 (appointment of superior court justices to provinces) of the Constitution Act, 1867 or to consider the question of provincial interference with the administration of purely federal institutions.”
81. (The original matter): In September 2010 a Notice of Claim is filed in Vancouver courthouse BC Supreme Court under BCSC file No.: 106413. The plaintiffs included in the style of cause are Ita Robbins and Frana Matich. The defendants include BMO Bank of Montreal and a half dozen other parties.
82. The basis of the claim against BMO is that it failed to provide notice of pending foreclosure following a request from Ita Robbins and Frana Matich for deferral of 3 months rent. This - The first indication of any issues with the 2 months outstanding mortgage occurs at the point of service of Lis Pendens in February 2009. The overdue amounts are paid within 2 weeks of the receipt of the Lins Pendens. BMO admits during taxation that they failed to provide notice to either Ita Robbins and Frana Matich when they are asked if they prove that they sent such notice. BMO admits that there is no proof of notice and no costs are provided to its legal counsel Robert Ellis of Ellis Roadburg. It is a legal fact that Adair J., made the incorrect decision in favour of BMO on the alleged “merits” of the case that the documented lack of notice not provided by BMO (determined and admitted to under transcript by Robert Ellis legal counsel) was not in fact res judicata to the foreclosure process as the notice period precedes the filing of Lis Pendens and Petition.
83. From Bank of Montreal versus Hall , Supreme Court of Canada case information 20373-Banks and banking - Secured loans -Security interest created under ss. 178 and 179 of Bank Act - Security seized - Provincial legislation requiring judicial approval for seizure of security (Ed: consider under illegal seizure of property) Whether or not acts constitutional Whether or not bank required to comply with provisions of provincial act when enforcing security interest created under federal act Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, S.C. 1980 81 8283, c. 40, ss. 178, 179 (formerly Bank Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1, ss. 88, 89; now Bank Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-1, s. 178, 179) Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16, ss. 19, 27. Constitutional law - Division of powers Paramountcy Federal power over banks and banking and provincial power over property and civil rights Security interest created under ss. 178 and 179 of Bank Act Security seized Provincial Limitation of Civil Rights Act requiring judicial approval for seizure of security Whether or not acts constitutional Whether or not acts conflicting so as to render provincial act inoperative., Respondent, a Saskatchewan farmer, contracted loans from appellant bank and granted two mortgages on his real property in favour of the Bank and a security interest in a swather pursuant to s. 88 of the Bank Act (subsequently s. 178 of the Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980 and now s. 178 of the Bank Act). Respondent defaulted and in August 1984, the Bank, acting pursuant to the Bank Act, seized the swather and commenced an action to enforce its real property mortgage loan agreement. By way of defence to the foreclosure proceedings, respondent alleged that the Bank had not served the Notice of Intention to Seize required under Saskatchewan's Limitation of Civil Rights Act and sought to have the foreclosure proceedings dismissed. He also brought action seeking cancellation of the security agreement and to recover all monies paid on it as provided by this Act. The Bank countered by alleging that it was not subject to the Act in respect of proceedings taken under the Bank Act. In November 1985 the parties applied by way of Notice of Motion for a determination by the Court of Queen's Bench of the question whether a chartered bank was required to comply with The Limitation of Civil Rights Act in enforcing a security interest under the Bank Act. The Chambers Judge held that the Bank was not required to comply with the provincial legislation. The Court of Appeal, by majority, reversed that decision. The principal issue here was whether a security interest created pursuant to ss. 178 and 179 of the Bank Act may constitutionally be subjected to the procedures for enforcement of security interests prescribed by the Saskatchewan Limitation of Civil Rights Act. Also at issue was the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of both the federal and provincial Acts. The constitutional questions before this Court queried: (1) whether ss. 19 to 36 of The Limitation of Civil Rights Act were ultra rives the province in whole or in part; (2) whether ss. 178 and 179 of the Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980 were ultra vires Parliament in whole or in part; and, (3) whether ss. 178 and 179 of the Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980 conflicted with ss. 19 to 36 of The Limitation of Civil Rights Act so as to render inoperative ss. 19 to 36 in respect of security taken pursuant to s. 178 by a chartered bank. Held: The appeal should be allowed. The first and second constitutional questions should be answered in the negative. As to the third, ss. 19 to 36 of The Limitation of Civil Rights Act are inapplicable to a security taken pursuant to ss. 178 and 179 of the Bank Act. Sections 19 to 36 of The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, questions of paramountcy apart, come within property and civil rights in the province. The federal banking power empowers Parliament to create an innovative form of financing and to define, in a comprehensive and exclusive manner, the rights and obligations of borrower and lender pursuant to that interest. Parliament, in the exercise of this power, can both create the ss. 178 and 179 security interest qua interest, and define the rights and obligations of the bank and its borrowers pursuant to that interest. The rights, duties and obligations of creditor and debtor are to be determined solely by reference to the Bank Act. The security interest in question here was designed to allow the banks to lend money and make advances to certain classes of borrowers on the security of certain specified goods, including loans and advances to any farmer for the purchase of agricultural implements, on the security of such agricultural implements. The effect of the interest created by s. 178 was to vest title to the property in question in the bank when the security interest is taken out. Section 179 authorized the bank to sell all or any part of that property and provides that the proceeds of the sale shall be applied against the debt in question. These provisions complement the bank's right under s. 178(3) to take possession of secured property on default. There can be no hermetic division between banking as a generic activity and the domain covered by property and civil rights. A spillover effect is inevitable. The fact that a given aspect of federal banking legislation cannot operate without having an impact on property and civil rights in the provinces cannot ground a conclusion that that legislation is ultra vires as interfering with provincial law where the matter concerned constitutes an integral element of federal legislative competence. The security interest created by ss. 178 and 179, while at a variance with provincial law, was intra vires Parliament because of the policy reasons behind the creation of this security interest. This security interest met the pressing need to provide, on a nationwide basis, for a uniform security mechanism so as to facilitate access to capital by producers of primary resources and manufacturers. It freed borrower and lender from the obligation to defer to a variety of provincial lending regimes and facilitated the ability of banks to realize on its collateral. This in turn translated into important benefits for the borrower: lending became less complicated and more affordable. The manner in which a bank is permitted to realize on its s. 178 security interest is not a mere appendage or gloss upon the overall scheme of the Act but rather the very linchpin of the security interest. It is integral to, and inseparable from, the legislative scheme. Severing the realization provisions would defeat the specific purpose of the Bank Act security interest for the banks would then be forced to contend with all the idiosyncrasies and variables of the various provincial schemes. There is an actual conflict in operation between ss. 178 and 179 of the Bank Act and ss. 19 to 36 of The Limitation of Civil Rights Act and accordingly ss. 19 to 36 are inoperative in respect of security taken pursuant to s. 178 by a chartered bank. The legislative purpose of Parliament would be displaced if the bank were required to defer to the provincial legislation in order to realize on its security. The Bank Act provides that a lender may, on default of the borrower, seize the security; The Limitation of Civil Rights Act forbids a creditor from immediately repossessing the secured article on pain of determination of the security interest. The unqualified right of seizure granted to the bank by the federal legislation is restricted by the provincial legislation to situations where leave has been granted by judge, who will apply criteria formulated by the Province as to when and under what circumstances seizure can take place. It is not open to a provincial legislature to qualify in this way a right given and defined in a federal statute even though the sole effect of the provincial legislation would be to delay the bank's ability to take possession of its security. Dual compliance is impossible when application of the provincial statute can fairly be said to frustrate Parliament's legislative purpose. The section 178 security interest would no longer be cognizable as such the moment provincial legislation might operate to superadd conditions governing realization over and above those found within the confines of the Bank Act.” (Ed: This passage would relate to the paramouncy of the Interest Act (Canada) clearly in breach in this matter and evidence of possible breaches on the part of the Canadian government relative to trade agreements made with nations it trades with who rely on consistency of Interest rates and want to know that all provinces are operating their economies in a manner consistent with federal law).
84. Glen Robbins has been seriously injured in a workplace accident prior to the filing of the Lis Pendens. BMO is the corporate bank for WorkSafe BC.
85. Neither Ita Robbins or Frana Matich sign the notice of claim under BCSC 106413. It is signed by Glen Robbins in a place on the final page of the notice of claim where the form itself provides a space for “Lawyer for the Plaintiffs”. Glen Robbins does not write in in his own hand the words “Lawyer for the Plaintiffs”:.Glen Robbins signs the notice of claim even though he does not have a license to practice law in the 'expectation of a fee, gain or benefit”. Glen Robbins does sign the notice of claim in the space provided on the form in the spot provided for lawyers as his wife's lawyer in Glen Robbins capacity and ability under the Legal Profession Act to practice law so long as he isn't practicing law in the “expectation of a fee, gain or benefit.” He does so as Justice Grauer later reasons under BCSC S111171 as their “representative” in the case before Adair J., under BCSC 106413 (Reasons for Judgment: Oct 3, 2011, The Honourable Mr. Justice Grauer Page 5, paragraph (17) line 5). Glen Robbins signs the notice of claim with Powers of Attorney from his wife Ita and mother in law, Frana as their attorney/agent. (Ed: the case law featured hereunder particular “Yal” and others deal at some length with judicial direction in amending filing documents insofar as endorsements are concerned. In those cases parties are writing in stipulated endorsements that differ from the provincially developed 'boiler plates'. In this instance the forms in British Columbia have moved away from Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim to Notice of Claim. The designation of “Lawyer for Plaintiffs is written into the form content as part of the boiler plate. Glen Robbins does not write in that he is the lawyer.)
86. The language of representative is similar to that language ascribed to aboriginal representatives operating in the practice of law without 'expectation of fee, gain or benefit' as described in great detail in “YAL” (discussed later).
87. Commencing at Page 7 paragraph (27) Grauer J., reflects on the history of relevant case law once again reaffirming the unclear language in the provisions relating to Glen Robbins specifically those provisions in section 15 (1) which permit non lawyers to practice law if they don't expect a fee, gain or benefit, and with the serial Interpretive problems with section 15 (5) the ambiguities of which seem in historical context to be purposeful and with the object of the Law Society of BC to control parties who aren't paying membership fees: “Given these peculiarities, it is not surprising that judges have not always agreed on how these provisions should be applied in given circumstances. The divergence in judicial opinion was described by Mr. Justice Groberman, then of this Court, (BC Supreme Court not BC Court of Appeal) in Law Society of B.C. V Bryfogle, 2006 BCSC 1092 @ [42} from Groberman J.” “In granting this order, I recognize that there is, apparently, some debate as to whether s. 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act prohibits a person from commencing, prosecuting or defending a proceeding as an agent for another person if the person acting is not being paid for that service.” and @ [43] from Yal v Minister of Forests, 2004 BCSC 1253 “Halfyard J. Appears to have assumed that s. 15 (5) does extend that far. More recently, in Law Society of B.C. v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277, Williams J., appears to suggest that it does not.”
88. Justice Grauer writes at Page 8 paragraph (28): “Mr. Justice Groberman preferred Halfyard J.'s Interpretation of the section. An appeal from his decision was dismissed. In its reasons, the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of the proper interpretation of section 15 (5) and preferred not to do so given that it did it not before it the relevant legislation history.”
89. Grauer J. cites cases following the Groberman decision from Dardi J. in Law Society of B.C. V Targosz, 2010 BCSC 969, and by Silverman J. in Woolsey v Dawson Creek (City), 2011 BCSC 986. (ed- this was actually Cullen J.) (Ed: Ultimately an analysis will reveal why so much confusion existed around s 15 (5) of the Legal Profession Act (B.C.). The fact that the section was amended after so many years of confusion in May 2012 just months after the Grauer J., decision given the Court of Appeals refusal to clarify it should suggest the legislation was faulty in terms of its ambiguous language made less clear by the contradictory proposals of section 15 (1) as considered by the Interpretation Act, which renders the section 15 (5) to be impossible to translate literally, particularly as it fails to properly distinguish itself from the practice of law entitling lawyers not person in good standing with the Law Society of B.C., who are assisting other without expectation of a 'fee, gain or benefit', or to its proper and conclusive application to various persons whether they be British Columbians in remote areas (Court Agent Act - “Bryfogle”), (Aboriginal representative- “YAL”) and to matters of decisions made by independent justices as these relate to the actual merits of cases before them).
90. (Argument) -In context of the amended version of section 15 (5) and given the extensive history involving those provisions it must be considered as fact by the length of history of these decisions that 15 (5) in its previous condition and its current form are intended to remain ambiguous to be used by the Law Society of BC as a type of club over the head of persons practicing law legally under the Act who are operating without expectation of 'fee, gain or reward' but whom the Law Society of BC wishes to control at the point of the provincially controlled court registry as part of the agreement with the Attorney General of B.C. , and the Lieutenant Governor in Council who are either Benchers in the self governance model of the Law Society of BC or who are able to make political appointments to the Benchers. The amended language of 15 (5) (May 2012) would have done little more to clarify matters particularly for persons not trained in law (and perhaps more so for some of those who are trained in law) if 15 (1) “practice of law” had not been clarified as well.
91. It is a fact that this confusion has historically permitted the Law Society of BC as in the “Robbins” case, “Bryfogle” and others that the Law Society of BC, aware of circumstances which it believes offend the Legal Profession Act are able to lie in wait (ambush) to petition unsuspecting persons subjected to what appears to be intended ambiguous language from an enactment specifically mandating their society, in order to 'get at' persons accessing justice for others included in the Robbins case his own wife, owner of property in joint tenancy with her mother. In the Robbins case the Bank was offside and neglected to provide notice as it must do under the federal statute.
92. The Foreclosure decision could not be considered res judicata to the lack of notice as the notice does not occur under the foreclosure petition as the former is a breach of the Bank Act (federal jurisdiction under the Canadian Constitution), and the petition and order nisi are derived from the BC Supreme Court Act (provincial).
93. “In Woolsey”.... “the plaintiff, who claimed loss arising from undue delay in the issuance of a building permit, chose to have her son represent her in every way, including speaking on her behalf in court. Her son was not legally trained and assisted his mother without the expectation of a fee, gain or reward. The defendant sought to have the plaintiff's pleadings struck out, and the action was dismissed.” From Grauer J., at (3) “Mr. Justice Silverman found it unnecessary to express any opinion on the merits of the issue of whether the son was practising law in those circumstances. He was content, instead, to abide by the principle of judicial comity set out by Wilson J., as he then was, in Re Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd., (1954) 4 D.L.R. 590 (B.C.S.C.).” Although it was Cullen J., in “Woolsey” the point in this case, and Hansard (by virtue of judicial comity) and the reasons provided by Halfyard J in “YAL” is is clear that justices have made orders based on the merits of the cases before them even when legal authority issues were on the table from the Law Society of BC. This may not make absolute the case that Bryfogle advanced arguing res judicata as Halfyard J pointed out, but it does serve to outline the fact that justices hearing cases before them are independent including independent of the issues raised by the Law Society regarding matters concerning the provincial registry courts and documents filed there.
94. (Argument) The evidence of this separation once again showcases the great distance, indeed the gulf between the events which occur as a consequence of the provincial BC Civil Rules and matters before independent decision makers speaking under the legal principal of right of audience. When and how a particular justice appointed under the Constitution decides to hear from any person is their choice and this is outlined in the Grauer J., case without any doubt or confusion- again at Page 3 beginning paragraph [6] Grauer J., states: “Glen Robbins (sic) has not been practicing law because he has not been charging a fee, and simply stands in the shoes of his family members. Accordingly, the Law Society should leave him alone. It is for the court to decide in its discretion whether it will grant him an audience”, and at para. [7] “It is for the court to decide in its discretion whether it will grant him an audience....”That the court has such discretion, quite apart from anything in the Legal Profession Act, is not in doubt.”
95. Justice Grauer likely mischaracterizes the relevance of Silverman J's., (sic) opinion in Hansard Spruce by suggesting that “the merits of the issue of whether the son was “practicing law” in terms of this case as the Hansard case preceded the changes to the Legal Professions Act in 1955 Act wherein the practice of law was redefined.
96. Justice Grauer at Page 8 paragraph (31) states: “I have had the advantage of the legislative history of the relevant provisions being put before me in the form of the Legal Professions Act, 1895 (S.B.C. 1895, c. 29), and the Legal Professions Act, 1955 (S.B.C. 1955, c. 40).” His Honour writes this after indicating that the BC Court of Appeal had not dealt with the issue, making Grauer J., the most current justice in recent history to deal with these issues,and this application for appeal a proper manifestation of his Reasons, and the admendments which follow his Judgment including the order misrepresented at hearing May 9, 2013 producing the erroneous orders including (1) the order of prohibition against Glen Robbins speaking on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich and the order nisi (substantive) which followed thereafter. Glen Robbins, Ita Robbins and Frana Matich assert that it is a fact that these events form part of a conspiracy to deny them a fair hearing and to cover up systemic mortgage fraud in the province capturing dozens if not hundreds of British Columbia lawyers participating in this mortgage fraud and fraudulent filing of registrations as mortgages of circumstances involving loans not mortgages and loans which are not valid contracts. (Ed: In previous paragraphs herein the applicants provide a more significant history then does Grauer J. particular as this pertains to the separation of solicitor work underscored by Halfyard J., in “Yal” and the right of audience – the application of which must adhere to analysis of the events on May 9, 2013).
97. At page 9 paragraph (34) Grauer J. writes: “By 1955, the distinction between the barrister and that a solicitor was no longer maintained, and the legislation included a definition of “practice of law”. That definition included the same matter I quoted from the current definition, and ended similarly with the proviso that the practice of law does not include 'any such act if not done for or in the expectation of any fee, gain or reward, direct or indirect, from any other person...”
98. The 1955 provisions as they pertain to the practice of law also features the same language we discover in section 15 (5) circa the Grauer J., decision. The history of the evolving legislation ties the 'other person' from 15 (5) to the payment of “fees, gain or reward” language particularized to the “practice of law”. Grauer J. makes note of this at Page 9 paragraph (34) second to last and last line “This appears to have replaced the fee aspect of the former section 74” from the 1895 Act and section 74 provided therein.
99. Here, then, is that paragraph from Law Society of B.C. v. Bryfogle, 2007 BCCA 511 at para [41]: “Finally, I note that Mr. Bryfogle invited this Court to resolve an issue concerning the interpretation of s. 15(5) and related provisions of the LPA and to resolve inconsistent decisions of the B.C. Supreme Court in that regard. In my view, the facts of this case do not require us to resolve that issue and, without the benefit of full argument, including the full legislative history of the provisions in issue, it would be unwise for this Court to embark on that analysis”.
100. (Argument): If Bryfogle did not resolve issues relating to section 15 (5), the Reasons of Grauer J. in Law Society of BC v Glen Robbins, took a further step toward clarification, primarily illuminating that the legislation was written badly and confusing (Ed: the applicants believe in context of the history the confusing language was intended). The events which followed under appeal to BC Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court of Canada (35302), and the further events under H130330 including the misrepresentations of the Grauer J injunction to the court by lawyers Ronald Bakonyi and Robert Ellis and the apparent delusion by Fenlon J. from these 'masterful submissions' (emphasis of sarcasm added) including the courts refusal to read Grauer's Reasons during her one and one half recess, took these historical efforts back a few hundred years.
101. At this juncture of the submissions it is necessary to introduce and to go into some detail of the Yal v. Minister of Forests, 2004 BCSC 1253, Halfyard J. decision. This will involve some 40 paragraphs from that decision with comments underneath where applicable in different font provided as response by the applicant in connecting relevance to matters of BCSC 106413, S111171 (Part 1 – the petition) and BCSC H130330.
102. From paragraph [5] of “YAL” “Action No. 12437 was commenced by petition filed on May 2, 2002 in the Smithers (B.C.) Registry. The petitioners are eight hereditary chiefs of an unstated number of the houses that constitute the Gitxsan Nation of aboriginal people. They sued the Ministry of Forests and the Attorney General of B.C. 'on behalf of themselves an din their capacity as Gitxsan House Chiefs and on behalf of all members of the Gitxsan Houses. ' Thus, the petitioners purported to represent all of the Gitxsan people (“G”). The petition was signed by Gordon Sebastian as solicitor for all of the petitioners.” (Ed: This signature of Gordon Sebastian as it represents the only evidence we have in all cases of clearly identifying what was intended by the provisions of the Legal Profession Act under the authority to practice law. It compares what ws intended to what was confused. Glen Robbins signed his name on behalf of two other persons in the place designated on the Notice of Claim form provided by the Province of British Columbia under his authority to practice law which at the time designated by statute and by inference that Glen Robbins was also a lawyer, so long as he did not practice law in the expectation of a gain or benefit from these actions. Glen Robbins was an entitled to practice law when he signed the notice of claim on behalf of Ita Robbins and Frana Matich as was Gordon Sebastian. The difference was that Gordon Sebastian was entitled and permitted to expect a fee, gain or benefit for his actions.' Glen Robbins was entitled to practice law in perpetual pro bono status).
103. (Argument) Prior to Royal Assent removing the distinction of the practice of law in terms of fees, gains or benefits done in conjunction with the removal of certain language from subsection 15 (5) (enabling that provision to have clear authority over the solicitors role in filing documents {unrelated to right of hearing}) Glen Robbins could practice law. However Glen Robbins was not made aware of the legislative amendments to subsections 15 (1) and 15 (5), whose responsibility was it to inform him, particularly given that the Grauer J decision was traveling through the BC Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada.
104. From paragraph [7] of “YAL” “A hearing of this petition was held before Mr. Justice Tysoe on September 23 to 27, 2002 at Smithers, together with the hearing of similar petitions of the “G” First Nation and the petition of the “L” Indian Band, and the “AT” Tribes Association. In reasons for judgment filed December 10, 2002 Tysoe J., found that all of the petitioning first nations had established a good prima facie claim of aboriginal title and a strong prima facie claim of aboriginal rights to part of the areas claimed by them......He (Tysoe J.) held that the petitioners had established a prima facie infringement of aboriginal title or rights, and that the Minister of Forests had a duty to consult and accommodate the interests of the petitioners before consenting to the change of control. Tysoe, J. further held that the provincial Crown had breached its duty of consultation and accommodation. He refused to quash the Minister's decision to give his consent to the change of control” (from Skeena Cellulose Inc. To NWBC Timber and Timber and Pulp).
105. From paragraph [8] of “YAL” “Action No. 13155 is a petition filed September 22, 2003 at Smithers. The petitioners WII GYET (Lloyd Morrison) and YAL (Aubrey Jackson), “G” hereditary house chiefs, who sued on behalf of themselves and 54 additional petitioners. The respondents are the “G” Government Commission, “G” Treaty Society, “G” Resources Trust, Office of the “G” Hereditary Chiefs, “G” “W” Authority and all of Hazelton, British Columbia. The petition was signed by GYET (Lloyd Morrison) “on behalf of all petitioners”.
106. From paragraph [9] of “YAL” “I would summarize the relief sought in this petition as being an order that the respondents provide an accounting to the petitioners.”
107. From section (3) reference Action No. 13184 and from paragraph [11] of “YAL” “Action No. 13184 was commenced by writ of summons filed October 15, 2003 at Smithers. The plaintiffs are YAL (Aubrey Jackson) on behalf of himself as hereditary chief of the house of YAL on behalf of 55 additional plaintiffs (named in an attached schedule) who are described as hereditary chiefs of “G” houses and “the people of those houses that they represent” ....”T he writ was signed by YAL “for all the plaintiffs. “It appears that no statement of claim has yet been filed in action No. (sic) 13184.” (Ed: This reveals that section 15 (5) is not applicable to the aboriginal persons not lawyers who signed these documents on behalf of others. Why are aboriginal people treated differently than others? Is it because of their capacity as distinct aboriginal nations and recognition of these rights or is it because they come from regions of the province where there aren't sufficient lawyers to meet the requirement of the Court Agent Act?)
108. From section (4) reference Action No 13305 and from paragraph [14] of “YAL” “Action No. 13305 is an action commenced by writ of summons filed November 28, 2008 at Terrace under action No. 13985. The plaintiffs are described in the writ in this way: “YAL (Aubrey Jackson) in his capacity as Hereditary Chief of the “G” House of YAL and on behalf of its members, TSABUX (Wilmer Johnson) in his capacity as Hereditary Chief of the “G” House of TSABUX and on behalf of all its members, and all of the Hereditary Chiefs, their respective Houses and the people of those Houses that they represent as shown on the “Schedule of Plaintiffs” attached hereto.”
109. From paragraph [15] of “YAL” “The writ was signed by Ron Jackson for “YAL” (Aubrey Jackson). Ron Jackson is not a plaintiff in the action, and is not a lawyer.”
110. From paragraph [16] of “YAL” “There are multiple defendants being sued...”
111. From paragraph [17] of “YAL” “The statement of claim was filed together with the writ of summons on November 28, 2003.”
112. From paragraph [23] of “YAL” “A statement of defence was filed in Action No. 13305 on August 9, 2004, on behalf of the “G” Treaty Society (and other persons) (sic)”
113. From paragraph [24] of “YAL” “Action no. 13306 was commenced by a petition filed November 28, 2003, in the Terrace Registry, under number 13986....”. “The style of cause describes the petitioners this way: “WII GYET (Lloyd Morrison) Hereditary Chief of the “G” House of WII GYET of Kispiox British Columbia on his own behalf and on behalf of all of the members of the “G” House of WII GYET....... (plus others including YAL (Aubrey Jackson) (sic)”
114. From paragraph [25] of “YAL” “Schedule 1 contains the names of 60 persons, in addition to WII GYET and YAL. These words appear at the end of he petition. “on behalf of all petitioners by: Petitioners WII GYET (Lloyd Morrison) YAL (Aubrey Jackson). The petition was signed by Ron Jackson “for YAL (Aubrey Jackson)”. There is no signature by or on behalf of Lloyd Morrison, but it appears that he swore the affidavit in support of the petition on November 28, 2003 (which may not have been filed until July 5, 2004.”
115. Described in Halfyard J., decision as: THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS APPLICATION: From paragraph [30] of “YAL” “On January 26, 2004, Madam Justice Satanove made orders which included, among other things: (a) an order that a case management judge be appointed; and (b) that these proceedings all be styled (with specific exceptions) pending a case management conference.”
116. From paragraph [31] “A case management conference was held on June 14, 2004, at which time the applicants (sic), were scheduled for hearing during the week of September 7, 2004. Satanove J's., stay orders were extended until then.”
117. Described in Halfyard J., decision as: THE FIRST GROUND OF THE APPLICATION: From paragraph [33] “Counsel for the applicants submit that s. 15 of the Legal Professions Act is a complete bar to the proceedings, because they are all representative proceedings, and the statute prohibits the commencement or prosecution of such proceedings by any person who is not a practicing lawyer”. “15 (1) No person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law, except (a) a person who is an individual party to a proceeding acting without counsel solely on his or her own behalf, (5) Except as permitted in section (1), a person must not commence, prosecute or defend a proceeding in any court in the person's own name or in the name of another person.” Here then after successive judicial orders section 15 is raised as a bar to further proceedings. (Ed: Why not earlier?)

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